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ABSTRACT
This study examines the case for government intervention on
the tobacco markets in Finland. The research enquiry is split
into three specific sub-questions: (1) Do demand-side market
failures exist in the tobacco markets? (2) Are market
failures quantitatively significant? (3) Are there effective
tools available for government intervention? The study
consists of three closely interconnected parts which aim to
answer these questions.
The first part of the study analyses market failures most
likely to occur in the tobacco markets, as well as outlining
the principal policy responses for remedying them.
Appropriate measures are also derived for evaluating the
welfare implications of intervention separately for each of
the policy tools.
The second part of the study evaluates the main health and
economic consequences of smoking in Finland. Specifically, it
develops a methodology for estimating the institutional and
final external costs of smoking, with varying assumptions
about tobacco addiction and consumer awareness of the health
risks.
The third part of the study examines to what extent the
demand for various tobacco products can be affected by policy
measures; in particular, the possibility of asymmetric demand
responses to changes in prices and income. Furthermore, the
effects of anti-smoking publicity on demand are analysed
explicitly.
The final part of the study summarizes the main findings and
concludes that there may not be a case for government
intervention on the tobacco markets in Finland to correct for
financial externality, though there may be case for
intervention to correct for the caring externality, imperfect
information and tobacco addiction.
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INTRODUCTION
The research question posed by this study is simple: is there
a case for government intervention on the tobacco markets in
Finland? The issue may be approached from the viewpoints of
different disciplines: economics and medical sciences being
most appropriate for designing policy.
The medical approach to smoking is straightforward. Smoking
appears a major contributing factor to illness and premature
death, and various health authorities claim smoking to be the
most important single preventable cause of death (e.g. STM
1987). In the medical approach the key word is health and the
aim of policy is to cut down tobacco consumption in order to
diminish adverse health effects resulting from smoking. The
economic question here is: what are most efficient methods
for influencing the demand for tobacco?
One factor supporting the medical approach is the alleged
diminishing marginal productivity of health care. The health
of populations do not seem to improve at the same pace as
resources devoted to health care increase. Consequently,
health policy makers have started to look beyond health care
for more effective health improvment factors. The economic
question here is: is prevention more efficient than cure in
creating health improvements?
1
Closely related to the health issue is how smoking affects
the utilization of health care services? If smoking causes
ill health it is likely to have an impact on health care
resources. Rapid growth in health expenditure has forced
decision makers to search for efficient cost-containment
measures, prevention being one of the favorite candidates. As
smoking is claimed to contribute to as much as 8-17 % of
health expenditure (e.g. Thompson and Forbes 1983, Collishaw
and Myers 1984) curtailing smoking would appear potentially
effective in containing health care costs.
Government intervention on health grounds may attempt to
reduce or prevent smoking in order to diminish morbidity and
premature mortality, as well as to relieve pressures on
health expenditure. A major problem with the medical approach
is that it completely ignores the consumer orientation.
Curtailing consumption is seen as means to ends other than
consumer satisfaction, such as improved public health or
slackening the rate of growth of health expenditure.
Health is not, however, the only thing consumers value.
Although health is regarded an important part of the
individual's welfare, other things, including smoking,
contribute to this. Like the medical approach, the economic
approach acknowledges that smoking may cause ill health and
therefore decrease welfare, but it also recognizes that
smokers derive satisfaction from their risky activity and
thus improve their well-being. And there are no good reasons
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to ignore this consumption benefit when designing policy
towards smoking.
While health promotion may provide a sufficient case for
intervening on purely paternalistic grounds, welfare
promotion is the main economic criterion for government
intervention in the case of smoking. In the economic approach
the key word is efficiency, with the aim of policy being to
attain the optimum level of tobacco consumption in order to
maximise social welfare.
In order to prove the case for government intervention, the
economic approach would first need to indicate that there are
market failures associated with tobacco consumption which
lead to inefficient allocation of resources (e.g. Leu and
Schaub 1984). This would demonstrate that there may be a case
for intervention. Secondly, it would be required to show that
market failures are quantitatively and economically
significant, which would establish that there may be
potential efficiency gains attainable. Thirdly, it would be
vital to show that the demand for tobacco can be influenced
by means at the government's disposal. This in turn, would
indicate what possibilities there are for intervention.
Finally, in the event of intervention, it needs to be
ascertained that the welfare gains from intervention are
likely to exceed the welfare losses.
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Several studies in various countries have examined smoking-
related health problems from the economic standpoint
indicating the significant social costs which arise from
tobacco smoking (e.g. Collishaw and Myers 1984, Hjalte 1984,
Ellemann-Jensen 1986, Rice et al 1986). Demand for tobacco
products has also been an extensive topic of econometric
research (e.g. Fujii 1980, Lewit and Coate 1982, Leu 1984).
Only a few studies have raised the more profound issue of
whether a case for government intervention on the tobacco
markets exists on any other than purely paternalistic grounds
(e.g. Leu and Schaub 1984, Markandya and Pearce 1989).
Several studies have focused on one of the above
preconditions, but none has covered them all. Costing studies
have concentrated on aspects of the first question while
demand studies have examined the second. Only a few studies
have attempted a broader economic evaluation of the effects
of market intervention (e.g. Godfrey and Maynard 1988).
This study points out the major demand-side market failures
in the tobacco markets and outline specific policy responses
individually for each of the failures to correct them.
Further, measures to determine the welfare effect of
government intervention are derived separately for the main
policy instruments.
Specifically, the study examines the significance of one
likely market failure, financial externality. The study
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applies the framework initially outlined by Atkinson (1974)
and modified by Markandya and Pierce (1989), but extends it
further to include varying assumptions about tobacco
addiction and consumer awareness of the health risks of
smoking. This study may be the first of its kind to examine
economic consequences of smoking empirically from different
economic perspectives. In particular, the study develops a
methodology which allows estimation of the social costs of
smoking falling on different institutions (institutional
externality) and to examine how such costs are eventually
distributed between smokers and non-smokers (final
externality). The demand analysis tests several models
suggested in the literature and outlines the relevant policy
implications.
Purpose and structure of the study
The purpose of the study is to examine the case for
government intervention on the tobacco markets in Finland.
This research enquiry is split into three specific sub-
questions:
(1) Do demand-side market failures exist in the tobacco
markets?
(2) Are market failures quantitatively significant?
5
(3) Are there effective tools available for government
intervention?
This study consists of three closely connected parts which
aim to answer the three study questions. Part I analyses the
likely market failures in the tobacco markets, as well as
outlining the main policy responses to remedy these and
derives appropriate measures for evaluating the welfare
implications of intervention separately for each of the
policy tools.
Part II evaluates the main health and economic consequences
of smoking in Finland. Specifically it develops a methodology
for estimating the institutional and final external costs of
smoking, with varying assumptions about tobacco addiction and
consumer awareness of the health risks.
Part III examines whether the demand for various tobacco
products can be affected by policy measures. In particular,
the study explores the possibility of asymmetric demand
responses to changes in prices and incomes. Furthermore, it
analyses explicitly the effects of anti-smoking publicity and
tobacco advertising bans on demand.
Part IV summarizes the main findings of the study and
concludes with several policy recommendations.
6
Although the study concentrates on tobacco, the approach
outlined here for examining the case for government
intervention is equally suitable, if appropriately modified,
for analysing any activity which generates positive or
negative health consequences, such as sports, nutrition and
use of alcohol.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A normative starting point in economics is to respect the
individual consumer's choices and assume that he knows what
is best for himself. This is known as consumer sovereignty;
the consumer is assumed to strive for maximum satisfaction of
his needs and wants by consuming goods and services. Rational
consumption behaviour means that a consumer chooses that mix
of goods and services which maximizes his well-being or
utility within the bounds of his preferences and income. The
consumer's well-being is maximized when he consumes each
commodity at such a level that his well-being is not improved
by changing the overall structure of his consumption, for
example by consuming more tobacco and less alcohol. With
private consumption optimized thus, the marginal private
benefits and the marginal private cost of consumption are
regarder as equal. Consumption of a particular commodity
implies that some other commodities are left unconsumed. Thus
the very act of smoking reveals that smokers necessarily
derive some benefit from smoking, otherwise they would not
smoke.
It is further assumed that, under certain conditions, free
competitive markets lead to the most efficient allocation of
society's scarce resources. In explaining, efficient
allocation, economists refer to the Pareto principle, which
implies that the allocation of resources is efficient when it
is not possible to improve the welfare of any single
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individual by reallocating resources without worsening the
welfare of some other individual (e.g. Layard and Walters
1978). If such an improvement (called Pareto improvement) is
feasible, resource allocation is inefficient. Inefficiency
implies waste of resources in the sense that it would be
possible to improve the welfare of society at large with the
prevailing resources by reallocation and improved
utilization.
Most economists agree that an economic system based on more
or less free market competition is more efficient in
maximizing social welfare than any form of government
intervention. Competition between private firms for
consumers' favour stimulates firms to provide commodities in
quantities and qualities that are most preferred by
consumers. Firms, striving for maximum profit, have an
economic incentive to produce these commodities at minimum
cost.
If, on the other hand, it can be shown that markets fail to
produce an efficient allocation of resources, there may be a
case for government intervention to improve efficiency. A
case for government intervention, on efficiency grounds, can
be made if the following three conditions are met: 1) there
exists a market failure, 2) a market failure is
quantitatively significant, and 3) government intervention
can help to remedy market failure without generating further
problems elsewhere.
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There appear to be at least four potential market failures in
the tobacco markets:
(1) Externalities in consumption.
(2) Imperfect information.
(3) Dependency.
(4) Inefficient level of prevention.
These potential market failures will be analysed more closely
in chapter two. Significance of market failures is an
empirical matter which will be analysed in part two.
In principle, the feasibility of government intervention
could be evaluated by applying the Pareto principle. However,
this is a strong criterion which is seldom attainable in
practice. For example, Pareto improvement assumes that the
prevailing income distribution persists. Many public projects
affect the income distribution within society and hence
decrease some individuals' welfare. Any government
intervention on the tobacco markets would be unfeasible on
this basis, since it would decrease the welfare of some
smokers and owners of production factors in the tobacco
industry.
For practical policy evaluation, the criterion for approval
of an intervention has been changed to that of potential
Pareto improvement. The intervention would satisfy the
potential Pareto improvement criterion if it could make at
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least someone better off and no one worse off, if those who
gain from the intervention could, at least in principle,
compensate those who lose. Thus the criterion is satisfied if
beneficiaries' gains exceed the amount losers lose.
Potential Pareto improvement is the cornerstone of cost-
benefit analysis which aims to identify projects that satisfy
this criterion. The aim is to maximise the total value of
outputs produced in order to achieve social efficiency. This
differs from the allocative efficiency in that the latter
implies no losers, whereas the pursuit of social efficiency
implies that there can be losers. If there is a potential
Pareto improvement and compensation from beneficiaries to
losers is actually undertaken then social and allocative
efficiency coincide.
In chapter two we shall analyse potential market failures in
the tobacco markets and outline some possible policy options
to remedy them. We shall focus only on the demand side
failures. Supply side failures, such as monopolistic market
structure, are left unexplored. Chapter three introduces the
benefit and cost concepts relevant for analysing smoking from
the economic perspective and for deriving welfare measures of
intervention. In chapter four we shall focus on the welfare
implications of the market failures. Chapter five deals with
the effects of the alternative tools of government
intervention. In the final chapter we shall analyse the
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welfare implications of the intervention and derive measures
of their welfare effects.
The analytical framework developed in this part of the study
will be applied for an empirical analysis of the tobacco
markets in parts two and three. In the second part we shall
analyze the market failures for economic significance. In the
third part we shall explore the availability of effective
tools for the government to intervene with.
15
2 MARKET FAILURES IN THE TOBACCO MARKETS
2.1 Externalities
Externalities refer to harmful or beneficial side effects of
consumption or production of commodities that are borne by
parties not directly involved in the market exchange. Market
demands and supplies of commodities reflect only the benefits
and costs to the participants in the market (consumers,
producers and distributors). Benefits and costs falling on
third parties will not be taken into account when consumption
and production decisions are made. Harmful side effects to
third parties are called external costs and beneficial side
effects external benefits.
Externalities lead to a divergence between private and social
costs and benefits and hence to an inefficient allocation of
resources. In the case of external costs (benefits) the
marginal social costs exceed (fall short of) the marginal
social benefits. As third parties do not pay for external
benefits and they are not compensated for external costs, the
market mechanism fails to produce an efficient allocation of
resources. It leads to over or under consumption/provision of
the commodity in question. Welfare of the society could be
improved by curbing the demand for commodities producing
external costs and stimulating the demand for commodities
creating external benefits.
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The market mechanism is unable to balance social costs and
benefits since parties involved in the market exchange do not
have any incentive to pay for the external costs, and third
parties do not have any incentive to pay for the external
benefits. The situation may be improved by government
intervention, which may include measures, such as taxation,
that feed the necessary cost/benefit information into the
market mechanism.
The benefits of smoking seem to remain entirely with the
consumer and, therefore, there are no significant external
benefits associated with smoking. Thus the social and private
benefits are equal. There are clearly external costs
associated with smoking and, therefore, social and private
costs will diverge. To the extent that the external costs are
not included in the price of tobacco products, the price is
too low and smokers will consume more tobacco than is
socially desirable. Society as a whole would be better off if
consumption were reduced. There appear to be two types of
external costs related to smoking: direct and indirect
externalities in consumption.
2.1.1 Indirect externalities
Indirect consumption externalities refer to all harmful side
effects of smoking to third parties that arise as a result of
smokers' ill health. These may include the additional health
care costs and life insurance premiums non-smokers have to
17
pay due to smoking, and the emotional distress due to
smoker's ill health and premature death. These externalities
do not affect non-smokers directly in the short-run, but only
indirectly in the long-run through hazardous health effects
to smokers. More formally, these effects can be classified
into financial and caring externalities (Culyer 1976, Evans
1984, Mooney 1986).
Financial externality is simple to perceive. Smokers may
impose monetary costs on non-smokers, who have to share the
costs of e.g. health care generated by smoking-induced
illness. Financial externalities may be interpreted as
arising as a moral hazard in the market for life and health
insurance. Since premiums paid by smokers may not fully
reflect their higher probability of illness and death, but
only average risks, smokers do not have financial incentives
to take into account these risks on other insured and
taxpaing individuals in their consumption decisions. In this
case, non-smokers would be collectively justified in
influencing smokers' smoking behaviour.
Since Pigou (1920), financial externality has been a common
argument for warranting government intervention on efficiency
grounds. In the health field, however, this type of
externality may not be as significant as the caring
externality, meaning that individuals care about each other,
and, particularly, about each other's health. The extensive
government provision and subsidy of health care services
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found in most of the developed countries can be interpreted
to reflect people's willingness to pay to reduce distress
caused by the ill health and suffering of others (e.g. Culyer
1976).
The caring externality argument is particularly relevant to
preventive programmes directed at children. An individual's
smoking and other lifestyle decisions are not taken in
isolation. Each individual's lifestyle becomes part of the
environment which affects the decisions of others. The
tendency of smoking behaviour to begin among children in
response to media and peer group pressure (e.g. Rimpela 1981)
and then to become addictive emphasizes the significance of
caring externalities.
Caring externality applies to independent adults as well. If
a non-smoker cares enough about a smoker, or a smoker's
health, to subsidize his health care consumption, then
presumably his interest is equally legitimately reflected in
public programmes to influence smokers' behaviour or
otherwise reduce the probability of smokers falling ill due
to smoking. Few individuals are so isolated that their ill
health or death, especially if premature, is not a cause of
grief to others. To the extent that people are willing to pay
to avoid this grief, prevention of ill health and deaths due
to smoking is justifiable. However, although individuals may
be willing to prevent ill health, they may not be willing to
pay for preventive measures. So, there may be a case for the
19
government to intervene to reduce caring externalities and
force all taxpayers to share the costs of intervention.
The conventional response to negative financial externalities
is some form of tax to equate the marginal social costs with
the marginal social benefits. In this case the government
would rely on the markets' ability to deliver information
about the risks of smoking to consumers and producers through
the price mechanism. Besides taxation, all efficient measures
that will reduce financial externalities will be appropriate,
such as health education, restrictions and improved risk
technology. The caring externality argument leads to the same
policy recommendations, apart from taxation. Taxation would
not be an appropriate tool to correct for caring
externalities since smokers would have to pay for others'
caring. A relevant financial response would be to subsidize
smokers to give up smoking.
Figure 1 represents indirect consumption externalities and
some possible remedies.
2.1.2 Direct externalities
Direct consumption externalities refer to harmful side
effects of smoking to third parties that accrue directly as a
result of smoking. These include health hazards to non-
smokers due to passive smoking as well as other non-health
related financial and non-financial nuisances. Such effects
20
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fall directly on third parties, unlike indirect consumption
externalities which arise indirectly through smokers' ill
health and premature death.
Passive or involuntary smoking appears to exert adverse
health effects on those exposed. For example, maternal
smoking during pregnancy and parental smoking in general are
to some degree hazardous to the child. Smoking during
pregnancy is related to low birth weight, early birth,
stillbirths, and neonatal and perinatal deaths (McIntosh
1984). Several studies have reported a significant
association between the prevalence of respiratory illnesses
(bronchitis and pneumonia) in infants and children and
parental smoking habits (e.g. Liard et al 1982, Ferguson et
al 1981).
Among healthy adults, the most common symptoms arising from
passive smoking are eye irritation, headaches, nasal symptoms
and coughs (USDHEW 1979). There is also some evidence
associating passive smoking with lung cancer (e.g. Hirayama
1981, Trichopoulos et al 1981, Humble et al 1987), but this
link is still in dispute, particularly in men (Vandenbroucke
1988). Other nuisances include costs of firedamage and
cleaning due to smoking.
Appropriate measures to correct direct externalities include
dissemination of information about the risk, restrictions on
consumption and improvements in risk technology. Taxing
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tobacco may not be effective in this case. Risks of passive
smoking may be reduced by informing mothers-to-be and parents
about the risks and restricting smoking in public places and
in public transportation. These measures require minimal
interference with smokers' rights. Direct externalities do
not, however, justify the current extensive intervention
found in many countries.
Figure 2 represents direct consumption externalities and some
possible remedies.
2.2 Imperfect information
The health hazards of smoking are widely publicized and most
individuals know that smoking involves risks to health. It
may be argued that smokers are aware of the risks and take a
calculated risk when they decide to smoke. This may be
interpreted to reveal that smokers consider the benefits they
derive from smoking to exceed the risks involved. Smoking may
be viewed as normal rational consumer behaviour comparable to
other activities involving risks, like cycling or car-driving
where risk is voluntarily assumed. It is clear, however, that
an individual's behaviour can reflect his true preferences
only if he is fully aware of the consequences of his actions.
This means that individuals should have rather accurate
knowledge of the nature and likelihood of the risks involved.
If consumers are unaware of the risks, consumption will be
greater than if they were fully informed.
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At a general level people know and can identify the major
risks of smoking (e.g. Valtonen and Rimpela 1984). It is much
more difficult, if not impossible, for a particular
individual to perceive how hazardous smoking is for himself.
For example, in a representative interview survey of the
Finnish adult population, Valtonen and Rimpela (1984) found
that smokers regarded the general health risks of smoking
more soundly proven than the specific risks closely related
to the respondent's own smoking. Most of the smokers
estimated smoking to have at most only a minor effect on
their own health, and their perceived health risks were not
related to the amount smoked, in contrast to the actual risk.
Lack of risk awareness is mainly related to individuals
ability to perceive small risks, the long latent period
between exposure and ill health, and the gains of quitting.
Although it is not known how accurately individuals can judge
smoking related risks, a study by Lichtenstein et al (1978)
suggests that individuals may systematically under-estimate
the risk of lung cancer, emphysema and heart disease and may
not have accurate knowledge of the risk they face.
Individuals also appear to have great difficulties in
perceiving small risks. Compared to other every-day hazards
such as being run over by a car, the risks of smoking may be
seen as so small and distant that they can be ignored. Health
risks of smoking emerge only after years of continuous
smoking and the risk increases as a function of time smoked,
and hence also as a function of age. Most smokers start
smoking when young (Rimpela 1981) and they may have great
difficulties in understanding the ultimate consequences of
their initial consumption decision.
Unlike the situation with most other commodities, it is very
difficult to learn from one's own or another's smoking
experiences, and to experiment with the beneficial and
harmful effects of smoking as is possible for example with
medicines. Benefits and side effects of medicine usually
appear after a relatively short usage. If side effects
emerge, it is possible to try another medicine. The benefits
of smoking are experienced instantly, whereas the possible
health hazards appear only after years of continuous smoking
when it may already be too late to give up.
Hazards due to other common risks, like cycling and car-
driving, fall on identifiable individuals and are commonly
reported in the mass media. Smoking hazards also fall on
individuals, but apart from smoking-related fires, it is
usually impossible to identify the individuals affected. The
hazards of smoking fall on 'statistical' individuals who do
exist, but cannot be identified with certainty. Therefore,
many of the hazardous consequences of smoking may be
completely invisible to the public at large.
It is not clear how significant the lack of risk awareness
is. A case can be made, however, that markets do not provide
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sufficient information about the risks of smoking. Due to
externalities, the price of tobacco may not fully reflect all
the costs of consumption. On the other hand, markets do not
provide enough information about the hazards of smoking. The
tobacco industry and trade do not have any economic incentive
to inform consumers about the risks of smoking, but every
reason to suppress, belittle and contradict such information.
Since tobacco does not have close substitutes, competing
industries do not have any incentive to provide information
about the risks of smoking. Therefore, a case can be made for
government intervention to supply such information. This can
take various forms, including tobacco taxation.
Although an individual smoker's risk of contracting a
smoking-induced illness is fairly small, it may be
significant from the point of view of society. Individuals
may have difficulty in assessing how smoking affectst heir
own health. When the government has superior information
about the risks, there is a legitimate basis for
intervention. Government agencies have greater possibilities
to pool information from different sources, to increase the
precision of their risk judgements and to interpret the
implications of the available scientific evidence more
accurately to individuals and society at large. Thus
government should provide more information and diminish
consumers' unawareness of the health risks of smoking, thus
enabling consumers to make more informed judgements about the
consequences of their choices.
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It may not be sufficient, however, to restrict intervention
only to the provision of information. Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) suggest that most individuals prefer certain to
uncertain gains, but prefer uncertainty to certainty with
respect to losses. Such asymmetry in risk aversion may have
important consequences for smoking prevention. Consider a
smoker contemplating giving up smoking, and hence some
pleasure. The immediate action involves a certain loss, but
his future gain is quite uncertain even though it may be
highly predictable, on a large population level. Thus, the
stronger the individual's asymmetry with respect to
uncertainty, the less likely he will be to give up smoking.
The uncertainty element is probably large in the case of
giving up smoking. Even the best information available
indicates only the average expected benefits from such health
investment. The return to any individual is highly uncertain.
For example, only a minority of smokers will contract lung
cancer or coronary heart disease, while giving up smoking
does not provide a guarantee against these diseases.
Since provision of information may be costly and not very
effective, one way to inform smokers about the risks is to
tax tobacco to the extent that social costs and social
benefits of smoking will be equal.
Figure 3 represents imperfect information and some possible
remedies.
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2.3 Dependency
Two types of dependency are associated with smoking: the
smoking habit and tobacco addiction. The borderline between
habit and addiction may be difficult to draw, but in
practice, addiction can be assumed when individuals wanting
to abandon the habit cannot do so. Therefore, the distinction
between habit and addiction may be defined as follows. If an
individual wanting to change a habit, e.g. give up smoking,is
able to do so then the dependency may be termed a habit. If,
on the other hand, the individual is unable to give up the
habit then the dependency may be called an addiction.
Extensive behavioural and psychological research demonstrates
that smoking, once established as a habit, is extremely
persistent and resistant to change (USDHEW 1979). This may
not, however, be typical only to smoking. Some economists
argue that habit formation is a rather universal phenomenon
(e.g. Scitovsky 1976) and in this respect smoking does not
differ from other everyday activities like drinking coffee or
watching television. Habit formation, as such, is not the
problem. Littlechild and Wiseman (1984) illustrate this with
an example taken from classical music. One may acquire a
taste for classical music as a result of repeated listening
to it. Such changes are often deliberately cultivated, and
there is no reason to believe that the individual's ability
to choose is at all impaired. It is just that different
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choices are made as a result of experience. No government
intervention is called for in such cases.
Another case arises when the use of a substance results in
addiction. Insofar as the psychological or physiological
dependency on tobacco products prevents the smoker from
choosing freely whether and how much he wants to smoke,
addiction interferes with the basic rationality postulate of
consumer theory and hence constitutes a market failure.
A crucial issue is how severe a problem addiction is and
hence how important a source of market failure. In a recent
Finnish health survey 20 per cent of current smokers claimed
to have attempted to stop smoking during the previous six
months without success (Vohlonen 1989), severe withdrawal
symptoms being one of the major reasons for failure. Thus,
tobacco addiction may be a source of a significant market
failure. If that is the case, two questions arise: what
society should do in order to help the addicted to abandon
the habit, and how far society should attempt to prevent
individuals from becoming addicted in the first place.
Helping addicts to give up smoking may include public
provision or subsidy of smoking cessation programmes and
subsidies to the tobacco industry to remove addicted
substances from tobacco. In order to prevent addiction,
government may launch health education programmes, set
restrictions on advertising of tobacco products and restrict
sale of tobacco to minors. The government may also use tax
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measures to deter minors from taking up smoking and thus
prevent them becoming addicted. Taxation would, however,
reduce the welfare of those who continue to smoke. The
changing risk technology would involve creation of incentives
to the tobacco industry to remove addictive substances from
tobacco products.
Figure 4 represents smoking dependency and some possible
remedies.
2.4 Inefficient level of prevention
Prevention of smoking refers to a whole range of activities
that may help individuals and society avoid the harmful
effects of smoking (e.g. health education, restrictions and
taxation). Preventive measures may be effective in reducing
the social costs of smoking, but the public good aspect of
prevention and related externalities may lead to a situation
where markets may provide too little prevention even if it
would be socially efficient to prevent smoking.
Public (or social) goods refers to commodities which are not
provided, or not in sufficient quantities, by the market
because of two characteristics: non-exclusion and non-rival
consumption (e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980). Non-exclusion
means that once the good is provided for some individuals, it
is impossible or at least very costly to exclude others from
benefiting from it. Non-rival consumption means that many
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individuals may simultaneously consume the same good without
diminishing its availability to others.
Smoking prevention, particularly the provision of information
about the health risks of smoking, clearly has
characteristics of a public good. If risk information is
provided for one individual, there is no way in which others
can be prevented from consuming it as well. Nevertheless,
consumption of risk information by one individual does not
reduce the amount available for consumption by others. The
marginal cost of supplying a fixed quantity of information
about the health risks of smoking to another individual is
also likely to be small.
On the other hand, it may be impossible or extremely costly
to charge those who would benefit from private preventive
programmes. Effective preventive measures may discourage some
smokers from smoking, thus reducing the social costs of
smoking and hence benefiting each taxpayer. However, no
single taxpayer would be willing, on purely economic grounds,
to finance such campaigns voluntarily since he would have to
bear the full implementation costs while the benefits would
be spread over all taxpayers (free rider problem). For this
reason there will be no extensive private demand for such
programmes, and the market does not provide them. Therefore,
it may be necessary for the government to intervene and less
costly to force every taxpayer to contribute to the
implementation costs.
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2.5 Conclusions
The preceding discussion indicates that due to market
failures free competitive tobacco markets may lead to an
inefficient allocation of resources. Consumption
externalities, imperfect information about the health risks,
smoking dependency and inefficient levels of prevention may
lead to a situation where free competitive tobacco markets
may create external costs to third parties and may not
maximize smokers' and nonsmokers' welfare. Therefore, if left
alone, the competitive markets may fail to produce an
efficient allocation of resources and thus there may also be
a case for the government to intervene in tobacco markets on
other than purely paternalistic grounds.
Existence of a market failure is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for government intervention. A further
condition is that market failure is quantitatively
significant. This can be assessed by analysing the social
benefits and social costs of smoking. Another condition is
that the government has effective tools to intervene.
The most commmonly used intervention tools include taxing
tobacco, health education campaigns, restrictions on
availability, provision and advertising of tobacco,
improvements in risk technology and financial subsidies to
smokers and firms.
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It is important to recognize that the choice of an
appropriate tool depends on the market failure government
wants to remedy (Figure 5). If the main concern is financial
externality, prevention of addiction or an inefficient level
of prevention, then taxation, health education; restrictions
and improvements in risk technology will be appropriate. If
the government attempts to diminish caring externality then
health education, restrictions, improvements in risk
technology and subsidies will be suitable. The same measures,
excluding subsidies, are appropriate for correcting direct
consumption externalities. Market failure due to imperfect
information may be corrected by health education and
taxation. If the government attempts to help addicts free
themselves of dependency, then improvements in risk
technology, subsidies to smokers wanting to give up and firms
helping smokers in their endeavour will all be suitable
measures to take.
The relative efficiency of intervention measures in remedying
each of the market failures can be evaluated by cost-
effectiveness analysis, where effectiveness is defined in
relation to the objectives of the intervention (e.g. Sintonen
1981). If the government is concerned how best to help
addicts to give up smoking, then the relative efficiency of
reimbursing smokers to give up compared with subsidizing
smoking cessation clinics to supply their services free of
charge or at reduced price, or subsidizing the tobacco
industry to produce a non-addictive tobacco, can be evaluated
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by comparing the costs of each option by relative success
rates. Options can then be compared and ranked according to
their cost-effectiveness. An option will be technically
efficient and preferable to other options if it maximises the
benefit obtainable from the given budget or minimises the
cost of attaining the given objective.
Most of the intervention measures also influence other market
failures and may have desirable or undesirable effects on
other parts of the economy if they affect employment,
inflation and income distribution (Figure 5). For example,
improved risk technology may, apart from relieving
dependency, reduce financial, caring and direct consumption
externalities. In order to assess the relative merits of
intervention it may, therefore, be preferable to evaluate the
social efficiency of intervention which involves estimating
the costs and benefits of each option in monetary terms (e.g.
Sintonen 1981). If the net welfare gain is positive, e.g.
benefits exceed costs, the option will be socially efficient.
If a choice must be made between several mutually exclusive
options, the one with the largest net welfare gain will be
preferred.
In chapter three we shall derive the cost and benefit
concepts relevant to an economic analysis of smoking. In
chapters four to six we shall derive the appropriate welfare
measures for each of the intervention measures.
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3 COST AND BENEFIT CONCEPTS RELEVANT TO SMOKING
3.1 Introduction
Conceptually it is simple to define the social costs of
smoking as the total costs of smoking to the whole of
society. In practice, however, the term social costs is used
inconsistently. Some researchers speak of social costs when
they mean external costs (e.g. Markandya and Pearce 1989),
and some use the terms the other way round. Confusion is
compounded by the yet unestablished use of concepts such as
resource costs, economic costs (e.g. Rice et al 1986) or
simply costs (e.g. Thompson and Forbes 1982, Hjalte 1984) of
smoking to indicate a subset of social costs that arise as a
result of smoking. Usually no attempt is made to relate these
or other related concepts to external costs. In this chapter
we shall define the cost and benefit concepts that will be
used throughout this study.
3.2 Private costs
Private costs of consumption ( PC) per unit consumed are made
up of three components: price of tobacco (P), and perceived
(CRp ) and unperceived (CRup ) costs of health risks of smoking,
which depend on the amount of tobacco smoked. The perceived
cost CRp is the psychological cost a smoker attaches to each
amount of tobacco consumed, knowing that smoking can be
hazardous to his health in the long-run. CR p
 includes all
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other costs of smoking besides the price of tobacco that the
smoker believes to fall on him as a result of smoking, e.g.
health care costs, lost earnings and risk of ill health and
premature death. The unperceived cost CRup represents all
costs of smoking falling on a smoker that he is not aware of.
The sum of CRp and CRup represents the private costs of health
risk of smoking (CR) to a smoker per unit consumed. Hence the
private cost of smoking equals
PC = P + CRp + CRup
= P + CR.
The price of tobacco (P) is made up of taxes (T), production
costs (PRC) and costs of distribution (DC):
P = T + PRC + DC.
The private costs per unit consumed can now be redefined as
PC = T + PRC + DC + CR.
Taxes and other components of the unit price are assumed to
be constant over the relevant range of consumption.
Epidemilogic evidence suggests (e.g. USDHEW 1979) and it is
also commonly perceived (e.g. Valtonen and Rimpeld 1984) that
the more one smokes the more likely he is to experience
smoking related health problems. Therefore, marginal private
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costs of health risks of smoking (MCR) are assumed to
increase as a function of the amount consumed.
3.3 Social costs and external costs
Social costs of smoking (SC) can be defined as the total
costs of smoking to the whole society. Since Pigou (1920) the
divergence between the social and private costs have been
called external costs (EXC):
SC - PC = EXC.
External costs arise whenever consumption or production
activity creates adverse effects on third parties which are
not compensated for. In the absence of external costs, social
costs equal private costs. Negative external costs are called
external benefits. As most of the external costs of smoking
are due to smoking related health risks, it is likely that
the marginal external costs (MEXC) will increase as the
amount of tobacco consumed increases.
In the absence of costs other than price to consumers, the
difference between social costs and price gives the external
costs per unit consumed
SC - P = EXC.
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If consumers have to incur other costs besides the price this
identity does not hold. In the case of smoking
Sc - P = EXC + CR.
As the CR is assumed to be positive over the relevant range
of consumption it is likely that
SC - P > EXC.
The external costs and private costs of health risks of
smoking can be decomposed into monetary (m) and intangible
(i) costs:
CR	 = CRm + CRI
EXC = EXCrn
 + EXCi.
Monetary costs are measured in monetary terms. Intangibles
are costs that cannot be measured or are not favoured to be
expressed in monetary terms. The distinction between monetary
and intangible costs largely depends on the state of the art
in measuring and valuing cost components which do not have
market price.
The monetary costs can further be sub-divided into direct
(md) and indirect costs (mi)
CR°	 = CR'd + CRmi
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EXC' = EXC'd +
Direct costs mainly comprise costs of prevention, treatment
and rehabilitation for smoking related illnesses. Indirect
costs consist mainly of the value of lost health resulting
from smoking related morbidity and mortality. Direct cost
reflect the true financial burden of treating illnesses
falling on society. Indirect costs are based on imputed
values.
The social costs can now be redefined as
SC = P + CR"cl + CRtm1 + CRi + EXC rnd + EXCrni + EXCi
and rearranging terms
SC - P = CR" cl + CRWI + EXC'd + EXC rni
 + CRi
 + EXCi.
3.4 Economic costs and adverse costs
The commonly estimated economic costs (EC), resource costs or
simply costs of smoking (e.g. Shillington 1977, Luce and
Schweitzer 1978, Thompson and Forbes 1982, Collishaw and
Myers 1984, Hjalte 1984, Ellemann-Jensen 1986, Rice et al
1986) are the sum of monetary external costs and monetary
private costs of health risks of smoking
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EC = CRm + EXCm
= CRmd + CRmi + EXCmd + EXCmi.
It is clear that economic costs do not measure social costs
nor external costs. As economic costs also include costs that
fall on smokers themselves it is obvious that external costs
are only a sub-set of economic costs. Social costs and
external costs can be defined with the help of economic costs
as follows
SC = EC + P + CR i
 + EXCi
EXC = EC + EXCi - CRmd - CRmi .
By redefining the divergence between the social costs and
price in terms of economic costs
SC - P	 = EC + CRi + EXCi
= CRm + EXCm + CRi + EXCi
it seems obvious that earlier cost of smoking studies have
used a cost concept that is not strictly related to external
costs. The estimates exclude intangibles and include monetary
costs of smoking falling both on smokers and third parties.
Even the estimated monetary costs are only partially external
since some of them are borne by smokers.
Because, in the case of tobacco, we cannot refer to the
divergence between the social cost and the price as external
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cost, and as the concept of economic cost only partially
covers the difference, we use the concept adverse costs (ADC)
to indicate the value of the adverse effects of smoking to
both third parties (EXC) and to smokers (CR)
ADC = SC - P
= CR + EXC
= CRm + CRi + EXCrn + EXC.
Figure 6 indicates the relationship of the different cost
concepts developed above. An attempt to estimate the various
components of the adverse costs is made in part two.
3.5 Institutional and final external costs
Having estimated either the adverse costs or economic costs
of smoking the next question is how to isolate the external
costs from the rest, i.e. how to estimate the EXCm + EXC I in
ADC = CRm + CRI + EXCm + EXCi
or EXCm in
EC = CRm + EXCm.
The extent to which the ADC or EC reflects true external
costs depends on institutional arrangements. For example, if
patients have to pay all the medical treatment costs in full
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without being reimbursed then all the health care costs of
smoking would be borne by smokers and third parties would be
unaffected. All costs would be private and there would be no
external costs. If compensation is paid and funded by
payments from third parties, then there will be external
costs.
Assuming we have estimated the economic costs, then the
external costs are the difference between the total economic
costs and the economic costs borne by smokers
EXCm
 = EC - CRm.
It is obvious that both the magnitude of external costs and
the ratio between external and economic costs depends on how
the cost component CR is defined. We have two options here.
We can either assume that
(i) the CR includes only the direct monetary losses
suffered by smokers (e.g. out-of-pocket payments for
medical treatment), or that
(ii) the CR also includes smokers' contributions to the
financing of the health care services, social security
and other relevant institutions affected.
The external costs are clearly greater in the former case.
The latter, however, is the more appropriate approach, since
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it recognizes the fact that smokers also contribute to the
financing of the institutions concerned. Smokers use e.g.
health care services and finance them together with non-
smokers. The first option implicitly assumes that the only
cost to smokers is out-of-pocket-payments, while the
remainder is financed by non-smokers. The first option (i)
characterizes externalities from the viewpoint of various
institutions and these can therefore be called institutional
externalities. The second option (ii) demonstrates how costs
are distributed between smokers and non-smokers and can
therefore be termed final externalities.
It is not clear which of these two options researchers into
the costs of smoking have had in mind. A cautious
interpretation would suggest writers to be in favour of the
institutional externalities approach. We shall adopt here the
second option, however, since there are no good reasons for
ignoring smokers' contributions to the financing of the
institutions concerned.
3.6 Private and social benefits
The jobs created in the tobacco industry and trade, as well
as the tax revenues received by the state, are often
interpeted as social benefits of smoking. In economics,
however, benefits can only be assessed in relation to
consumers' satisfaction or utility. In an efficient economic
system, allocation of resources eventually adapts to consumer
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preferences rather than the other way round. The change in
consumer preferences manifests in the change of demand and
thereby in the demand for labour and income within different
production sectors. When the demand for a product decreases,
it is likely that consumers spend their money thus released
on other commodities, thus increasing the demand for labour
and income in respective production sectors.
Tax revenues derived from tobacco by the state represent a
transfer of income from smokers to the state. Taxes are used
to redistribute income between the private and the public
sector and, as such, do not increase the consumption
potential of society as a whole. Tobacco excise can, however,
be interpreted to offset the external costs of smoking.
The real benefits of smoking are the satisfaction of needs or
the utility which consumers derive from smoking. The minimum
of these benefits can be crudely estimated by consumer
expenditure on tobacco, which reflects consumers' aggregate
willingness to pay for obtaining the benefits associated with
smoking. In practice, this approach is not completely
satisfactory, since it ignores any effects of possible
imperfect information and the existence of dependency, and
does not account for consumer surplus.
The benefits of smoking seem to rest entirely with smokers.
Therefore, it is likely that there are no significant
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external benefits, and thus the social benefits of smoking
will be equal to the private benefits.
3.7 Private consumption equilibrium
In economics, consumers are assumed to consume each product
in the quantity that equates the marginal private benefits
(MPB) with the perceived marginal private costs (MPC * ). Hence,
at optimum consumption, MPB = MPC* . The perceived marginal
private costs reflect the costs of consumption to the
consumer that he is aware of. As was noted earlier, however,
these may not, represent the full cost of consumption to the
consumer, since he may incur some costs that he is unaware
of. The true marginal private cost (MPC) is made up of three
components: the money price of tobacco (P) and the marginal
private costs of health risks of smoking, which may be
perceived (MCRp ) or not perceived (MCRup ) by the smoker
MPC = P + MCRp
 + MCRup
= MPC* + MCRup.
This distinction between the perceived and unperceived costs
is important since it is the perceived marginal cost that
determines an individual's actions (cf. Markandya and Pearce
1989). For the sake of analysis we assume that smokers
perceive the private costs fully, e.g. we assume that MPC =
MPC*
 and MCRup
 = 0. Hence the private consumption optimum will
be where MPB = MPC*.
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4 IMPLICATIONS OF MARKET FAILURES IN THE TOBACCO MARKETS
4.1 Introduction
In chapter two we introduced four potential market failures
in the tobacco markets which may lead to inefficient
allocation of resources. Market failures lead to a situation
where the market demand for tobacco is greater than is
socially optimal. As the demand effects of all potential
market failures are similar it is sufficient to outline their
welfare effects by illustrating one of them. For the sake of
analysis we shall focus on the welfare effects of external
costs. These generalized conclusions are equally appicable to
other market failures, since this analysis will highlight the
effects both on external costs and perceived costs of smoking
which are affected by all such failures.
4.2 Welfare implications of market failures
In the absence of external costs of smoking the marginal
social costs (MSC) will be equal to the marginal private
costs
MSC = MPC = P + MCRp.
Also, the marginal private benefits and marginal social
benefits (MSB) will be equal
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MSB = MPB = P + MCRp = MSC.
When consumption creates external costs (MEXC > 0), marginal
social costs will exceed the marginal private costs. This can
be shown by a simple diagram (Figure 7). The vertical axis
measures marginal costs and marginal benefits of smoking, and
the horizontal axis the quantity of tobacco consumed.
It is natural to assume that the marginal private benefits
will fall as the quantity of tobacco consumed increases. This
reflects the decreasing marginal utility of consumption:
individuals can increase their well-being by consuming more,
but the marginal increase in well-being derived by an
increase in consumption is decreasing. Therefore the marginal
benefit curve in figure 7 slopes downwards. The area under
the MPB curve represents the total value consumers attach to
each level of consumption. It indicates consumers'
willingness to pay for each quantity of tobacco consumed.
The marginal private costs will be equal to the marginal
private benefits only for the last unit consumed. For the
last and all previous units consumed, the total private costs
of consumption are less than the total private benefits from
that consumption. The area between the MPB and the MPC curves
represents the total consumers' surplus associated with each
consumption level.
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The money price of tobacco is assumed to be constant over the
relevant range of consumption. The perceived marginal costs
of health risks of smoking, and hence the marginal private
costs, are assumed to be an increasing function of
consumption. The marginal external costs are also assumed to
rise as a function of consumption. The marginal social costs
are the sum of marginal private costs and external costs
MSC = MPC + MEXC.
In the absence of government intervention, smokers will
consume an amount Qp of tobacco, which equates the marginal
private benefits and costs (EG in Figure 7). At Qp the
marginal social costs (EH) exceed the marginal private costs
because of the external costs of consumption (GH). Society as
a whole would be better off if consumption were reduced. The
socially optimal level of consumption is where the marginal
social benefits equal the marginal social costs. Assuming
that smoking does not create marginal external benefits to
third parties, marginal social benefits are equal to marginal
private benefits. Then the socially optimal level of
consumption is Qs , where marginal private benefits equal
marginal social costs (AD).
By reducing their consumption, from the current level Qp to
the socially optimal level Q s , smokers will lose part of the
consumer surplus (ACS) equal to
54
Op
Acs = f (MPB(Q) - MPC(Q))dQ
Q.
which equals the area CDG in figure 7. This represents the
loss of smokers' welfare resulting from reduced consumption.
On the other hand, smokers benefit from reduced smoking by an
amount of the decreased perceived costs of health risks of
smoking (ACRp ) equal to
Op
ACRp = f MCRp (Q )dQ
Os
Op
= f (MPC(Q) - P}dQ.
Os
This is equal to the area BCGF in figure 7.
The net welfare effect to smokers (AWs ) from reduced smoking
is the difference between smokers' gains and losses, i.e.
(1) Aw s = ACRp - Acs.
Third parties gain an amount equal to the reduction in
external costs associated with a fall in consumption (area
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CDHG). More formally the reduction in external costs (AEXC)
is
Qs
(2) AEXC = f MEXC(Q)dQ
Q s
Qp
= f (MSC(Q) - MPC(Q))dQ.
Qs
This represents the original welfare loss to third parties
resulting from market failures. The net welfare gain to
society is the sum of the gains to smokers and to third
parties minus the loss in smokers' welfare. The sum of (1)
and (2) indicates the net welfare gain to society (A14)
resulting from reduction in consumption from Q p to Q„ i.e.
(3) Ala = AEXC + ACRp - ACS
f fmsc (Q) - MPC(Q)}dQ +	 (MPC(Q) - P)dQ
Qs	 Qs
QD
- f{MPB(Q) - MPC(Q))dQ
Qs
Q
= f(MSC(Q) + MPC(Q) - MPB(Q) - P)dQ
Qs
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which is equal to area DHG + BCGF in figure 7. This
represents the total original welfare loss due to market
failures that could potentially be eliminated by government
intervention.
4.3 Welfare effects of reduced smoking
It is worth noting that the socially optimal level of
consumption is not zero, but the level where marginal private
benefits equal marginal social costs, i.e. Q s in figure 7. The
failure to recognize this and to call for outright
eradication of smoking is obviously based on notion that
smoking causes external costs to third parties but no
benefits to smokers, i.e. MEXC > 0 and MPB = 0 for all Q. The
latter assumption is clearly not justified, since smokers
presumably derive some benefit from smoking, otherwise they
would not smoke. An alternative justification for eradication
is if the benefits of smoking are constant over the relevant
range of consumption, i.e. if the marginal benefit curve is
horizontal. In either case (MPB = 0 or MPB = constant) the
socially optimal level of consumption is zero. The welfare
gains resulting from eradication differ, however.
If smokers derive no benefit from smoking, but are forced to
smoke, then, besides the external costs, smokers' expenditure
on tobacco as well as other costs born by smokers also
represent a welfare loss to society (cf. Atkinson and Meade
1974). Society would be better off by the amount spent on
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tobacco plus the external and perceived costs of health risks
of smoking if smoking was eradicated. In this case the
welfare gains of eradication are
Qp
(4) Ale	 (MPC(Q) + MEXC(Q)}dQ
0
= j (MCRp (Q) + MEXC(Q) + P)dQ.
0
In figure 8 this equals the area OAEB.
If, on the other hand, smokers do derive benefit from
smoking, but the size of the benefit does not depend on the
amount consumed, the socially optimal level of consumption is
again zero. That is the only level of consumption where the
marginal social costs equal marginal private (social)
benefits. In this case, it is reasonable to assume that the
marginal private benefits equal the price of tobacco. The
welfare gains of eradication will be smaller than in the case
of zero consumption benefits. Gains to third parties equal
the reduction in the external costs (area AED). As there is
no consumer surplus, there will be no loss in smokers'
welfare due to this reason. Smokers welfare will improve by
the amount equal to the reduction in the perceived costs of
health risks of smoking (area ADC). Welfare gains to society
resulting from eradication of smoking will be the sum of the
gains to third parties and to smokers, i.e.
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Qp
(5)
	
Ale*	 f (MEXC(Q) + MCRI,(Q))dQ
0
9A.j (MSC(Q) - P)dQ.
In figure 8 this equals the area AEC.
It is clear from (3)-(5) that, even if applied to estimate
the welfare gains of a less dramatic reduction in smoking
than complete eradication, such as movement from 402, to Qs in
figure 7, the three welfare criteria will produce different
estimates. In general the magnitude of the estimated welfare
gains are likely to be in the following order
< Alor < Ale .
Economists tend to follow criteria more in line with Aw (e.g.
Leu and Schaub 1984), whereas the medical profession tends to
be more in favour of AlAr (e.g. Thompson and Forbes 1982).
4.4 Conclusions
Information requirements arising from the above discussion
fall into three categories depending on the question under
consideration:
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(1) In order to evaluate the socially optimal level of
consumption, information on the marginal external
costs and on the marginal private costs and benefits
is required.
(2) To justify government intervention on efficiency
grounds information on external costs is needed.
(3) To determine the optimal extent of government
intervention information on the welfare gains and
costs of intervention is essential. This includes data
on the likely changes in external and perceived costs
of health risks of smoking and in consumer surplus,
and information on the costs of intervention itself.
Part two will attempt to provide some of the information
required.
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5 METHODS OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
5.1 Introduction
The government can take a variety of steps to remedy market
failures and to bring the level of consumption of tobacco
down to its socially optimal level. It has four main options
available:
(1) taxation on tobacco,
(2) health education,
(3) restrictions on consumption, and
(4) improvements in risk technology.
This chapter will focus on the effects of these options. Each
option will be examined in turn.
5.2 Taxation
In this case the social optimum can be achieved by setting
tobacco tax at a level where the marginal social benefits
equal the marginal social costs. In figure 7, the optimal
tobacco tax would be set at CD per unit of tobacco. The tax
would raise the marginal private costs from EG to AD and
reduce the private consumption optimum from Qp down to the
social optimum Qs.
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It is important to note that ideally the optimal tax rate
should be set in relation to the marginal external cost at
the social consumption optimum Q s and not in relation to the
marginal external cost at the current consumption level Q.
The optimal tax per unit equals the marginal external cost
per unit at Qp only if MEXC is constant over the relevant
range of consumption. Otherwise, the optimal tax per unit is
less than the marginal external cost at Q. Only if the
marginal external costs are decreasing over the relevant
range of consumption is the optimal tax greater at Q s than at
Q . In the case of tobacco the assumption of falling marginal
external costs can be safely ruled out.
It is also worth noting that there will be costs to third
parties even when the optimal tax is levied at the social
consumption optimum Q. The costs to third parties will be
equal to CD in figure 7. Interpretation of these costs is not
always unambiguous. In welfare economics these costs would
not be called external costs since smokers compensate for
them to third parties, at least in principle, by paying a tax
per unit that equals precisely the cost CD. However, only if
the tax is earmarked and used to compensate third parties
fully do no problems arise. Taxes that are not earmarked
raise a distributive dilemma. If the government does not
compensate the third parties they still have to bear the
costs despite the tax. Government receives the tax revenue,
while the third parties have to bear the costs. Here we shall
call the costs to third parties as the optimal external cost
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per unit of consumption. The total amount of the optimal
external costs (EXC°) to third parties at the social optimum
is given by
Qs
EXC° = 5 MEXC(Q)dQ.
0
5.3 Health education
Health education attempts to alter consumers' perception of
the benefits attached to consumption of hazardous or
beneficial goods. Technically, smoking related health
education aims to shift the marginal private benefit schedule
MPB so that the new MPB schedule cuts the marginal private
cost schedule MPC at point C in figure 7. When consumption
falls from Qp to Qs the marginal external costs are reduced
from GH to CD.
Now three points are worth noting. First, it is indeed
possible to reduce external costs via health education by
altering smokers' perception of the marginal private benefits
of smoking. Second, it is never possible to internalize
external costs by health education. Third parties are better
off by the amount equal to the reduction in external costs,
but even at the new level of consumption Q. the divergence
between the marginal social and private costs remains (CD in
figure 7). This is because smokers do not compensate for the
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loss they cause to third parties. Third, the socially optimal
level of consumption can never be secured by health education
alone. Due to health education the social optimum is
continously shifting. In fact, the social opimum is reached
only when consumption is zero. That is the only level of con-
sumption where there is no divergence between the marginal
social and private costs. This can be seen from figure 9.
Assume that health education has shifted the marginal private
benefit schedule from MPB to MPH* so that the MPB* schedule
cuts the MPC schedule at point E. With their new preference,
smokers voluntarily choose to consume the socially optimal
amount Qs of tobacco. When consumption is reduced from Qp to
Qs via health education, losses to third parties will fall
from HI to EF per unit of tobacco consumed. Moreover, the
marginal private costs at Qs are CE which fall short of the
marginal social costs CF by the amount EF. The latter there-
fore represents the welfare loss to third parties at the new
consumption level Q. Therefore Q s clearly cannot be the
socially optimal level of consumption. The optimal level of
consumption with consumers' new preferences is Q: (< Q s ) in
figure 9, where the marginal private benefits equal the
marginal social costs.
The government can attempt to reach the new optimum by
launching a new health education programme, but then again if
the programme is effective the social optimum will shift to a
lower level of consumption than Q:. Thus it is not possible
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to attain the social optimum by health education alone. Only
if accompanied by taxation or restrictions can the social
optimum be reached. The new optimum Q8* 	 be attained by
setting a tax per unit equal to the marginal external costs
at Q:, i.e. equal to AB. Thus, health education needs to be
supported by taxation or restrictions in order to achieve the
socially optimal level of consumption.
5.4 Restrictions
The government can try to achieve the socially optimal level
of consumption by restricting consumption directly to the
optimal level, e.g. by rationing the maximum number of
cigarettes sold to X packs per time unit per consumer. If the
government succeeds in its attempt, the welfare implications
are the same as in the health education option. The social
consumption optimum does not shift continuously in this case,
however. In the social consumption optimum Q,, in figure 7,
the marginal social costs and benefits are equal to AD. There
will still be divergence between the marginal social and
private costs at the optimal consumption level Q, equal to CD.
This can be interpreted to represent indirect subsidy to
smokers from third parties since they are willing or forced
to accept that amount of external cost.
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5.5 Improvements in risk technology
In this case the government would either attempt to set
maximum legal limits on harmful substances allowed in
tobacco, or subsidize the tobacco industry or other parties
to develop and produce a safer cigarette. An improvement in
risk technology will have three effects: (1) while it will
reduce both the marginal private and external costs (2) it
will encourage smokers to increase their consumption and (3)
it will increase both the private and socially optimal level
of consumption. Figure 10 illustrates the consequences of
improved risk technology.
At the current level of consumption Qp , introduction of a new
risk technology, e.g. launching a safe cigarette into the
markets, will shift the marginal private cost schedule from
MPC to MPC* and the marginal social cost schedule from MSC to
MSC* . The marginal private costs will be reduced from GJ to
GI, marginal external costs from JM to IK, and marginal
social costs from GM to GK. The fall in the marginal private
costs will induce smokers to increase their consumption of
tobacco from Qp to Qp* , where the marginal private benefits
will be equal to the marginal private costs (NP) under the
new risk technology. The private consumption optimum will
therefore be higher under the new risk technology than under
the old one. The social optimal level of consumption will
also increase. As the marginal social cost schedule will then
shift from MSC to MSC * , Q. will no longer be socially optimal.
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Figure 10.
The marginal private benefits BD at Q, exceed the marginal
social costs BC by the amount CD. Consequently the social
optimum will move from Qs to Q:, where the marginal social
costs equal the marginal private (social) benefits (EF) under
the new risk technology.
We can distinguish between two types of improvements in the
risk technology: complete and partial. Complete here refers
to changes in risk technology that will entirely remove the
hazardous components from tobacco and thus eliminate all the
external and private costs of health risks of smoking.
Partial refers to less succesful attempts. As we have already
covered the partial case we shall discuss here only the
complete case.
If the new risk technology is complete there will be no
adverse costs at any level of consumption. Therefore, there
will be no divergence between private and social costs and
the private and social consumption optima will merge. The
marginal social costs will be equal to the price of tobacco
in this case. The new private optimal level of consumption
Q**
	
be greater than the old optimum Q p , since the only
cost to smokers will now be the price of tobacco.
Figure 11 illustrates the effects of a complete change in
risk technology on consumption and social costs. As the
marginal private costs will fall from BD to BC, consumption
will increase from Qp to Q. Also the socially optimal level
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of consumption will rise to Q**
	 4:* ) from Q. since there
will be no adverse costs of smoking anymore. It is clear that
both the private and social optimum levels of consumption
will be greater under the complete risk technology than under
the partial one. It is not possible, however, to attain the
social optimal level of consumption by changing risk
technology unless the resulting technology is complete. In
all other cases, the private optimum will always be greater
than the social optimum.
5.6 Conclusions
What has been said above can be summarized as follows:
(1) It is indeed possible, in principle, to reduce the
external costs of smoking by taxation, health education,
restrictions and by changing risk technology.
(2) The social optimum can be acheived by taxation and,
in principle, by restricting consumption, but in the
latter option there will still be external costs.
(3) The socially optimal level of consumption cannot be
attained by health education, unless the optimum is
zero, nor by changing risk technology, unless the new
risk technology is complete.
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(4) If, in addition to reducing the external costs, the
aim of the intervention is to reach the social optimal
level of consumption then health education and changes
in risk technology ought to be combined with taxation or
restriction measures.
(5) Taxation is the only measure that will internalize
externalities, other measures will reduce external
costs, but there will always be some costs to third
parties.
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6 WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
IN THE TOBACCO MARKETS
6.1 Introduction
The mere existence of market failures does not automatically
imply that government intervention on efficiency grounds is
desirable. Two further conditions must be met. The government
must have efficient tools available to remedy market
failures, and the welfare gains achieved by intervention must
outweigh its costs. The former condition is trivial, but in
practice not much is known about the effectiveness of
measures other than taxation. The latter condition is
important but mostly overlooked in practice. In this chapter
we shall derive measures for the net welfare gains of
intervention for the four major policy options: (1) taxation,
(2) health education, (3) restrictions, and (4) improvements
in risk technology.
It is often argued that since determination of the socially
optimal level of consumption requires so much information it
may be more practical to direct public policy towards the
attainment of some predetermined target level of consumption
rather than the social optimum (Baumol and Oates 1979,
Burrows 1979). This is the approach adopted by the Finnish
government in its tobacco policy. In a recent health policy
document 'Health for all by the year 2000' the government set
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a target of reducing the total consumption of tobacco by
three per cent annually (STM 1987).
To simplify matters, it is assumed in the following analysis
that the government has set the social optimum as the target
level of consumption and that the relevant demand, cost and
other functions are known. This is illustrated in figure 12.
In the initial situation a tax is included in the price of
tobacco. The tax per unit consumed (to ) is equal to to = KL so
that the cost to consumers per unit is P = to + P o , which
equals KL + JK = JL in figure 12 and, where Po is the pre tax
price. Consumers' expenditure on tobacco is the retail price
multiplied by the quantity consumed, i.e. PQp or the area
OBLJ. The government's tax revenue equals the tax per unit
multiplied by the quantity consumed, i.e. toQp or the area
ABLK. Revenue to producers and distributors is equal to the
pre tax price multiplied by the quantity consumed, i.e. PoQp
or the area OAKJ. This allows us to examine the effects of
alternative public policies on tax revenues and producers'
and distributors' revenues. In the initial situation, the
private optimum Qp is greater than the social optimum Q s which
is set by the government as the target level of consumption.
6.2 Taxation
In this option the government would raise the tax on tobacco
from to (FG in figure 12) to t 1 (or FG + HI) per unit. This
would raise the total costs to smokers from JM to El per unit
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and reduce consumption from Qp to Q„ which would become also
the private optimum. As a result of tax increase, smokers
would suffer a loss in welfare equal to the loss of consumer
surplus (ACS) which equals the area CDIH + HIM. The former
(area CDIH) represents the welfare loss to consumers
resulting from the fact that amount (t1 - to)Q, is now paid in
taxes (AT 1 ). The latter (area HIM) represents the welfare
loss to consumers resulting from the reduction in quantity
consumed. On the other hand, the fall in perceived costs of
health risks of smoking from LM to GH creates a welfare gain
to smokers (ACRp ) which is equal to the area GHML. This gain
is analogous to the loss of consumer surplus. While consumers
pay only the price of tobacco, they attach to each unit of
tobacco consumed a perceived marginal cost of health risks of
smoking.
Thus the net welfare loss to smokers (AWs ) is
A.w. = A.T, + A.cs - AcRp.
In the tax option, third parties gain from the reduction in
smoking in two ways. First, the external costs imposed on
third parties (A.EXC) will fall by the amount depicted by the
area HINM. Second, a rise in tax rate from to
 to t1
 increases
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tax revenue by the amount (AT I ) equal to the area CDIH. Thus
the total welfare gain to third parties (A.14) is
AWtp = AEXC +
The net welfare gain to society (AM ]) is the difference
between gainers' gains and losers' losses, i.e.
=	 A.Ditp
= AEXC + A.T 1 - AL.T, - Acs + AcIR,
= AEXC + A.utp - Acs.
In figure 12, this is equal to the area HINM + GHML - HIM =
INM + GHML. More formally the net welfare gain to society can
be expressed as
Qp	 Q,
fcmExc(Q) + MCR(Q))dQ - f(MPB(Q) - MPC(Q)}d0
Os	 Os
9P
= j(MSC(Q) - P}dQ -
Q.
J{MPB(Q) - MPC(Q))dQ
Q.
= J{MADC(Q) + mPC(Q) - MPB(Q))dQ.
Q.
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The reduction in tax revenue (ATL ) associated with the
reduction in consumption, the area FGLK, is loss to third
parties, but it is not a loss to society as a whole.
Consumers will gain exactly the same amount since they do not
have to pay that in taxes anymore. ALT/ represents a transfer
of income from third parties to smokers and the net welfare
effect will therefore be zero. The same conclusion applies to
the other tax component (AT I. ). In political decision making,
however, income transfers often play a crucial role.
Typically the loss of tax revenue is an argument often used
to fend off demands for future government intervention in the
tobacco markets (e.g. Pekurinen 1985).
The gain in tax revenue (.TG) is equal to the increase in tax
rate (t 1
 - to) multiplied by the new quantity consumed (Qs).
The loss in tax revenue is equal to the old tax rate (to)
multiplied by the reduction in consumption ( Qp - Q 5 ). The net
effect of the increase in tax rate on tax revenue (AT I ) is
thus
= A.; -
= (t1 — to) Q. — to(Qp — Qs).
The reduction in smokers' tobacco expenditure, area EFKJ,
does not represent a loss to society, but a transfer of
income from producers and distributors of tobacco to
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producers and distributors of other commodities. However, the
loss of revenue and jobs in the tobacco industry and trade
are the main arguments used by producers and distributors to
oppose any actions aimed at curbing consumption. The revenue
loss to producers and distributors (ARi ) is equal to the pre
tax price multiplied by the fall in consumption, i.e.
AR1 	 Po( Qp — Q. ) •
6.3 Health education
In this case government aims to shift the marginal private
benefit schedule MPB to the left, so that the new schedule
MPB" cuts the marginal private cost schedule MPC at the point
E in figure 9. As a result of health education, consumers
will attach a smaller marginal benefit to each unit of
tobacco consumed. With their new preferences smokers will
choose to consume (), voluntarily. Welfare gains to third
parties will be equal to the reduction in the external costs
(AEXC), area EFIH. Smokers gain the amount equal to the
reduction in the perceived costs of health risks (ACRp ), area
DEHG. In this case there will be no loss of consumer surplus,
since smokers reduce their consumption voluntarily. In fact
there will be an increase in consumer surplus (ACE") to
smokers, as shown by Fujii (1975), equal to area EHG. This
welfare gain results from smokers' ability to avoid a welfare
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loss, equal to EHG, caused by imperfect information. The net
welfare gain to society is equal to smokers' and third
parties' gains, i.e.
Am2 = Aw,„ +
AEXC + Acrzp
 + Acs*.
In figure 9, this is equal to the area DFIG + EHG. More
formally, the net welfare gain to society from health
education is
Qp	 9P
A.14 2 . JMEXC(Q)dQ + JMCRp (Q)dQ + j(MPC(Q) - MPB(Q)}dQ
Q.
9P
= j(msc(Q) - P)dQ + J{MPC(Q) - MPB(Q)}dQ
Q.	 Q.
= J.P(MADC(Q) + MPC(Q) - MPB(Q)}dQ.
Q.
Government, producers and distributors will lose revenue if
the health education is effective and the target level of
consumption is reached. The loss in tax revenue is equal to
the fall in consumption multiplied by the tax rate, i.e.
AT 2 = to(Qp - Q.).
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The fall in producers' and distributors' revenues is equal to
the pre tax price multiplied by the fall in consumption, i.e.
AR 2
	AR1 = Po(Qp	 Qs).
6.4 Restrictions
In the restrictions option the net welfare gain to society
will be the same as in the tax option, but the impact on tax
revenue will be the same as in the health education option.
Effects on producers' and distributors' revenues will be the
same as in the tax and health education options. In the
restrictions option therefore, the net welfare gain to
society is
op
AN3 = A.w1 = f(MADC(Q) + MPC(Q) - MPB(Q)}dQ.
Os
The loss in tax revenue is
AT3 =A	 = to( Op — Os)
and the fall in producers' and distributors' revenue is
AR3 = A	 = ARi = Po ( Qp — Q, ) .
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6.5 Improvements in risk technology
In this option the government would either set maximum legal
limits on harmful constituents in tobacco, or subsidize the
tobacco industry or other parties to develop and produce a
safe cigarette. The resulting improvements in risk technology
would be either complete or partial. In the complete case the
new risk technology would eliminate all the hazardous
substances and thus most of the adverse costs of smoking. In
the partial case the new risk technology would be less
successful and some adverse costs would still remain at all
levels of consumption.
Consider first the case of complete risk technology
improvement illustrated in figure 11. The complete risk
technology would eliminate all the hazardous components from
tobacco and thus the adverse health consequences of smoking.
While indirect consumption externalities would disappear some
direct consumption externalities would probably remain.
If there are no direct consumption externalities, third
parties' gain from complete risk technology improvement will
be equal to the reduction in the external costs. Since all
external costs will be eliminated, the gains to third parties
will be equal to the total external costs of consumption
(EXC) at Qp , i.e.
A p = EXC.
83
In figure 11, this is equal to the area AED.
The gain in smokers' welfare is made up of two components:
reduction in the perceived costs of the health risks of
smoking (CR p ), area ADC, and the increase in consumer surplus
(ACS), area CDF, i.e.
Aw. = cR„ + Acs.
CRp represents welfare gains to smokers arising from
elimination of the adverse health effects of smoking. The
increase in consumer surplus represents the welfare gain to
smokers resulting from the increased quantity of tobacco
consumed.
The total welfare gain to society from the complete risk
technology improvement is equal to
Aw4 = EXC + CRp + Acs.
In figure 11, this is equal to the area AEDF. The welfare
measure * provides an estimate of the maximum potential
welfare gains that can be achieved by producing a completely
safe cigarette. A144 can thus be compared with the costs of
developing and producing such a product. More formally, the
welfare gain to society is
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op	 QQ;*
A.14 4 = f(MSC(Q) - MPC(Q)}dQ + J{MPC(Q) - P)dQ + f(MPB(Q)-P)dQ
0	 0	 Op
9R
i fmscw, _ P}dQ + j(MPB(Q) - PlpQ
0	 op
(3,1°	
Qp**
= JMADC(Q)dQ + ffNIPB(Q) - 13)(1Q.
0	 Op
There will be an increase in the government's tax revenue equal
to the increase in consumption multiplied by the tax rate, i.e.
A.T 4 = to( Qp** - Q).
There will also be an increase in producers' and distributors'
revenues equal to the increase in consumption multiplied by the
pre tax price, i.e.
AR4 = RO Qp **	 Qp ) •
If, on the other hand, there are direct consumption
externalities, smokers' gain from complete risk technology will
be the same as in the previous case, but gains to third parties
will be smaller. Figure 13 illustrates this case. Smokers' gain
equals
= CRp + Acs
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or the area ADB + BDG = ADG. Welfare gains to third parties equal
the reduction in external costs of consumption (A.Exc*), i.e. area
AED - ACB. In this case, however, third parties still have to
bear the costs of direct consumption externalities. This loss of
welfare is equal to the increase in costs of direct consumption
externalities resulting from increased consumption, (A.Exc**) which
is equal to the area BCHG. Thus the net welfare gain to third
parties is
Aw,„ = AEXC * - AEXC**.
The net welfare gain to society as a whole equals
= AEXC * - AEXC** + CRp
 + Acs.
In figure 13, this is equal to the area AED - ACB - BCHG + ADB +
BDG = AEC - BCHG + BDG = AEDF - FHG. More formally, the net gain
to society is equal to
Q,	 Qp** "
= f(MSC(Q) - MSC"(Q)}dQ + ffMPB(Q)-P}dQ - f(MSC"(Q)-P}dQ
o	 Op	 op
Q	 Qp**
= J{MSC(Q) - MSC"(Q)}dQ +f(MPB(Q) - MSC"(Q)}dQ.
0	 op
Government, producers and distributors will increase their
revenues by the same amount as in the previous case, i.e.
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AT 5 = A.; = tO Qp**
	Q)
and AR5 = AR4 = Fo(Qp** 	Qp) .
Consider finally the partial risk technology improvement
option. In this case there will be welfare gains and losses
both to smokers and third parties. Welfare gains are
generated in two ways. First, the marginal external and
private costs will fall at private consumption optimum Qp
under the old technology. Second, there will be an increase
in consumer surplus resulting from an increase in consumption
from Qp to Qp", the private optimum under the new risk
technology. Losses of welfare are associated with the rise in
the marginal external and private costs resulting from
increased consumption under the new risk technology. Which of
the compensating effects dominates is an empirical question.
It is clear, however, that creation of a less hazardous
tobacco does not automatically improve social welfare, unless
the new risk technolocy is complete. Welfare effects are
illustrated in figure 10.
The welfare gains to third parties resulting from improved
risk technology are equal to the reduction in the external
costs (AEXC+ ) at the old private optimum Q. This is the area
AML, which is equal to the reduction in social costs (AMSC),
area AMK, minus the reduction in the private costs (A.C:Rp),
area AJI. Third parties will suffer a loss (AEXC") resulting
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from increased consumption of tobacco which is equal to area
IKQP. Thus the net welfare gain to third parties from the
introduction of a partial risk technology is
AWtp = AEXC + - AEXC++.
Welfare gain to smokers equals the fall in the perceived
costs of health risks of smoking (ACRp + ) at the old level of
consumption plus the gain in consumer surplus (CS)
resulting from increased consumption. In figure 10, the
former is the area AJI and the latter the area IJP. There
will also be a loss to consumers resulting from increased
consumption which is equal to the increase in the perceived
costs (AcRp ++ ), the area HIPO. Thus the net welfare gain to
consumers is
Aws = Acs+ + ACRp + - AcRp++.
The net welfare gain to society is the sum of the gains and
losses to third parties and consumers, i.e.
Aw 6 = AEXC + - AEXC" + ACS + + AcRp + - ACRp++
= AEXC + + ACRp + + ACS + - AEXC ++ - AcRp++
= AADC + + A.cs + - AAnc++.
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In figure 10, this is equal to the area AMK - AJI + AJI + IJP
- HKQO = AMK + JKQP + HIPO. More formally, the net welfare
gain to society from the partial improvement in risk
technology is
Op 	 Qp*
Aw6 = f(msc(Q) - MSC * (Q)}dQ + fCMPB(Q) - MPC*(Q)}dQ
0	 Qp
*
- fP(msc* (Q) - P}dQ
OP
f{MSC(Q) - MSC*(Q))dQ
0
*
+ fP{mPB(Q) + MSC* (Q) + P - MPC*(Q)}dQ.
Op
There will be an increase in the government's tax revenue
equal to the increase in consumption multiplied by the tax
rate, i.e.
ST 6 = t0 ( Q* - Qp ) .
There will also be an increase in producers' and
distributors' revenues equal to the increase in consumption
multiplied by the pre tax price, i.e.
AR6 = Po( Op* — Os )
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6.6 Comparison of the welfare and revenue effects of the
alternative policy options
Measures derived for the welfare and revenue effects of the
examined options are summarized in table 1.
Compare first the tax, health education and restrictions
options. Overlooking the costs of intervention, it is obvious
that the net welfare gains to society from achieving the
target level of consumption will be greater with the health
education option than with either of the other two, i.e.
> Awl 	Aw- 3 •
The net welfare gain with the health education option
outweighs the gains of tax and restriction options by the
amount
Aw2 - Aw i
	Acs* + Acs.
It is clear that AN2 - Aw l > o, since Acs" > o and Acs > o.
The tax option is preferable for governments, however, since
it may result in a net increase in tax revenue, whereas the
health education and restriction options will inevitably
result in a fall in tax revenue, i.e.
Aw2
AT I > LIT2 = AT3.
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Tax revenue generated by the tax option will exceed the
revenue from the two other options by the amount
AT I - AT 3 = (t1 - to)Qs.
All the options will reduce producers' and distributors'
revenues by the same amount, i.e.
AR I = AR2 = AR3.
Compare next the alternative risk technology options. The net
welfare gain to society is greatest when the new risk
technology is complete and there are no direct consumption
externalities, i.e. .
Aw4 > A115	and	 Am4 > A.146.
The net social welfare gains arising from the complete risk
technology in the absence of direct consumption externalities
exceed the gains from the technology with production
externalities by the amount
A144 - A.145 = EXC + AEXC" - Am:"
and those of partial risk technology by the amount
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Aw4 - Aw6 = EXC + CRp +	 - AEXC + - doc
- ACS + AEXC++ + ACRp++.
The difference AIA1 4 -	 > 0, since EXC > AEXC* , and AIM:*
> 0. Also A.144 - A.101 6 > 0, since EXC + CRp > &E).CC + + AL.CRp+ , Acs
> Acs + , A.ED(c- > 0 and AcFc- > o. It is not a priori clear,
however, whether A.1a5 is greater, equal or smaller than A.10/6.
As the direct consumption externalities tend to be only a
fraction of the indirect consumption externalities it is
highly probable that A145 is greater than A.T.46.
Since the private consumption optimum will be higher under
the complete risk technology, so will be the increase in the
government's tax revenue and producers' and distributors'
revenues resulting from increased consumption, i.e.
=L&
	
> A.T 6 , and
AR4 = AR5 > AR6.
The total tax revenue produced by the introduction of the
complete risk technology will exceed the revenue generated by
the partial risk technology by the amount
AT 4 - AT 6 = to(Qp** - Qp*).
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The net revenue gain to producers and distributors from the
complete risk technology as compared with the partial
technology will be
AR4 - AR 6
*.
= Po( Qp - Qp * ) .
6.7 Efficiency of the government intervention
In the above analysis the costs of government intervention
were overlooked. In reality there are clearly costs
associated with intervention. Only when these costs are taken
into account can rational judgements be made about the
desirability and optimal extent of intervention, and
meaningful comparisons be made between options. Defining the
net benefits of intervention (ANB) as a difference between
the net welfare gains and costs of intervention (C)
ANB = Aw - c
then option i is preferrable to option j if
ANBi
 > ANBJ
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and purpose of the study
In the previous part of the study it was argued that there
are several market failures associated with consumption of
tobacco products. It was also noted that the existence of
market failures is not in itself a sufficient condition for
government intervention. The second criterion set here was
that market failures should be quantitatively significant. In
order to establish their magnitude, it is necessary to
consider health, as well as the cost and beneficial
consequences of smoking.
The health risks of smoking have been extensively researched
over the past 30 years. Mounting epidemiologic evidence
suggests smoking to be associated with the onset of numerous
diseases (USDHEW 1979). Prevention of smoking and a sustained
fall in consumption are thought to be effective measures in
improving public health. For example, the Finnish national
health strategy "Health for all by the year 2000" (STM 1987)
maintains that stopping smoking would reduce premature
mortality and morbidity more than any other preventive
measure.
During the last 20 years, economists, epidemiologists,
medical researchers and public organizations in various
countries have sought to estimate the economic costs of the
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health consequences of smoking. This has made decision-makers
more aware of the smoking and health issue than when
described simply in terms of rates of death and disability.
As a result, the arguments used to support preventive actions
have changed slightly. It has long been the tradition to
support active measures to restrict smoking by health
arguments. During the last 10 years, economic arguments have
become more popular: since smoking appears to create a
significant economic burden on society, it is vital to reduce
this burden by taking active measures to cut consumption. In
Finland, however, such economic evidence has not yet been
published.
Does smoking create an economic burden on society?
Empirically the question may be divided into at least three
sub-questions depending on the point of view:
(1) Do smokers, as a group, burden non-smokers
economically?
(2) Does smoking cause a financial burden on the
public sector and other parties?
(3) Is smoking more beneficial than harmful on the
society at large?
More technically, these questions can be reformulated as
follows:
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(1) Does smoking cause external costs?
(2) Does smoking cause institutional externalities?
(3) What are the social costs and benefits of smoking?
In this study we seek to answer these questions in the
Finnish context. Some answers will be tentative, since
current epidemiologic and economic knowledge does not permit
us to measure and evaluate all economic consequences of
smoking. We hope, however, to give some impression of the
order of magnitude of the costs and benefits involved and
point out the need for further research.
The purpose of this study is:
(1) To outline an analytical framework for analysing
the economic consequences of smoking from the point of
view of different parties.
(2) To analyse empirically the social costs and
benefits of smoking and their incidence in Finland in
1987.
(3) To estimate the institutional and final external
costs of smoking in Finland in 1987.
1.2 Structure of the study
This study is divided into ten chapters. After this
introductory chapter, the second chapter, will briefly
describe the economic approaches and analytical methods
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applied in several previous studies dealing with the economic
consequencies of smoking-related health risks.
Chapter three outlines a framework allowing us to analyse the
economic consequences of smoking from the point of view of
different parties. Chapter four summarizes the facts about
the Finnish tobacco markets. In chapter five we shall
describe the main health effects of smoking, define the
diseases analysed in this study and estimate the fraction of
cases attributed to smoking.
In chapters six and seven we shall analyse in detail the
economic consequences of smoking arising from morbidity and
mortality. Economic, financial and distributive effects will
be analysed separately. Chapter eight focuses on other
economic consequences of smoking.
Chapter nine gives a detailed summary of the health and
economic effects of smoking. In particular, it focuses on two
questions: does smoking cause external costs, and is there a
case for government intervention on the tobacco markets? The
main cpnclusions of the study are presented in chapter ten.
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2 SOME PREVIOUS STUDIES
2.1 Introduction
During the past two decades, several studies have explored
economic aspects of smoking in various countries like Sweden
(Lindholm 1973, Johnsson 1980, Hjalte 1984a, 1984b), Denmark
(Ellemann-Jensen 1986), Switzerland (Leu and Schaub 1984),
England (Peston 1972, DHSS 1972, Atkinson and Townsend 1977,
Cohen 1984), the United States (Luce and Schweitzer 1978,
Rice et al 1986) and Canada (Shillington 1977, Thompson and
Forbes 1982, Collishaw and Myers 1984). In most cases,
studies have primarily sought to discover the magnitude of
the social costs of smoking-related health problems in the
country.
Studies differ in how they view smoking in terms of consumer
theory, and hence how costs and benefits are defined, what
diseases are to be included in the analysis, and how various
health consequences are quantified and valued. In this
chapter we shall briefly outline the methods used in some of
the major previous studies.
2.2 Viewpoints
The economic consequences of smoking can be analysed from
many different perspectives. The viewpoint may be, for
example, that of smokers, households, firms, the public
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sector or the whole of society. The analysis can be made more
complex and effective by examining how costs and benefits are
distributed between smokers, firms, local government, central
government, and other parties who commonly finance the costs
of diverse activities. It is also possible to examine who
eventually pays the costs: smokers or non-smokers. Revenue
effects may be analysed from firms' or the public sector's
viewpoint.
Previous studies have primarily adopted the societal
viewpoint. This is well-founded, since a narrower perspective
would leave part of the effects unexamined and thus make the
analysis incomplete. Only a few studies have looked at the
distribution of costs between smokers and other parties (e.g.
Leu and Schaub 1984). External costs have not been analysed
empirically. Some studies have shown, however, that smoking
may not cause external costs in health care (Leu and Schaub
1983b, Stoddart et al 1986).
Several studies have examined various revenue effects of
smoking, such as tobacco excise (DHSS 1972, Atkinson and
Townsend 1977, Thompson and Forbes 1982, Cohen 1984,
Collishaw and Myers 1984, Ellemann-Jensen 1986), other tax
revenues (Ellemann-Jensen 1986), disability pensions (DHSS
1972, Atkinson and Townsend 1977, Thompson and Forbes 1982,
Ellemann-Jensen 1986), sickness benefits (DHSS 1972, Atkinson
and Townsend 1977, Ellemann-Jensen 1986), widows' pensions
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(DHSS 1972, Atkinson and Townsend 1977), and revenues of the
tobacco industry (Thompson and Forbes 1982).
Since the primary aim of the studies has been to estimate the
costs of smoking, little attention has been paid to benefits.
It is not completely clear, however, whether the studies have
tried to estimate the social costs or external costs. While
social costs also include those falling on smokers, external
costs exclude them. External costs are the relevant costs for
guiding policy.
2.3 Economic frameworks
The economic frameworks have varied somewhat but one of the
following three options has generally been used: (1) a
prevalence-based disease costing approach, (2) an incidence-
based disease costing approach, or (3) a traditional or
modified economic model. Some studies do not permit us to
determine which economic framework has been applied (e.g.
Thompson and Forbes 1982, Cohen 1984). In the following we
shall briefly outline these options.
The prevalence-based disease costing approach
Most studies have used the so-called disease costing model
(Hodgson and Meiners 1982) as their economic framework, and
applied the corresponding methods (Table 1). In this approach
the attemp is to evaluate the value of resources used (direct
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Not known COI
	
Human capital
35-74	 TradE TradE
Not known TradE Not valued
15+	 Ad hoc Not valued
COI4 main
All
All
15+
CANADA
11 Shillington
(1977)
12 Thompson and
Forbes (1982)
13 Collishaw and
Myers (1984)
Human capital
All	 Ad hoc Human capital
15+	 COI	 Human capital
Table 1. Stylized facts about the previous studies.
STUDY	 Diseases Age-groups Economic Method used
analysed'	 framework2 to evaluate
health effects2
35-89
	 COI	 Human capital
SWEDEN
1 Lindholm (1973)
2 Johnsson (1980)
3 Hjalte (1984a)
4 Hjalte (1984b)
ENGLAND
5 Peston (1972)
6 DHSS (1972)
7 Atkinson and
Townsend (1977)
8 Cohen (1984)
All/
4 main
4 main
12 main
4 main
All
4 main
Not known
4 main
+ 4 minor
40-69
35-84
35-84
COI	 Human capital
COI	 Human capital
COI/i Human capital
UNITED STATES
9 Luce and	 Several
Schweitzer (1978) mdg3	Not known COI
10 Rice et al (1986) Several mde 	 17+	 COI
19 main	 20+
(mortality) (mortality)
Human capital
Human capital
DENMARK
14 Ellemann-Jensen 	 COI &
(1986)	 12 main	 35-84	 A&M4	 Human capital
SWITZERLAND
15 Leu and Schaub	 COI	 Human capital &
(1984)	 Not known	 Not known TradE TradE
1 Will be defined in chapter 5.2.
2 COI = Cost of illness (prevalence approach),
COI/i = Cost of illness (incidence approach),
TradE = Traditional economic model,
Ad hoc = Theoretical economic model not clearly specified.
3 Main disease groups.
4 Analysis suggested by Atkinson and Meade (1974)
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costs) and lost (indirect costs) due to a disease in a given
year, regardless of the time of onset of the disease. Direct
costs mainly include the costs of treatment. Indirect costs
describe the value of lost health. In principle, this
approach also attempts to estimate the intangible costs (e.g.
grief and suffering to others), but in most cases they are
merely mentioned.
This approach describes the impact of past smoking on the
costs in a given year. The analysis is based on the
prevalence of diseases caused by smoking which manifest in
the total morbidity or mortality of that year. For this
reason, this type of approach is sometimes called the
prevalence approach.
The incidence-based disease costing approach
In contrast to the prevalence approach, which embodies the
costs manifested during a given year, the incidence approach
seeks to estimate the life-time costs expected to occur as a
result of smoking-related disease. In the incidence approach
all present and future costs are determined for a single
person affected by the disease in present or future periods
(Hartunian et al 1981). The costs attributable to smoking are
derived by multiplying the anticipated costs by the increased
probability of incurring the disease in each of the periods
in question for a smoker versus a non-smoker (Oster et al
112
1984). The costs thus calculated are discounted and summed in
order to get the present value of the costs per smoker.
This approach describes the impact of current smoking on the
future costs. The results can be used to approximate the
economic benefits for an individual giving up smoking.
The traditional and modified economic model
Prevalence- and incidence-based disease costing models aim
primarily to estimate the social costs of smoking. They do
not, however, allow one to identify the external costs. Only
a few studies have sought to outline the magnitude of the
institutional externalities but none has assessed the final
external costs.
Several studies have employed the traditional economic
framework (DHSS 1972, Atkinson and Townsend 1977, Leu and
Schaub 1984) to identify the financial external costs, while
some (e.g. Ellemann-Jensen 1986) have applied the modified
economic model suggested by Atkinson and Meade (1974) which
allows for consumption benefits, addiction and inadequate
information. Interpretation of the empirical results has
proved difficult, since it appears impossible to carry out an
unambiguous cost-benefit analysis of smoking. The end-result
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depends crucially on how addiction and inadequate information
are interpreted and allowed for in the stud?.
2.4 Methods and results
In principle, there are two main methods available for
evaluating the health effects of smoking 2 : the human capital
approach and the willingness to pay approach (Hodgson and
Meiners 1982). The human capital approach values an
individual's health in terms of his production capacity and
seeks to answer the question: what is the individual's
economic contribution to production (e.g. Cooper and Rice
1976)? In the willingness to pay approach, health evaluation
is based on the individuals' willingness to pay for a
reduction in the risk of illness or death (e.g. Mishan 1971,
Jones-Lee 1976).
Previous studies have applied mainly the human capital
approach (Table 1). Consequently, they have attempted to
estimate the value of resources devoted to prevention, cure
and rehabilitation of illness resulting from smoking (direct
costs) and the value of potential production lost due to
smoking-related illness and premature deaths (indirect
costs). Studies have not, however, analysed how the cost-
burden falls on different parties (institutional
1 This topic will be discussed more thoroughly in
chapter 3.
2 These approaches will be discussed more thoroughly in
chapter 5.4.
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externalities) and how it is eventually distributed between
smokers and non-smokers (final externalities). Only a few
studies have considered the benefits of smoking
simultaneously with the costs (e.g. Collishaw and Myers
1986).
Empirical results have varied substantially, even within a
country. For example, the difference between various Canadian
cost-estimates is over five-fold (Shillington 1977, Thompson
and Forbes 1982, Collishaw and Myers 1984). In the USA, Rice
et al (1986) estimated the costs of smoking to amount to
8.5 % of the total costs of all illnesses while the Luce and
Schweitzer (1978) estimate is over 11 % of the costs.
Internationally, the total costs per smoker, as reported in
Markandya and Pearce (1989), range from FIM 1070 (Shillington
1977) to FIM 4130 (Luce and Schweitzer 1978) at 1987 prices.
These discrepancies are mainly due to the different diseases
chosen for analysis, the different age-groups included, and
the different empirical estimation methods employed.
Most studies have covered either all diseases or focused on
those for which there exists a broad consensus of their
highly probable causal relationship with smoking (Table 1).
Costs have been estimated either for all age groups, for
people aged 15 and over or for people aged 35-84. It is
evident that the fewer diseases and the narrower age-band
analysed, the smaller will be the costs of smoking.
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The number of cases (e.g. lung cancer deaths) and the related
costs due to smoking have been estimated by applying so-
called attributable fractions'', which indicate what
proportion of the cases observed in the population may be
interpreted to result from smoking. Attributable fractions
have commonly been derived by using national tobacco
consumption data and smokers' mortality risk as compared to
non-smokers', obtained from the most well known epidemiologic
studies (e.g. Hammond 1966, CederlOf et al 1975, Doll and
Peto 1976).
Besides mortality, the same attributable fractions have been
applied for other health consequences of smoking (health care
utilization, sickness absence and disability) (e.g. Lindholm
1973, Shilling-ton 1977, Luce and Schweitzer 1978, Cohen 1984,
Hjalte 1984a, Thompson and Forbes 1982, Ellemann-Jensen
1986). In some studies, estimates of the attributable
fractions have been derived on the basis of smokers' and non-
smokers' different utilization rates (e.g. hospital inpatient
care, outpatient visits) and differences in case prevalence
(e.g. disability) (e.g. DHSS 1972, Atkinson and Townsend
1978, Collishaw and Myers 1984, Rice et al 1986).
A general feature of the studies is that the indirect costs
constitute the bulk of the estimated costs of smoking,
1 Attributable fractions will be discussed more
thoroughly in chapter 5.3.
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ranging from 56 % (Rice et al 1986) to 90 % (Leu and Schaub
1984).
Two studies (Hjalte 1984b, Oster et al 1984) have applied the
incidence approach to estimate the cost of smoking. In the
preface to Hjalte (1984b), Lindgren points out that the total
costs per individual smoker thus calculated can be converted
into national figures by summing all smokers' anticipated
costs. The results of the incidence approach (Hjalte 1984b)
are remarkably higher (fourteen times for the direct costs
and six times for the indirect costs) than those of the
prevalence approach (Hjalte 1984a). It is not possible,
however, to determine the reason for this dicrepancy.
2.5 Conclusions
Generally, the previous studies suggest that it is not
feasible to carry out a rigorous cost-benefit analysis of
smoking for several reasons. It is difficult to include, even
in a semi-quantitative manner, all the costs associated with
smoking. Moreover, there are many consequences, particularly
those related to disability and death, which are not readily
quantifiable in economic terms, such as the pain and
suffering that must be borne by smokers and by their families
in cases of smoking-related illness and death.
Perhaps the most important item in any comprehensive analysis
of the costs of smoking is the value placed on an
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individual's life. However, very different values can be
placed on an individual's life depending on the valuation
method used.
Even if the analysis is confined to entities which can be
expressed fairly readily in economic terms, the estimated
costs of smoking will vary considerably depending on which
economic frameworkl
 is used. A theoretically correct economic
analysis of the costs of smoking depends to a large extent on
unknown quantities - what should be included and what should
not - and depends on the assumptions made with regard to
dependence and information among consumers.
1 Alternative options for analysing the cost and benefits
of smoking will be discussed in the next chapter.
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3 ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS FOR ANALYSING THE COSTS OF SMOKING
3.1 What is the problem?
It is of some interest in itself to know the magnitude of the
social costs of smoking. These may not, however, be
particularly meaningful for policy purposes since some of the
social costs are paid by smokers themselves. Traditionally
economists have argued that it is only the costs falling on
parties other than smokers which justify public intervention
in the tobacco markets. A further condition is that such
external costs should exceed the proceeds from tobacco
excise.
It is important to note that it is not necessary to analyse
the benefits of smoking in order to assess conditions for
public intervention on efficiency grounds. It is sufficient
to clarify whether the relevant costs exceed proceeds from
tobacco excise. However, in order to decide the optimal scale
of intervention, information on benefits is also required.
Since consumers may have limited information and may be
addicted to tobacco, the traditional economic model may be an
inadequate framework for distinguishing policy-relevant
costs. Several authors (e.g. Atkinson 1974, Atkinson and
Meade 1974, Leu and Schaub 1984, Markandya and Pearce 1989)
have sought to outline policy-relevant costing models with
varying assumptions about addiction and smokers' awareness
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about the smoking-related health risks: i.e. the costs that
may be used to assess justification for public intervention.
At one extreme is the traditional, fully-informed, rational
consumer who is not addicted to tobacco. At the other end
lies the addicted smoker who is unaware of the health risks
and does not even derive any benefits from smoking. As the
models are based on different assumptions about smoking
behaviour, the cost items to be included and the intervention
criteria also vary from model to model.
In this chapter we shall first derive the alternative costing
models and list the items to be analysed. Then we shall
indicate how the social costs of smoking may be decomposed
into institutional and final externalities. The analysis will
focus on financial externalities.
3.2 Alternative economic models: part 1
3.2.1 Traditional economic model
The traditional economic model assumes consumers to be fully
informed about the health risks of smoking, but not to be
addicted to it. Consumers are assumed to act rationally and
to take into account the health risks of smoking in their
private decision making. In this model, smoking is comparable
to any other activity involving risk. Smokers' consumption
decisions reflect their individual valuations of the private
benefits and costs of smoking. There is no need to value, for
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example, premature deaths. If smokers are fully informed
about the health risks, one may assume that they consider
themselves better off despite the risk (e.g. Mishan 1971). In
this model only the external costs may justify government
intervention. Relevant costs to the analysis (C o ) are defined
as (see Table 2 1
 for definition of the cost items)
Co = EXC.
Government intervention is justified if external costs exceed
the revenue obtained from tobacco excise (T), i.e. if C o - T >
0. The change in social welfare 2
 as a result of a public
intervention is the change in external costs minus the change
in consumer surplus
Avio	Aco - Acs.
The assumption of the fully informed non-addicted consumer
may not, however, be a proper description of smoking
behaviour, as noted in part I of this study. If a smoker is
not fully aware of the health risks of smoking, he presumably
does not take into account the likely private costs of
1 Table 2 indicates which cost items Atkinson and Meade
(1974) considered relevant in different models. We shall
not, however, appply their classification in the empirical
part of this study, since the methodology developed here
permits estimation of policy-relevant costs
directly.
2 The costs of intervention are overlooked in deriving
the welfare measures on pages 121-131.
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Table 2. Cost-items included in alternative costing models
as defined in Atkinson and Meade (1974)1.
Item	 Traditional Modified Modified
economic	 economic economic
model
	
model 1	 model 2
IF & NAD	 NIF & NAD NIF & AD
Health care
costs (HC)
Lost production
as a result of
a sickness (LPs)
Social security
benefits paid
in case of
sickness (SEls)
Cost of premature
death (LPD)2
Net financial
costs of premature
death (NCD)3
Resources employed
in the production
of tobacco (PDC)
Losses of well being,
pain and suffering
to others (PS)
Nuisance and other
externalities to
non-smokers (NE)
+
+
+
+
+
1	 IF = consumers aware of the health risks of smoking.
NIF = consumers unaware of the health risks of smoking.
AD = consumers addicted to smoking.
NAD = consumers not addicted to smoking.
2	 Includes pain and suffering to others (PS).
3	 Taxes not received - social security benefits not paid.
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smoking-related illness and premature death when he decides
to smoke. If this is the case, then the unperceived costs
should also be included in the analysis.
3.2.2 Modified economic models
Atkinson has modified the traditional economic model to allow
for aspects of addiction and lack of awareness about the
health risks of smoking (Atkinson 1974, Atkinson and Meade
1974). He specified two models, which will be termed modified
economic models 1 and 2.
Modified economic model 1 differs from the traditonal
economic model in that consumers are assumed to be unaware of
the health risks of smoking. Because of this they are not
able to take into account these risks in their private
decision making. The decision to smoke will not reflect the
private costs associated with the risk of increased illness
and premature death. Otherwise they are assumed to act
rationally. In this model the external costs and the
unperceived private costs to smokers are basis for government
intervention. Relevant costs are defined as (see Table 2)
C1 = EXC + CR.
Government intervention is justified if the sum of the
external and unperceived private costs exceeds the revenue
from tobacco excise, i.e. if C 1
 - T > 0. The change in social
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welfare as a result of a public intervention is the change in
external costs and private unperceived costs to smokers minus
the change in consumer surplus
= Ac i
 - Acs
In modified economic model 2 consumers are assumed to be both
unaware of the health risks of smoking and addicted. In this
case consumers' ability to make rational choices is
distorted. They do not derive any utility from smoking, but
are forced to do so only because of addiction. Consumers
overvalue their tobacco consumption by the amount they spend
on it. If they could be freed from addiction, they could
spend that amount on other commodities instead of tobacco and
thus increase their well-being without giving up anything.
Expenditure on tobacco equals production and distribution
costs plus profits and taxes. Profits represent a transfer of
income from smokers to the owners of the tobacco industry and
trade and taxes represent a transfer from smokers to non-
smokers. Neither of these income transfers should be included
in the real cost. In this model the external costs and the
unperceived private costs to smokers (CR), as well as the
cost of production and distribution (PDC) are basis for
government intervention. Relevant costs are defined as (see
Table 2)
C2 = EXC + CR + PDC.
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Government intervention is justified if the sum of the costs
exceeds proceeds from tobacco excise, i.e. if C2 - T > 0. As
there will be no loss in consumer surplus in this case, the
change in social welfare as a result of a public intervention
is the change in the costs
Aw2 = Ac2.
3.2.3 Medical model
Most of the previous studies referred to in chapter 2 have
estimated the costs of smoking by applying the cost of
illness methodology (see Table 1). In this medical model
smoking is comparable to a disease which causes costs to
consumers and to society at large without providing any
benefits, not even to smokers. In this model the external
costs and the perceived private costs to smokers are basis
for the government intervention. Relevant costs are defined
as
C4 = EXC + CR.
Costs defined by the medical model and the intervention
criteria are the same as in modified economic model 1, but
the welfare implications of intervention differ. Unlike
modified economic model 1, the medical model does not
identify any consumption benefits. Therefore, there will be
no welfare loss in terms of forgone benefits. The change in
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social welfare resulting from public intervention is the
change in the costs as there will be no loss in consumer
surplus in this case
A w, = A c, .
3.3 Alternative economic models: part 2
One aspect that differentiates the above defined models is
addiction. In order to highlight the polar cases it was
assumed that addiction is either perfect or non-existent. In
reality, however, it is highly unlikely that all smokers
would be addicted to tobacco, or would be willing to give up
smoking. Even if smokers were addicted, it is apparent that
those who would prefer to carry on with the habit would
derive some benefit from smoking. There are no good reasons
to ignore these consumption benefits.
Even if all smokers were addicted to tobacco, part of the
resources devoted to production and distribution of tobacco
would be used in ways that would improve consumers well-
being. Therefore, it may not be appropriate to include the
entire value of these resources in social cost estimates, as
was done in modified economic model 2.
For analytical purposes, addiction can be defined as in part
I of this study: i.e. addiction can be assumed when
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individuals wanting to abandon a habit, e.g. smoking, cannot
do so. The strength of smoking-dependency is difficult to
measure. For the purpose of economic analysis it may be
depicted by smokers' willingness to pay for means which may
help free them from dependency. In this case, the
willingness-to-pay estimate represents the value of the
smoking-caused disbenefit (DBA), which smokers would prefer
to live without.
Economic model 2 can now be modified by allowing for
consumption benefits for those who would like to continue to
smoke, despite dependency, and for disbenefits for those who
would like to give up. This is achieved by substituting
production and distribution costs for the value of smoking-
caused disbenefit to those who would prefer to give up. The
relevant costs may be redefined as
C% = EXC + CR + DBA.
Government intervention is justified if the sum of the costs
exceeds the revenue from tobacco excise, i.e. if C% - T > 0.
As revised model 2 allows for consumption benefits, the
change in social welfare as a result of public intervention
is the sum of change in external costs, private unperceived
costs to all smokers and smoking-caused disbenefit to those
smokers who would like to give up moking, but cannot do so
because of addiction, minus the change in consumer surplus
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Aw*2 = Ac* 2
 - Acs.
Analogically, we can now define the fifth model, modified
economic model 3, which assumes consumers to be aware of the
health risks and addicted to tobacco. In this model, the
relevant costs for considering grounds for government
intervention are the external costs, smoking-caused
disbenefit and the perceived private costs (CRA ) to those who
would be willing to give up smoking. Relevant costs are
defined as
C3 = EXC + CRA
 + DBA.
In this case also, government intervention is justified if
C3 T > 0. The change in social welfare as a result of public
intervention is the sum of change in external costs, private
perceived costs and smoking-caused disbenefit to those
smokers who would be willing to give up smoking minus the
change in consumer surplus
6,143
	Ac3 - Acs.
The alternative costing models derived in this chapter are
summarized in Table 3. Table 4 gives the intervention
criteria and net gain in social welfare due to intervention
implied by alternative models.
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In all the models derived above, government intervention may
be justified if the estimated costs exceed the revenue
derived from tobacco excise. However, very different
interpretations can be placed on the tobacco excise. Tobacco
excise can be regarded as an attempt to correct for the
consequences of the private decision to smoke with regard
partly to the externalities and partly to the consequences of
inadequate information and dependency. The original purpose
for levying an excise on tobacco may have had little to do
with these motives, however. Tobacco has traditionally been
one of the governments' favorite taxable items because of its
low price elasticity. In Finland, the fiscal motive has
clearly dominated tobacco taxation in the past (Pekurinen and
Valtonen 1987).
Markandya and Pearce (1989) argue that since the purpose of
tobacco excise is not solely to compensate for the external
costs but also to raise money for the government, only a
proportion of tobacco excise should be deducted from the
gross social costs to obtain a policy-relevant net cost
figure. They do not indicate, however, how this proportion
should be derived.
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3.4 Effects to be analyzed
Smoking-related harm to individuals arises mainly as a result
of illness and premature death caused by smoking. The direct
costs are mainly due to smokers' excess utilization of health
care services as compared with non-smokers. Direct costs are
commonly broken down into costs of hospital inpatient care
and non-institutional care, pharmaceutical expenditure and
other costs. Costs of inpatient care fall primarily on
general hospitals. Costs of non-institutional care ensue from
the use of outpatient services provided by general hospitals,
health centres, occupational health care and private
physicians. Pharmaceutical expenditure can be broken down
into expenditure on prescribed medicines and over-the-
counter-medicines. Most previous studies have also estimated
the costs of fires caused by (e.g. Shillington 1977, Luce and
Schweitzer 1978, Collishaw and Myers 1984, Ellemann-Jensen
1986). Some have also estimated the costs of rehabilitation
(e.g. Leu and Schaub 1984).
Indirect costs reflect mainly the value of health lost due to
smoking. A lower limit for this is usually derived by
estimating the value of production lost due to smoking
related morbidity and mortality. Production lost due to
-
morbidity arises as a result of sickness absence and short-
term and permanent disability. Production lost due to
premature death depicts the value of production which the
person could have generated by the end of his working life
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had he not died prematurely. Previous studies have not sought
to estimate the value of lives lost due to smoking.
Smoking also generates several other disadvantages that are
difficult to measure in monetary terms. Illness lowers
smokers' quality of life and this may also cause distress to
others. Passive smoking may cause health and other problems
to non-smokers. Employers may have to hire auxiliary
employees to offset smokers increased sickness absence.
Smoking also creates additional ventilation and cleaning
costs at home and in public premises. Investment in creating
special areas or sections for smokers is required, for
example, at workplaces and on public transport. Research into
smoking and health education also consume resources.'
Smoking also generates various transfers of income. Tobacco
excise is one such transfer of income from smokers to non-
smokers. Loss of earnings due to sickness absence and
disability are partly compensated by sickness allowance and
disability pensions and rehabilitation costs may also be
compensated. When death results, widow's and orphan's
pensions are paid. Illness and premature death result in less
taxes being collected. Due to premature deaths, pension
payments are 'saved', as are health care costs.
I Strictly speaking the costs of research into the
effects of smoking and health education should not be
included as costs in the social cost calculations, since
they represent the costs of actions to correct for
externalities. Instead, they should be viewed as costs in
economic appraisals of anti-smoking policies (e.g.
Markandya and Pearce 1989).
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In order to avoid double-counting, income transfers have not
usually been analyzed in previous studies. This is justified,
since transfers of income do not increase or decrease
society's available resources. Income transfers are used to
redistribute income between the private and public sector or
between smokers and non-smokers. Income transfers play a
significant role in political decision-making and should
therefore not be overlooked.
Table 5 details the direct consequences, and table 6 the
indirect consequences relevant to analysing grounds for
government intervention in the tobacco markets. The items
have been grouped under two headings, i.e. economic and
financial effects, and classified into costs and benefits.
Economic effects include items that reflect use of resources.
Financial effects contain items that indicate transfers of
income. For each of the items listed, some proportion
constitutes a component of policy-relevant cost, but they
cannot simply be added to produce a total. A summary of the
cost items analysed in previous studies is presented in
Appendix 1.
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Table 5. Direct economic effects of smoking analysed in this
study [Benefit (+), Cost (-)].
EFFECT	 ECONOMIC	 FINANCIAL
EFFECT	 EFFECT
PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION AND DEMAND
Benefits to smokers
- Resources devoted
to production and
distribution
- Proceeds from excise duty
Disbenefits due to addiction
MORBIDITY
Cost of hospital care
Costs of outpatient care
- General hospitals
- Health centres
- Occupational health care
- Private physicians
Cost of medicines
- Prescribed medicines
- Over-the-counter medicines
Sickness benefits
Costs of rehabilitation
Disability benefits
MORTALITY
Widow's and orphan's pensions
OTHER DIRECT EFFECTS
Fire damage
Costs of health education
and research
Costs of extra cleaning
and ventilation
Investments in facilities
for smokers
_	 -
_
1 Not analysed empirically in this study.
I 1'.
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Table 6. Indirect economic effects of smoking analysed in
this study [Benefit (+), Cost (-)].
EFFECT	 ECONOMIC	 FINANCIAL
EFFECT	 EFFECT
MORBIDITY
Lost production due to
- Sickness absence
- Disability
Extra costs to employers
Lost tax-revenues due to
- Sickness absence
- Disability
MORTALITY
Lost production
Avoided health care expenditure
Lost tax-revenues
Avoided pension payments
Other avoided social security
benefits
OTHER INDIRECT EFFECTS
1Psychosocial costs -
Quality of life _1
Grief and suffering to others 1
Nuisance to non-smokers 1
Health 1risks of passive smoking -
Costs and benefits at work-place
-/+1
1 Not analysed empirically in this study.
13(0
136
3.5 Estimation of the final external costs
After estimating the social costs by components the next task
is to decompose the costs between financing parties in order
to arrive at institutional externalities. Depending on the
origin of the cost the financing bodies vary, but in general
the following parties are involved: central government, local
authorities, public and private insurance institutions and
companies, firms and patients/employees. Besides knowing
which bodies bear the costs of smoking it is also essential
to know how they themselves finance their expenditure. Only
then can we distinguish the final external costs borne by
non-smokers from the costs borne by smokers. Figure 1
illustrates the case.
Take the health care costs of smoking as an example. The cost
imposed on health care by smoking (HC) is the sum of the
costs borne by smokers (HCs ) and by third parties (HC). The
final cost burden is determined by smokers' and non-smokers'
relative contributions to the financing of health care
services. Let us denote smokers' share by p s
 and non-smokers'
share by pm'. Thus
(1)	 HC = HC" + HCs
E.( p i" + pis ) HC i ,
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pilM, pig < 1; piEX	 pig = 1, and where subscript i
refers to the health care service i. If patients pay their
treatment in full, there will be no external costs. Thus, if
p is = I then p i" = 0 and hence HC isx = 0.
In practice, there are only few services for which patients
have to pay the full fee. Utilization of services is
typically heavily subsidized through taxation (public
provision) or insurance. In this case there may be external
costs. Thus, if p is < I then p isx and HC iEx > 0.
The magnitude of the final external costs depends on the way
health care is financed. In Finland, health care is financed
by the central government, local authorities, public health
insurance, state churches, employers, patients, and other
parties (private health insurance, sickness funds, etc.). The
financing of the health care service i can thus be decomposed
into seven components
piS = piCG	 piLG	 piSi	 piC +piEM
	 piP	 piX; Epii = 1,
J
Where piCG
LGPi
= proportion of the total costs of service i
financed by the central government,
= proportion of the total costs of service i
financed by local authorities,
= proportion of the total costs of service i
financed by public health insurance,
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pi EX	 piS =
= proportion of the total costs of service i
financed by the state churches,
= proportion of the total costs of service i
financed by employers,
= proportion of the total costs of service i
financed by patients,
= proportion of the total costs of service i
financed by other parties.
Denoting smokers' proportional contribution to financing
services by p and non-smokers' contribution by (1 - p), each
of the components in (2) can be broken down to smokers' and
non-smokers' contributions. Thus
and rearranging terms (2) becomes
(3) PiEM	 P! [(cc	 ( 1 — R	
piLG
t'LG )
+ (1 — psi ) Pis '	 ( 1	 pc ) p iC 	 piEM	
piX]
[pp ' 	 13L.cPiLG	 NIP!'	 PCPiC	 PiP •
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The terms in the first brackets in (3) give the proportion of
the smoking-related costs of service i paid by non-smokers
(final external costs), i.e.
(4) PiEX =	 (	 PCC )PiCG 4- (1 - RLG)piLG 	( 1	 psi )piSI
+ ( 1 - Pc )Pc	 PiEm + Pi
and the terms in the second brackets give the proportion paid
by smokers, i.e.
(5) pis
	
pcGpiCG 	 pLGpiLC	 psipiSI	 pcpi.0	 piP
Thus, when the smoking related costs have been estimated,
formula (4) enables one to evaluate the final external costs.
The final external health care costs due to smoking in the
case of service i are
FiC i EX 	= PiEXHCi
=	 1	 pcc ) piCG	 ( 1	 r3LG ) piLC	 ( 1	 psi )piSI
( 1 - PC )PiC	 PiEM	 Pi9HCi
or in more general form
(6) HCicx	 =	 - f3j)pi-11-1Ci
where HCi
 = the costs of health care service i associated
with smoking,
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pi	 the proportion of costs of the service i
financed by party j,
1 - p i	 the proportion of party j's revenue paid by
non-smokers.
The total final external health care costs of smoking are the
sum of the final external costs by service or
( 7 )	 HCEX = E HC iEX	 E.( 1 - 13 i )piiHCi.
i	 ii
The smoking related costs of health care service i paid by
smokers are
( 8 )	 HCis = p isHC i = rp ei CG	 LGCG 	 NLGL-'1.	 +PP PcPi + Pi HCi
or in more general form
( 9 )
	
HCis	 =
The total health care costs of smoking eventually paid by
smokers as a group are the sum of the respective costs by
service, i.e.
(10)	 HCs = DICis =
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From (8)-(10) it is clear that the out-of-pocket payment is
only part of the medical treatment costs smokers have to bear
as a result of smoking. The rest may be quantitatively more
significant though less obvious to smokers. Other cost items
can be decomposed in the same way.
The advantage of decomposing the costs by formulae (6)-(10)
is that while identifying the parties affected, one can
directly estimate the magnitude of the external costs by
parties. Thus it is possible to sort out how the economic
costs of smoking are distributed between the parties
concerned (central government, local authorities, public
health insurance, employers, smokers and others)
(institutional externalities) and how they are eventually
distributed between smokers and non-smokers (final
externalities).
To summarize, the magnitude of the external costs of smoking
depends on
(i) the estimated economic costs, the HCi:s,
(ii) the way these costs are institutionally financed,
the p ii :s, and
(iii) smokers' contribution to financing the
institutions concerned, the pj:s.
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The estimation of the HC i :s is complicated and requires
specific research effort, but it can be done by applying
appropriately revised methods suggested by various authors.
The pii :s can be obtained from the relevant financial
statistics, though in some cases published figures need to be
revised (Vainiomaki et al 1987).
The estimation of the pj :s is clearly the most difficult and
demanding task. Financial statistics do not discriminate
between smokers' and non-smokers' contributions. As we cannot
observe the p i :s directly we have applied the approach
suggested in Appendix 2 to derive estimates for them in the
empirical part of the study.
144
4 CONSUMPTION, PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF TOBACCO
4.1 Consumption of tobacco products
In Finland the prevalence of smoking in the adult population
has changed in a manner similar to other developed countries:
the proportion of smoking men has decreased since the 1960s
but has remained steady during the last ten years at about 35
per cent. Smoking among women has become more popular, and
the proportion of smoking women has gradually increased to
about 20 per cent (STM 1987). Smoking among adolescents
decreased between 1973 and 1981 but subsequently appeared to
rise once again. During the past few years a great number of
smokers have switched to tobacco products containing less of
harmful substances.
In 1987 the total consumption of tobacco amounted to 8.2
billion units (a unit being equal to one cigarette, cigar or
one gramme of pipe tobacco) which is equal to 2072 units for
every Finn aged 15 or over. The total consumption of tobacco
products is divided between four product groups: manufactured
cigarettes (89.6 % of total consumption in 1987), pipe
tobacco (9.2 %), cigars (0.9 %) and snuff and chewing tobacco
(0.3 %) (Tilastokeskus 1988). Light cigarettes (containing
less than 10 mg tar) now account for one third of cigarette
consumption (Tilastokeskus 1988). Most of the tobacco
products consumed are manufactured in Finland, with foreign
products accounting for only about 2 per cent of the total
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consumption (Tilastokeskus 1988). Consumption expenditure on
tobacco was about FIM 1077 for every Finn aged 15 and over in
1987. Tobacco expenditure amounts to 2.2 per cent of
households' total consumption expenditure (Lehtinen and
Koskenkyld 1988).
4.2 Production and distribution
The retail price of tobacco is made up of excise duty,
turnover tax, percentages for the wholesale and retail
trades, and industry's share. The price structure of tobacco
products and the breakdown of the total retail sales value
among the sectors is shown in Table 7.
The tobacco industry is heavily concentrated. Tobacco markets
are dominated by three Finnish companies which are affiliated
to the major American and British tobacco companies.
The tobacco industry is capital-intensive. Labour costs
accounted for 41 per cent of the industry's total production
costs in 1987 (Tilastokeskus 1989). The tobacco industry
employed 1230 persons in 1987. The employement impact of the
tobacco trade is difficult to assess.
About 45 per cent of retail tobacco sales take place from
retail stores, 17 per cent from kiosks, 12 per cent from
cafés and bars and the rest from other sales outlets (LTT
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Table 7. Price structure of tobacco products and
distribution of total retail sale value in 1987.
Cigarettes
(%)
Pipe
tobacco
(%)
Cigars
(%)
TOTAL
(FIM
million)
Tobacco excise 51.42 36.00 30.02 2161.6
Turnover tax 16.00 16.00 16.00 685.3
Wholesale and
retail trade 16.15 16.15 16.15 691.7
Tobacco industy 16.43 31.84 37.83 744.5
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 4283.0
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1986). Tobacco products are a major sales item for retail
stores, and in particular for kiosks. They account for about
6 % of sales of retails stores and about 30 % of kiosk sales
(LTT 1982).
The balance of the tobacco trade in 1987 was FIM 132 million
negative. The value of tobacco exports was FIM 77 million,
and imports 209 million. Exports are comprised mainly of
tobacco products, while about 83 per cent of imports are raw
and other materials (Tilastokeskus 1988).
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5. SMOKING AND HEALTH
5.1 Introduction
The health risks associated with tobacco smoking have been
widely documented (e.g. USDHEW 1979). Smoking has been shown
to be associated with a number of illnesses, both serious and
minor. Smoking increases the smoker's likelihood of
contracting many chronic, widespread illnesses and it is
commonly regarded as the single most important cause of
premature death (e.g. USDHEW 1979). Smoking-related illnesses
are often influenced by other factors, but smoking is often
considered an important, and in some cases the most
important, single cause. A central problem in analysing the
economic consequences of smoking is to identify the health
risks that arise as a result of smoking and what is the
likely magnitude of these risks.
This chapter is mainly devoted to the epidemiologic aspects
of smoking and health which, although technical from the
perspective of economics, do, in fact, largely determine the
magnitude of the final cost estimates. The second sub-section
reviews findings from the major prospective epidemiologic
follow-up studies on the link between smoking and health, in
order to generate estimates of relative risks of smokers
compared to non-smokers that can be used in the cost
analysis. In the third sub-section the appropriate parameters
for estimating costs are derived. The fourth sub-section
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deals with the problem of how to value the health
consequences of smoking.
5.2 Smoking and mortality
5.2.1 General findings
The relationship between smoking and health is one of the
most extensively researched areas in epidemiology. Several
prospective surveys on the health consequences of smoking
began in the 1950's. Groups of initially healthy persons were
observed for a number of years and several important factors
were registered, including diseases, causes of death,
occupation, age, smoking habits, etc. Perhaps the most well
known prospective studies are that on the British doctors
(Doll and Peto 1976), the Dorn study on US war-veterans (Kahn
1966, Rogot and Murray 1980), the study by the American
Cancer Society (Hammond 1966) and the Swedish population
study (Cederllif et al 1975).
These studies generally described the impact of smoking on
mortality in terms of relative risk (mortality ratio), which
measures the importance of smoking in the etiology of a
disease relative to other possible causes of the disease. The
relative risks are obtained by dividing the death rate of
smokers by the death rate of non-smokers of the same age and
sex. The relative risk equals one if smoking is not related
to the disease, it is greater than one if the disease is
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either related to or associated with smoking, and it is less
than one if smoking is preventive factor in the etiology of
the disease.
Prospective studies have indicated that smokers experience a
higher mortality relative to non-smokers overall and with
respect to specific diseases. The relative risk of male
smokers compared to life long non-smokers is about 1.7 for
all causes of death, which implies 70 % excess mortality. For
women, the relative risks have generally appeared to be
smaller than for men, which the most recent studies attribute
to less hazardous smoking habits among women. Women tend to
start smoking later in life, to smoke less and to inhale less
than men (Rogot and Murray 1980).
Smoking habits have a crucial impact on relative risks. The
most important factors associated with the increased risk of
smokers compared to non-smokers are the type of smoking,
daily consumption, degree of inhalation, age at start and
years smoked (e.g. USDHEW 1979).
Cigarette smoking is the main cause of smoking-related
mortality. The relative risks of cigar and pipe tobacco
smokers are generally found to be only slightly above non-
smokers' risk. This is probably related to the fact that
inhalation is less common among pipe and cigar smokers than
among cigarette smokers (e.g. Hammond 1966).
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The amount of cigarettes smoked daily is found to be linearly
related to the relative risk. The relative risk depends also
on the degree of inhalation, but compared to the quantity
smoked effect the inhalation effect is relatively small (e.g.
Hammond 1966).
The health risks are also related to the tar, nicotine and
carbon monoxide content of the cigarette, but research into
these aspects has not yet been extensive, as 'low-tar'
cigarettes have only recently been launched onto the markets
(e.g. Rimpela 1986). The question of whether filter tipped
cigarettes are less hazardous than others is somewhat
controversial. Though filter cigarettes have a smaller tar
content than non-filter cigarettes, they cause a greater
exposure to carbon monoxide which is one of the risk factors
for coronary heart disease (e.g. Rimpela 1978).
Age at the start of smoking is inversely related to the
relative risk; the younger the new smoker, the greater the
risk (e.g. CederlOf et al 1975). Because most diseases
associated with smoking require a long period to develop, it
has been found that smoking even 5-15 years does not increase
the risk considerably (USDHEW 1979).
The relative risk decreases as a function of time passed
since smoking ceased. Sometimes the relative risk of ex-
smokers has been greater than that of current smokers, for
example, in the case of lung cancer, chronic bronchitis and
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emphysema (e.g. Hammond 1966, Kahn 1966, Doll and Peto 1976,
Rogot and Murray 1980). This finding has been interpreted to
arise from the fact that ex-smokers are likely to differ from
those who continue to smoke. Smokers do not stop smoking
randomly. Some stop because of ill health or on doctor's
orders. The survival of those with an advanced condition
cannot be expected to improve considerably after stopping
smoking, because much of the damage, particularly lung
damage, is already irreparable. In general, ex-smokers'
relative risk seems to decline over the course of time and to
approach non-smokers' risk in 10-20 years.
5.2.2 Smoking and disease specific mortality
Coronary heart disease
Coronary heart disease (CHD) is the leading cause of death in
Finland and in many other developed countries. Several
studies show cigarette smoking to be one of the most
important risk factors, together with raised blood-
cholesterol level and high blood pressure. Lack of exercise,
mental stress and diabetes may also have a role in CHD
etiology (e.g. USDWEH 1979).
The number of cigarettes smoked per day, years smoked and
degree of inhalation are found to be associated with the
development of coronary heart disease (e.g. CederlOf et al
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1975, Doll and Peto 1976, USDWEH 1979). The relative risks
appear to depend on age. The association is the strongest
among young men (35-44 years). After that the ageing effect
is so dominant that the contribution of smoking to risk is
rather modest at older ages (Townsend and Meade 1979). The
relative risk of cigar and pipe tobacco smokers is found to
be somewhat smaller than that of cigarette smokers.
Several studies show a reduction in the risk of heart attack
and of death from coronary heart disease among ex-smokers
compared to those who continue to smoke (e.g. Kahn 1966, Doll
and Peto 1976, Rogot and Murray 1980) although it may take
over 5 or more years for ex-smokers to approach non-smokers'
risk levels. In general, it is estimated that within ten
years after smoking has stopped ex-smokers risk will approach
that of life long non-smokers. It has also been found that,
smokers who stop after a heart attack are less likely to have
further attack than those who go on smoking (e.g. USDWEH
1979).
Cancers
The most well known of the health risks of smoking is the
increasing lung cancer risk which has been repeatedly found
in epidemiologic studies since the 1920's. Smokers' relative
risk is found to be about ten times higher than that of life
long non-smokers, though the results vary considerably (e.g.
Hammond 1966, Cederliif et al 1975, Doll and Peto 1976). This
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discrepancy is due to the fact that lung cancer is very rare
among non-smokers, which makes the estimation of relative
risk unstable.
An unanimous finding of the epidemiologic studies is that the
risk of death from lung cancer is closely related to
cigarette smoking and to a smaller extent to other forms of
smoking (e.g. Hammond 1966, Kahn 1966, CederlOf et al 1975,
Doll and Peto 1976, Rogot and Murray 1980). Amongst light and
moderate smokers those who inhale have a higher risk of
getting lung cancer than those who do not. The risk of lung
cancer is also greater among smokers who start early in life.
All prospective studies show a marked reduction in lung
cancer risk in those who have stopped smoking cigarettes
compared with those who continue (e.g. Hammond 1966, Kahn
1966, Doll and Peto 1976, Rogot and Murray 1980). This
reduction in relative risk is apparent within a few years of
stopping but it is still twice as high as that of life long
non-smokers after 15 years. The risk of those who continue to
smoke increases rapidly with age, but the ex-smoker's risk
stays almost constant (Doll and Peto 1976) and thus falls
relative to the increasing risk experienced by a person had
he continued smoking. About ten years after stopping, the ex-
smokers risk is only about one quarter that of the continuing
smoker of the same age.
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Air pollution and certain occupational factors such as
asbestos dust appear to raise the risk of lung cancer, but
this effect is small compared with that of cigarette smoking.
Strong occupational exposure may be the sole cause of lung
cancer for those exposed, but their number is small compared
to the whole population. For example, Hakama (1976) reports
that 80 % of lung cancers could be eliminated if no-one
smoked, while only 0.1 % of lung cancers could be elimated if
no-one was exposed to occupational risks. For its part, air
pollution is estimated to account for 8 % of all lung cancer
cases.
In addition to lung cancer, smoking has been found to
increase the risk of many other cancers, such as cancer of
the oral cavity, esophagus, pancreas, larynx and urinary
bladder (e.g. Doll and Peto 1976, USDHEW 1979). Being so
common, however, lung cancer is by far the most important
cancer in public health terms. Smokers' risk with respect to
all cancers combined is roughly twice the risk of non-smokers
(USDHEW 1979).
Chronic bronchitis and emphysema
Chronic bronchitis and emphysema are the two other important
causes of death attributable to smoking. They are invariably
found to be associated with smoking. Because of the small
number of deaths from these causes among non-smokers and the
strong relation between the smoking habit and risk, reliable
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estimation of the relative risk is difficult. Death rates
from chronic bronchitis and emphysema appear to be related to
the number of cigarettes smoked and the way of smoking (e.g.
Doll and Peto 1976, Rogot and Murray 1980).
Pollution and occupational exposure to certain dusts may
cause chronic bronchitis, but predominantly among smokers
(e.g. USDHEW 1979). The same holds for emphysema. Post-mortem
studies show that the pathological changes of bronchitis and
emphysema are related to smoking: severe emphysema is almost
never found in non-smokers.
The lower relative risks from chronic bronchitis and
emphysema in ex-smokers compared with those who go on smoking
have been reported in several studies (e.g. Doll and Peto
1976, Rcgot and Murray 1980). A considerable reduction of
death rates in ex-smokers can be expected only after 10 years
since smoking has stopped. Before that, giving up smoking
appears to increase the risk of death (e.g. Doll and Peto
1976, Rogot and Murray 1980), although this is likely to be
due to the selection bias mentioned earlier in relation to
cancer.
Passive smoking
Over the recent years, the effect of smoking on non-smokers
health has been extensively researched. The terms passive
smoking and involuntary smoking have been used synonymously
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throughout the scientific literature when describing this
relationship. A recent report by the U.S. Surgeon General
(USDHI4S 1986) reviews in detail the scientific evidence on
passive smoking as potential cause of disease in non-smokers.
The report concludes that, while the risks of passive smoking
are smaller than the risks of active smoking, passive smoking
is indeed a cause of diseases, including lung cancer, in
healthy non-smokers.
In particular, the report indicates that cigarette smoking
during pregnancy may have an adverse effect on the baby.
Mothers who smoke have, on average, smaller babies than those
who do not smoke, and have nearly twice the likelihood of a
baby weighing less than 2 500 g at birth. Still birth and
death in the first week of life are nearly 30 % more common
in mothers who smoke regularly after the fourth month of
pregnancy, and this relationship remains when the effects of
other factors known to be associated with increased death
rates have been controlled. Further, the children of parents
who smoke compared with the children of non-smoking parents
have an increased risk of respiratory infections and
respiratory symptoms.
5.2.3 On causality between smoking and mortality
Although the excess mortality of smokers compared to non-
smokers is undisputable, there is not complete unanimity over
the causal nature of the relationship. The dispute is mainly
158
localised over coronary heart disease, whereas the causality
between smoking and lung cancer, chronic bronchitis and
emphysema is generally considered proven. In order to regard
the association between assumed cause and effect as causal, a
dose-response relationship must first be observed (e.g. Saxen
and Hakama 1970). Secondly, the association must be
biologically sensible, and thirdly there must be confidence
that some third factor has not caused the association.
Despite the mounting evidence, all these criteria are still
being debated, particularly in regard to coronary heart
disease.
The dose-response relationship has been examined both on the
individual and aggregate levels. Prospective follow-up
studies have consistently shown mortality risks to increase
as a function of the daily intake. In itself, that is not
sufficient proof of causality, because a third factor which
increases in the same proportion as smoking may have caused
the association.
The fact that ex-smokers' risk is lower than that of
continuing smokers', and that the risk seems to decrease as a
function of time passed since smoking stopped is often
regarded as evidence of causality. The main problem with this
evidence is that ex-smokers are likely to differ from those
who continue to smoke (e.g. Selzer 1980). Unfortunately, the
studies involved have not generally controlled for the
selection effect. Friedman et al (1979) found that ex-smokers
159
had smoked less and far shorter periods than those who
continued. Moreover, ex-smokers consumed less alcohol and
were better educated.
Rose and Hamilton (1978) tried to overcome this problem by
designing an intervention study. In the study group smokers
were strongly encouraged to give up smoking, while no advice
was given to the control group. After eight years follow-up
the symptoms of chronic bronchitis had become more rare in
the study group than in the control group, while no
difference was found in overall mortality; nor had sickness
absences from work decreased. On the other hand, the
causality hypothesis is supported by findings that smokers
who stop after a coronary attack are less likely to relapse
than those who continue. A Swedish study reported that
stopping halved both the number of non-fatal recurrences and
the cardiovascular deaths (Wilhelmsson et al 1981).
At the population level the dose-response relationship has
been studied by comparing the changes in the smoking habit.
However, the results are conflicting even in the case of lung
cancer (e.g. Townsend 1978, Burch 1980). The discrepancy is
mainly caused by different opinions as to how smoking affects
mortality on the individual level and hence the choice of
different measures of exposure. On the other hand, mortality,
particularly coronary heart disease mortality, is affected by
so many simultaneous factors that it is doubtful whether the
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causality hypothesis can ever be proved at the population
level.
The main problem in proving causality is that the observed
excess mortality of smokers over non-smokers may be due to
compounding factors. Many studies do not adequately account
for socio-economic factors, other health behaviours such as
alcohol consumption, and other life style factors,
occupational and environmental risks which are known to be
related to health status and also to smoking habits (USDHEW
1979). Studies that have controlled for the compounding
factors have shown smoking to have an independent effect on
mortality, although alcohol consumption and low income
(CederlOf et al 1975) and occupational status (Marmot et al
1978) are found to be related to coronary heart disease risk.
Twin studies suggest that chronic bronchitis and lung cancer
are causally related to smoking, whereas in the case of
coronary heart disease causality is still open to debate. The
twin studies, however, do suggest that the relationship
between smoking and coronary heart disease may largely be
that of cause and effect (CederlOf et al 1977, Lundman 1981).
Causality between smoking and mortality can never be proved
conclusively by empirical methods, whatever the evidence,
because the influence of all compounding factors cannot be
controlled. For example, smoking is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for lung cancer; all smokers do not get
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lung cancer and a small proportion of lung cancer patients
have never smoked. Because the causality hypothesis cannot be
proved directly, conclusions must be based on the results
that support the correlation, on the strength of the
correlation, on the temporal dose-response relationship and
on the consistency of the findings from different studies.
For preventive purposes it is safe to adopt the pragmatic
concept of causality: causality exists if there is evidence
that the possible etiological factor, such as smoking, forms
a part of the circumstances under which the probability of
getting the disease increases and if the prevalence of the
disease declines when the influence of the factor decreases
or ceases (e.g. Saxen and Hakama 1970). In addition to this,
those responsible for prevention have to consider the harm
which may occur while waiting for conclusive evidence.
Findings from the epidemiologic studies imply that if we
adopt the pragmatic definition of causality, smoking can be
interpreted to be causally related to lung cancer, chronic
bronchitis and emphysema and strongly associated with
coronary heart disease and several other diseases. On the
basis of the results from Doll and Peto (1976) and the USDHEW
(1979) report, Leu and Schaub (1983) have isolated the
diseases listed in Table 8 as having a 'convincing' or
'highly probable' causal relation to smoking.
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Some of the most recent studies on the economic costs of
smoking have analysed various cost components with respect to
the eleven diseases or disease groups listed in Table 8
(Hjalte 1984a, Ellemann-Jensen 1986). Some studies have
estimated the costs for all diseases (Peston 1972, Lindholm
1973, Thompson and Forbes 1982, Collishaw and Myers 1984) or
for broad disease groups (Luce and Schweitzer 1978, Rice et
al 1986), while most have considered only the four main
diseases associated with smoking (DHSS 1972, Lindholm 1973,
Shillington 1977, Cohen 1984, Hjalte 1984b). Some studies do
not explicitly specify the diseases analysed (Atkinson and
Townsend 1977, Leu and Schaub 1984).
5.3 Estimates of attributability
5.3.1 Attributable risk
At the population level the quantitative relationship between
smoking and health risks is commonly expressed in terms of
attributable risk. Attributable risk is defined as the
maximum proportion of a disease that can be attributed to a
characteristic or etiologic factor (e.g. Lilienfeld and
Lilienfeld 1980) assuming that other factors influencing the
occurence of smoking-related diseases are equally distributed
among smokers and non-smokers. The attributable risk depends
on the relative risk of smokers as compared to non-smokers
and on the prevalence of smoking among the population. In
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heart disease 414410-412,Coronary
Aortic aneurysm 	 441
Other peripheral
vascular diseases
	 443
Chronic bronchitis
	 491
Emphysema	 492
Table 8. Diseases strongly related to smokinga
Disease	 ICD-9 code
Cancer of
Oral cavity 140-1491
Esophagus 1501
Pancreas 157
Larynx 1611
Lung 162
Urinary bladder 188
Source: Leu and Schaub (1983), based on Doll and Peto (1976)
and USDHEW (1979).
a The precise names of the diseases are given in Appendix 3.
1 50 % of the excess deaths of smokers attributed to other
factors.
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this section we derive the relevant parameters for estimating
the attributable risks and hence the proportion of cases and
costs that can be attributed to smoking.
5.3.2 Relative risks for the chosen diseases
The cases and costs estimated in the following sections are
confined to the diseases shown in Table 8, although they may
represent conservative estimates and thus underestimate the
health consequences of smoking. The chosen diseases are the
same as analysed in Leu and Schaub (1983b), Hjalte (1984a)
and Ellemann-Jensen (1986).
In the case of diseases that are caused by several factors it
is always difficult to isolate the true impact of a single
factor. Therefore it is very difficult, if not impossible, to
give a precise estimate of how smoking contributes to the
development of a particular disease. However, the
uncertainties surrounding the estimates can be minimized by
applying alternative relative risks for a given disease. As
disease, age and sex specific relative risks in relation to
smoking are not available for Finland, we used figures
commonly applied in comparable studies.
The approach here is to use the disease specific relative
risks derived in three well-known prospective epidemiologic
follow-up studies based on British doctors (Doll and Peto
1976), males and females in 25 U.S. states (Hammond 1966) and
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a probability sample of the Swedish population (CederlOf et
al 1975). Most of the previous studies on economic costs of
smoking have derived the relative risks either from Doll and
Peto (1976) or Hammond (1966). The Swedish study (CederlOf et
al 1975) controlled for several confounding socioeconomic
factors and was therefore included. Table 9 outlines some
basic information about the three studies. The age-and sex
specific relative risks used in this study for smokers and
former smokers are given in Appendix 4.
Application of the relative risks implies several
assumptions. First, the estimated excess mortality of smokers
compared to non-smokers is assumed to be mainly caused by
smoking. That is, if current smokers stopped smoking, their
mortality rate is then assumed to approximate that of non-
smokers. In reality this may happen only after a long period
of time, even if smokers were assumed to be similar to non-
smokers in all other respects. Secondly, it is assumed that
smoking has an independent effect on mortality. That is, a
combination of other risk factors, such as alcohol and
hypertension, will operate additively upon mortality.
Thirdly, the relationship between smoking and mortality in
Finland is assumed to be similar to the country of the
original study. That is, the prevalence of other risk factors
known to increase mortality, such as high blood pressure in
case of coronary heart disease, should be about equal. This
is not necessarily the case. Therefore, the results to be
reported in later sections should be interpreted cautiously.
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Table 9. Outline of the prospective epidemiologic studies of
smoking and mortality used to derive the relative
risks applied in this study
STUDY
Doll and
	 Hammond (1966)
	 CederlOf
Peto (1976)	 et al (1975)
Subjects	 British
	 Citizens of	 Probability
doctors	 U.S. states
	 sample of the
Swedish
population
Population size	 40 000	 1 000 000
	 55 000
- females
	
6 000
	 563 000
	 27 700
Age range	 20+	 35-84
	 18-69
Years of follow-up
reported	 20	 12	 10
Number of deaths
	
10 072	 150 000
	 4 500
Person years of
experience
	
600 000
	 8 000 000	 550 000
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5.3.3 Prevalence of smoking
The quantitative impact of smoking-related health risks
depends crucially on the prevalence of smoking in a
population. The proportion of smokers among the Finnish
population over 15 years old has remained more or less
constant since the latter half of the 1970's. A third of
Finnish males and about one fifth of women smoke daily (STM
1987). Smoking depends on age and sex. There are relatively
more former smokers in the oldest age groups than in any
other.
The prevalence of smoking is, however, very difficult to
establish precisely, since consumers tend to under-report
their consumption. Interview studies usually appear to reveal
only about 70 per cent of the total consumption suggested by
sales statistics (e.g. Valtonen and Rimpela 1982, Warner
1977). Accurate information on the prevalence of smoking is
essential for assessing its impact on the population and for
empirical cost estimates.
The relative sizes of various smoking groups were estimated
from a representative sample of the non-institutionalised
Finnish population. The original interview survey was carried
out by the Social Insurance Institution in 1976 (Kalimo et al
1982). For the purpose of this study the original sample was
limited to persons aged 25 and over (N=11 677). Interviewees
were divided into three smoking groups: non-smokers, former
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smokers and regular smokers (persons who had smoked regularly
during the year preceding the interview). Occasional smokers
were classified as non-smokers. Smokers were not divided into
sub-groups according to type of tobacco smoked, number of
cigarettes smoked per day or duration of smoking. Thus the
following results relate to an average smoker.
Enactment of the Tobacco Act in 1976 sparked a lively public
discussion about the health risks of smoking. As the
interview survey was carried out at about the same time, it
is unlikely that the interviewees exaggerated their smoking.
Thus it is possible that the attributable risks estimated in
this study are too low. Classification of occasional smokers
as non-smokers may have a similar effect. The figures were
not, however, adapted for possible underreporting. The
relative sizes of the smoking groups by age and sex are given
in Appendix 4.
5.3.4 Estimation of the attributable risks
The disease specific attributable risks were estimated
separately for smokers and jointly for smokers and former
smokers by age and sex. The attributable risks for smokers
were estimated for all diseases listed in Table 8. The joint
attributable risks were estimated only for the four main
smoking-related illnesses: lung cancer, coronary heart
disease, chronic bronchitis and emphysema.
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The total number of cases and costs attributed to smoking
were estimated using the joint attributable risks for the
four diseases and the smokers' attributable risks for the
other seven diseases. The maximum of potentially avoidable
cases and costs were approximated using the attributable
risks for smokers. These can be interpreted to reflect the
maximum number of cases that can be avoided or the maximum
value of resources that can be freed to cure other illnesses
or freed for other uses in society in the long run if all
current smokers stopped smoking and would never start again.
In order to estimate the range of the likely cases and costs,
three sets of age and sex specific attributable risks were
estimated for each diagnosis, applying the relative risks
obtained in the three chosen studies (Doll and Peto 1976,
Hammond 1966, CederlOf et al 1975).
Doll and Peto (1976) suggest that 50 % of the excess
mortality of smokers for cancers of the oral cavity (140-
149), esophagus (150) and larynx (161) can be attributed to
other factors than smoking. The estimated attributable risks
were adjusted accordingly.
In estimating the attributable risks for smokers, former
smokers and non-smokers were grouped together, assuming that
both groups were similar. This procedure is likely to
underestimate the potentially avoidable cases and costs.
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The results reported in the empirical part of this study were
detailed separately for each disease, age and sex group.
However, only the range of the empirical estimates is given
in each section. The attributable risks reported for males
and females in various sections indicate the total proportion
of cases and costs attributed to smoking in this study. The
detailed data and the method for calculating the attibutable
risks are given in Appendix 4.
5.3.5 Application of the attributable risks
The major economic consequences of smoking were listed in
chapter 3. The magnitude of the health consequences and the
subsequent costs are determined by the attributable risks.
The number of premature deaths due to smoking can be
estimated directly by applying the attributable risks defined
in the previous section. Other cost items are more difficult
to attribute.
Methodologically, the costs arising from health services
utilization, sickness absence, disability and rehabilitation
should be estimated by applying the respective attributable
risks derived from the different rates of utilization,
sickness absence, disability and rehabilitation between
smokers to non-smokers. This is the approach adopted in some
studies to attribute health care costs (DHSS 1972, Atkinson
and Townsend 1977, Collishaw and Myers 1984, Rice et al 1986)
and costs due to sickness absence (Atkinson and Townsend
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1977, Shillington 1977). Given that the data used have not
been controlled for other factors, such as social class and
use of alcohol, which are known to be related to smoking, the
studies tend to overestimate the costs.
The second best approach, adopted in most studies, is to
attribute health care costs and other health related costs by
applying attributable risks derived for mortality (Lindholm
1973, Shillington 1977, Luce and Schweitzer 1978, Thompson
and Forbes 1982, Hjalte 1984b, Cohen 1984, Ellemann-Jensen
1986). Use of attributable risks based on overall mortality
would implicitely assume all diseases to be terminal, which
obviously is not the case. However, this approach can be
employed for analysing costs arising from the major smoking-
related diseases, such as listed in Table 8, which are
frequently fatal, because it is reasonable to assume that the
observed differences in mortality also apply in morbidity,
otherwise two sets of causal relations would be called for.
In this study, the disease specific attributable risks are
used for estimating the cases and costs arising from health
services utilization, sickness absence, disability,
rehabilitation and premature deaths. The link between smoking
and all health risks is thus assumed to be the same as
between smoking and mortality by age, sex and diagnosis.
Estimated costs of smoking reflect the true costs as far as
this assumption is justified.
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5.4 Valuation of health effects
The most complex and controversial task in any study
attempting to evaluate the economic consequences of risky
activities is to assign a monetary value to the health
effects produced by the activity or avoided by prevention. In
economic literature, the problem of valuing health is most
commonly addressed under the heading of 'valuation of life'.
There is no single universally accepted approach for valuing
health. In empirical research either of the two main methods
is commonly applied: the human capital approach or the
willingness to pay approach. The human capital approach
derives the value of life from the discounted stream of
future earnings. The willingness to pay approach studies how
much individuals or society would be prepared to pay for a
reduction in the risk of death. The methods are used to value
changes in both morbidity and mortality.
The social costs of smoking depend crucially on the value
assigned to smoking related deaths. Therefore, in this
section we give a rather lengthy review of the pros and cons
of the alternative methods for valuing health and finally
assess their applicability for valuing the health effects of
smoking. In what follows, the terms value of life and value
of health are used synonymously.
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5.4.1 The human capital approach
According to the human capital school of thought the value of
health is determined by an individual's contribution to
production. Basically, this method attempts to assess a value
for an individual's productive output. The basic idea is
simple. When the individual falls ill, he is not taking part
in production and therefore part of society's human capital
rests idle. When the individual dies, the society loses part
of its human capital entirely. From this perspective, the
premature death of an individual of working age implies that
society loses his potential productive output, which is
reflected in commodities left unproduced and in lost economic
welfare (Cooper and Rice 1976, Mooney 1977, Hodgson and
Meiners 1982).
In the human capital approach the economic impact of a
premature death is evaluated by estimating what would have
been the value of individual's expected production during the
rest of his life-time had he not died prematurely. The value
of expected life-time production is usually estimated on the
basis of expected working-years and expected earnings (Cooper
and Rice 1976, Hodgson and Meiners 1982). An allowance is
made for the individual's life-expectancy and often for
his/her probability of being employed at various ages. The
earnings are often adjusted for indirect labour costs, such
as employers contributions to social security schemes, and
other components reflecting the value of production (Hodgson
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- and Meiners 1982). The value of expected life-time production
is estimated by age and sex and discounted to the present
value.
Several reasons have been put forward for discounting the
future costs and benefits. Individuals may have positive time
preference rates and may thus weigh future benefits less
highly than present benefits. This may be due to pure myopia,
to uncertainty associated with the future, or to diminishing
marginal utility of consumption. The other reason is that
benefits available in the present may be invested to produce
greater benefits in the future, and thus there may be an
opportunity cost of receiving benefits in the future instead
of in the present. In either case, the undiscounted sum of
the life-time benefits would overstate the present value of
the benefits to the individual. Discounting converts a stream
of future benefits into its present value.
Human capital estimates generally account for the anticipated
average annual rate of growth in productivity, and sometimes
for unemployment. The proponents of this approach, however,
suggest that the work-experience rates during a year of full
employment should be used, otherwise losses due to illness
cannot be isolated from losses due to unemployment (e.g. Rice
and Hodgson 1981). If, however, the figures are used to
illustrate only the economic losses to society, not the value
of life, then they should be adjusted for unemployment.
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Sometimes a component is added to the human capital estimate
to allow for pain, suffering and other psychosocial costs
(e.g. Weisbrod 1961, Dawson 1973). Non-labour income is
excluded from the calcluations, since the value and earnings
of a decendent's assets are transferred to other members of
society.
As the purpose is to describe the value of an individual's
production from the societal point of view, taxes and fiscal
charges are not deducted from the earnings. From the
individual's point of view the relevant perspective is
naturally the expected life-time net earnings (earnings minus
direct taxes and fiscal charges).
Some have proposed that the value of an individual's expected
life-time consumption should be deducted from the value of
expected life-time production (e.g. Weisbrod 1961, Dawson
1973). If the individual had not died prematurely he would
have increased society's material well-being by his
productive output, but would have consumed part of it
himself. It is therefore argued that when the individual dies
the rest of society loses the difference between his expected
life-time production and consumption. Economists applying the
human capital approach nowadays generally agree that
consumption should not be deducted from production, since
that would imply an individual's life to have value only to
other members of society, not to the individual himself (e.g.
Hodgson and Meiners 1982). The net approach is not commonly
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encountered in practice because of its obvious policy
implications: the death of anyone whose expected life-time
consumption would exceed expected production would imply a
net gain to society. In Finland, those would be men aged 55
and women aged 50. The net approach can, however, be applied
if the aim is to assess the economic externalities arising
from premature deaths.
Human capital estimates are relatively simple to derive and
intuitively easy to understand. This approach emphasises the
individual's value as a factor of production, but ignores
other dimensions of illness and death such as pain and
suffering, aversion to risk and loss of leisure. The
estimated human capital values reflect livelihood rather than
the value of life; what matters is the productive potential
of an individual, not his life itself. The method implies
that the life of the young is more valuable than the life of
the elderly and the life of a man worth more than a woman's.
Standard human capital estimates have a zero value for
persons living on non-labour income, such as pensioners, and
for persons doing unpaid work, like house-wives. However,
imputed values can be derived for these groups.
In this approach it is assumed that employees are paid by
their marginal product and the future will be like the
present. With centrally negotiated wages, it is clear that
wages and salaries paid do not necessarily reflect the
individual's marginal product. Ideally, the analysis should
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be based on expected future survival probabilities, the
probabilities of having an occupation and the expected
earnings provided one is alive and in an occupation. While
studies on the rational expectations provide some grounds for
assuming that the actual market prices reflect expectations
for the future, the same cannot be assumed of structural
factors such as female labour force participation rates,
which are influenced by cohort effects, among other things.
An important practical problem in applying the human capital
approach is the choice of the discount rate, as there is no
single correct discount rate applicable in all circumstances.
According to the time preference school of thought, the
discount rate should reflect the social time preference,
while the opportunity cost school of thought maintains that
the rate should reflect the social opportunity cost of
resources employed in the next best alternative. If all
markets were perfectly competitive these two rates would be
equal. However, since the markets are imperfect there is not
a single rate of discount which would combine both these
aspects. The discount rate should be the result of a balance
between opportunity cost and time preference. How to arrive
at this balance is not specified, however, and the usual
approach is to present a number of alternative rates.
-
The human capital approach also has some more profound
theoretical shortcomings (Mishan 1971, Jones-Lee 1976, Mooney
1977). It is not consistent with the traditional economic
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approach which is based on the consumer's own preferences;
i.e his/her willingness to pay for receiving benefits and
avoiding risks. The human capital approach does not measure
the individual's own assessment of the value of his life, nor
does it reflect society's valuation of an individual's life.
In the human capital approach life is seen to have only
instrumental value. The approach is based on the social
welfare function which aims to maximize the gross national
product (Mishan 1971, Jones-Lee 1976, Mooney 1977), which is
not necessarily the same as maxmizing social welfare.
When applied to the health sector, the method implies that
the primary objective of preventive or any other health care
activities is to improve the productive potential of the
labour force. That clearly is one of the objectives, but it
is not generally regarded as the most important (Sintonen
1981, STM 1987). Allocation of health care resources to the
care of the elderly, for example, indicates that the human
capital approach is not the leading principle for decision-
making within the health sector. The human capital approach
can, however, be applied to assess the economic burden to
society arising from illness and death.
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5.4.2 The willingness to pay approach
Individuals' willingness to pay
The lack of consumer orientation in the human capital
approach has led to attempts to value life in accordance with
mainstream economic theory. Mishan (1971) argued that
valuation of life should be based on the same principles that
are generally followed in welfare economics, and to derive
the value of life from individuals' preferences, and their
willingness to avoid or accept a health risk. The basic idea
is that the individual himself is the best person to make
value judgements concerning his welfare and health and
therefore that values should be derived from individuals'
willingness to pay.
In the willingness to pay approach it is crucial to make some
assessment of how individuals value small changes in risks.
In most decisions that lead to changes in health risks it is
not possible to idenfity in advance the individuals that will
be affected by the decision. In most cases it is possible,
however, to estimate, for example, how many deaths can be
avoided statistically by the decision. Thus, the willingness
to pay approach does not attempt to value life directly, but
_
to examine how much people are individually or collectively
prepared to pay for a small reduction in the risk of injury
or death (Schelling 1968, Mishan 1971, Jones-Lee 1976). If an
individual prefers a low probability of death to a high
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probability, he can be assumed to be willing to give up some
of his present wealth in order to achieve a reduction in the
probability of injury or death. Aggregating these valuations
among individuals a social valuation can be derived. This
approach is based on the social welfare function which aims
to maximize welfare of society, not only the gross national
product (Mishan 1971, Jones-Lee 1976, Mooney 1977).
The empirical willingness to pay estimates have been derived
either by examining the choices made by individuals or by
survey methods. Examination of choices is based on the idea
that in many real-life situations individuals choose between
alternative risky perspectives (e.g. travelling to work by
car or bus) and in making these choices reveal their
preferences towards various risks. Thus, it is possible to
infer from these choices indirectly how individuals value
changes in risks in practice. In this revealed preference
approach, the willingness to pay estimates are derived by
examining individuals actual choices in situations were they
voluntarily assume risks.
The revealed preference estimates have been derived on the
basis of the compensated wage differentials associated with
risky jobs and consumption decisions. By comparing the wages
paid in risky occupations with the general wage level,
various studies have attempted to estimate the size of the
risk-premium, i.e. the extra compensation necessary to induce
workers to take risky jobs (e.g. Thaler and Rosen 1973,
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Viscusi 1978, Veljanovski 1978, Needleman 1980, Mann and
Psacharopoulos 1982). Willingness to pay estimates inherent
in consumption activities have been derived by analysing for
example choices associated with the purchase of smoke
detectors (Dardis 1980) and traffic safety, such as the use
of pedestrian subways (Melinek 1974), car seat belts
(Blomquist 1979) and time, fuel and risk trade-offs in
motorway driving (Ghosh et al 1975). The labour market
studies have produced a wider range of estimates for the
value of statistical life than studies based on consumption
activities (Table 10).
The advantage of the revealed preference approach is that the
values are based on individuals' actual choices. In practice,
however, there are only rare situations where individuals are
genuinly free to choose between risk and compensation.
Studies using survey methods (interview- or postal surveys)
have attempted to estimate individuals willingness to pay
directly, by asking the respondents how much they would be
prepared to pay for a small reduction in risk of injury or
death in various hypothetical situations. The general
approach is to assume that, for example, two people out of
10 000 will die as a result of an action or activity, but it
is not known in advance who those two will be. Each of the
10 000 has an equal chance of becoming a victim. Individuals
are asked to assess how much they would be prepared to pay
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Dardis (1980)
Ghosh, Lees and
Seal (1975)
Melinek (1974)
Blomquist (1979)
Needleman (1980)
Thaler and
Rosen (1973)
Table 10. Estimates of the value of statistical life from
some revealed preference studies (FIM 1987)1
AUTHORS	 DATA SOURCE	 ESTIMATED VALUE
OF STATISTICAL
LIFE
(FIM million)
Time/safety/etc trade-off
Purchase of domestic smoke
detectors (USA)
Motorway speed/time/fuel
trade-off (UK)
Time/safety trade-off in use
of pedestrian subways (UK)
Time/safety trade-off in use
of car seat belts (USA)
Compensating wage differentials
for construction workers (UK)
for workers in risky
occupations (USA)
Mann and
	 for manual and non-manual
Psacharopoulos (1982) workers (UK)
Viscusi (1978)
	 for manual workers (USA)
Veljanovski (1978)
	 in industry (UK)
2.112
2.565
2.615
2.816
0.855
3.017
12.370
17.147
30.120
Source: Jones-Lee (1985).
1 The original 1983 figures reported by Jones-Lee have been
converted to 1987 Finn marks using relevant price indices
and exchange rates.
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for a reduction in the risk of death from 2/10 000 to
1/10 000 (e.g. Acton 1973, Jones-Lee 1976, Jones-Lee et al
1985, Persson 1988). The studies based on survey methods have
produced a wide range of estimates for the value of
statistical life (Table 11).
The willingness to pay approach produces substantially higher
estimates for the value of life than the human capital
approach and the range of willingness to pay estimates
appears to be wider (Blomquist 1981). Value of life estimates
reported in Jones-Lee's (1985) survey range from FIM 0.4
million to FIM 30 million, expressed in 1987 Finn marks. Most
of the studies surveyed reported the value of statistical
life to be over FIM 2.5 million.
Conceptually, the willingness to pay estimate is broader than
the human capital estimate and includes, in principle, all
factors affecting an individuals welfare, including factors
that are difficult to measure, such as pain and suffering,
risk aversion and the value of leisure. With the willingness
to pay approach it is also possible to derive a value of life
for persons living on non-labour income, such as pensioners,
and for persons doing unpaid work like house-wives, whose
life would be given a zero value in a standard human capital
approach.
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Table 11. Estimates of the value of statistical life from some
questionnaire studies (FIM 1987)1
AUTHORS
	
DATA SOURCE	 ESTIMATED
VALUE OF
STATISTICAL
LIFE
(FIM million)
Acton (1973)
Melinek (1974)
Melinek, Woolley
and Baldwin (1973)
Persson (1988)
Jones-Lee,
Hammerton
and Philips (1985)
Small non-random sample survey
(N = 93) of willingness to pay
for public provision of prevention
of death from heart attack (USA)
Non-random sample survey (N = 873)
of willingness to pay for
hypothetical safe cigarettes (UK)
Non-random sample survey (N = 873)
of willingness to pay for domestic
fire safety (UK)
Random-sample survey (N = 506) of
willingness to pay for transport
safety (Sweden)
Random-sample survey (N = 1 150) of
willingness to pay for transport
safety (UK)	 11.918
0.362
0.855
1.659
7.161
Source: Jones-Lee (1985) except Persson (1988).
1	 The original 1983 figures reported by Jones-Lee and
Persson have been converted to 1987 Finn marks using
relevant price indices and exchange rates.
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Empirical results suggest that the willingness to pay
estimates mainly reflect the non-economic side of life. In
the Jones-Lee et al (1985) study only a small proportion of
the respondents took into account direct economic effects,
such as lost working hours or medical costs, in answering the
valuation questions.
Theoretical studies, based on the expected utility theory,
have shown that individuals' willingness to pay for a similar
size change in risk increases with the level of the initial
risk (e.g. Weinstein et al 1980, Rosen 1981); individuals are
prepared to pay more for a reduction in risk from 10/10 000
to 9/10 000 than from 5/10 000 to 4/10 000, though the actual
reduction in risk is equal in both cases. This implies that
there is not a single value for a statistical life that could
be applied in all circumstances, but that it is likely to
vary depending on the decision context.
If applied in health care, the willingness to pay principle
would imply that priority in resource allocation would be
given to reduce the risks of those groups with high risk of
death, though the number of lives saved would be smaller than
had the resources been allocated to reduce the risks of low
risk groups.
The willingness to pay approach provides, at least in theory,
a simple solution to the discounting problem. The willingness
to pay estimate incorporates an implicit rate of time
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preference, which reflects how the individual weighs future
benefits as compared with the present. Therefore, no further
disounting is needed in this case.
In theory, the willingness to pay approach makes it possible
to derive a value for statistical life which is based on an
individuals' own valuations to be used in economic evaluation
of life-saving programmes. In practice, many difficulties are
encountered in deriving the willingness to pay estimates.
The reliability of the methods used for deriving willingness
to pay estimates is not yet very good. For example, the wage
premiums may not necessarily reflect accurately the risks
involved in jobs. Individuals' opportunities to choose freely
their occupation and place of work according to their
preferences are often limited. The situation in the labour
market may have a greater impact on job-seeking from risky
occupations than the compensation received, at least
occasionally and in certain regions. The wage-level is
determined mainly by other factors than the riskiness of the
occupation.
Individuals may not perceive risks correctly. For example,
wage premiums may not accurately reflect workers preferences
if they have incomplete information regarding the risks to
which they are exposed. Consumers' knowledge and ability to
understand the risks involved in consumption choices may be
limited. It is also difficult to separate risk premiums from
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other confounding factors. Apart from risks, consumption
decisions depend on consumers' ability to pay and hence on
the prevailing distribution of income. For the same reason,
it is likely that the sum individuals would be willing to pay
for reduced risk of death differs from the sum they would be
willing to accept as compensation for increased risk of
death.
Individuals have great difficulties in perceiving marginal
changes in small probabilities. In interview and postal
surveys, individuals may have difficulties in answering
rationally and consistently to abstract and complicated
questions dealing with marginal changes in risks in
hypothetical situations (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1974,
Muller and Reutzel 1984). In the Jones-Lee et al (1985) study
the great proportion of the respondents appeared to have
difficulties in this respect.
Answers to hypothetical valuation questions may also depend
on the respondents ability to pay. To allow and control for
this, the respondents may be asked to bear in mind what they
can afford (e.g. Jones-Lee et al 1985). Expressed willingness
to pay may differ from what individuals are actually prepared
to pay when faced with the real choice. Respondents may
conceal their true willingness to pay if they believe they
will eventually have to pay. On the other hand, they may
exaggerate their willingness to pay if they believe they will
not be actually required to do so.
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The willingness to pay approach is consistent with the
traditional economic approach which emphasizes consumer
sovereignity and is regarded a theoretically sound approach
to health valuation. Among economists, the willingness to pay
approach is clearly displacing the traditional human capital
approach. Due to uncertainties connected with the empirical
willingness to pay estimates, however, the method is not yet
commonly applied in economic evaluation and decision making.
Society's willingness to pay
The willingness to pay approach has been criticized in that,
among other things, the individual willingness to pay may
have little relevance in the decision-making of a public
sector body whose budget constraints need bear little
relation to the wealth of individuals affected by its
decisions (e.g. Keeney 1982). Therefore, it has been
suggested that the valuation problem should be approached
directly from the decision-makers point of view and to derive
the value of life indirectly from the values implicit in
previous resource allocation decisions (e.g Mooney 1977).
It is fairly straightforward to show that every decision
affecting health positively or negatively carries a value for
life implicit in the decision. When a new health care
programme is adopted, or the existing programme expanded, the
decision makers are valuing life indirectly. Investments
improving traffic safety or tighter fire safety regulations
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may prevent deaths. By examining the costs of the programmes
and deaths prevented/caused by them it is possible to derive
the value of life implicit in the decisions.
A simple example illustrates this approach. If y deaths
caused by collisions with elks can be prevented by installing
an elk-fence, costing x marks, along a highway, but the fence
is not installed, it can be inferred that the value of life
implicit in the decision is at most x/y marks. If on the
other hand, the fence is installed, the value of life implied
in the decision is at least x/y marks. In both cases the
decision made reveals the decision-makers' willingness to pay
to prevent deaths. The similarity with the revealed
preference approach is obvious.
The social willingness to pay estimates derived on the basis
of past decisions vary greatly from one situation and
programme to another (Mooney 1977) (Table 12). For example,
fewer resources are allocated to preventive measures aimed at
the healthy population than to treatment of the seriously
ill, though the expected number of lives saved would be the
same. The great variation in the implicit values applied in
different decisions may not, however, necessarily indicate
inconsistent decision-making.
As noted in the previous section, it is natural and
consistent with the expected utility theory that individuals
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Rescue operations at sea 	 478 000
Care of the mentally	 3 283 000
retarded
Care of the permanently	 3 788 000
disabled
Table 12. Estimates of the value of statistical life implicit
in some past decisions made in Finland (FIM 1987)
AUTHORS	 DATA SOURCE	 ESTIMATED VALUE
OF STATISTICAL
LIFE
TVH (1979)1
TVH (1979)2
LTT (1990)
Konttinen (1987) 2
	Coronary artery bypass	 28 000'
surgery	 36 000b
1	 The original figures have been converted to 1987 marks using
the consumer price index.
2	 The original figures have been converted to 1987 marks using
the hospital cost index.
a	 Cost per life-year gained.
b	 Cost per working-year gained.
191
value statistical life differently in cases of high and low
risk (e.g. Weinstein et al 1980, Rosen 1981). Preference for
ineffective, expensive, crisis-oriented medical procedures
rather than cheap, cost-effective preventive measures
affecting smaller risks can be perfectly rational, and thus
variation in society's willingness to pay natural.
The advantage of this approach is that the figures derived
reflect decision-makers' views on the value of life. However,
it ignores the valuations of the individuals affected by the
decisions, and thus it is not consistent with the traditional
economic approach which gives priority to individuals'
valuations. It is not generally possible to work out how the
implicit values have been arrived at. Despite its
similarities with the revealed preference approach, the
society's willingness to pay approach has not been commonly
applied in practice to valuation of health or life.
5.4.3 The relationship between the human capital approach and
the willingness to pay approach
These days, economists generally acknowledge that the human
capital estimates reflect only part of the value of life and
therefore recommend willingness to pay as a theoretically
sound approach to value life (e.g. Mishan 1971, Mooney 1977,
Jones-Lee 1985). In practice, however, the human capital
approach is the most commonly applied, despite its
theoretical shortcomings.
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From the point of view of decision-making, it is naturally
interesting to know whether the estimates derived by the two
methods are theoretically related, and hence if it is
possible to derive willingness to pay estimates from human
capital estimates. Theoretical studies that have addressed
the problem have usually examined individuals' willingness to
pay to avoid economic losses associated with small changes in
risks (e.g. Usher 1973, Conley 1976, Goddeeris 1983).
Willingness to pay estimates thus derived are conceptually
not as broad as the estimates derived by the revealed
preference approach or survey methods, which, at least in
principle, also include all non-economic factors affecting
individuals' welfare.
Usher (1973) and Conley (1976) examined how much, well-
informed rational individuals would be prepared to pay to
avoid economic losses associated with a small risk of death.
In accordance with the willingness to pay principle, they
assumed that individuals weigh economic risks and benefits
when they make decisions concerning safety, such as whether
to purchase a cyclist's helmet. Individuals are assumed to
maximize their expected life-time income, to be risk-averse
and to treat economic losses associated with the risk of
death symmetrically to other economic risks. It is shown
that, by these assumptions, the lower limit of the value of
statistical life is equal to the individual's expected life-
time income.
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Theoretical studies have not been able to show that the
willingness to pay estimates can be derived from the human
capital estimates. They do, however, strongly suggest that
human capital estimates can be interpreted to serve as a
lower limit for the willingness to pay estimates (e.g. Usher
1973, Conley 1976, Linnerooth 1979, Blomquist 1981, Rosen
1981, Goddeeris 1983, Jones-Lee 1985) and hence a lower limit
for the value of life. Blomquist (1981) therefore suggests
that decisions concerning projects which improve health by
small amounts should be based on a value of life greater than
the human capital estimate in order to avoid underinvestment.
Landefeld and Seskin (1982) have attempted to operationalize
the results obtained by Usher (1973) and Conley (1976) and to
seek for the likely lower limit of what the individuals would
be prepared to pay in practice from the human capital
perspective. They call their approach an adjusted willingness
to pay/human capital approach. In accordance with the
willingness to pay approach, they try to gauge how much a
risk-averse individual would be prepared to pay to avoid
economic risks associated with the risk of death. Following
the human capital approach, they examine only economic losses
associated with death and exclude all non-material losses.
They seek to discover how much potential income is lost by
the individual when he dies prematurely.
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The income concept applied in the analysis covers all an
individual's expected life-time income such as earnings,
interest, rents, royalties, pensions and other transfer
payments. As in the willingness to pay approach, the discount
rate used represents the individual's opportunity cost of
investing in risk-reducing activities, rather than society's
opportunity costs as in the human capital approach. From the
individual's perspective, the relevant income measure is net-
income (income after taxes) and the relevant discount rate is
after-tax rate of return. Finally, in accordance with the
willingness to pay approach, a risk-aversion factor is
applied to take account of the fact that individuals are
likely to be at least as risk-averse with regard to loss of
life as they are with respect to financial loss.
The empirical adjusted willingness to pay/human capital
estimates derived by Landefeld and Seskin (1982) were two to
four times higher than the human capital estimates for people
aged 35. The relative differences in the value of life
estimates between males and females and between young and old
persons remained virtually the same as in the human capital
approach. For those under 15 years of age, the proposed
method produced clearly higher estimates for the value of
life than the human capital approach, mainly because of the
lower discount rate used in calculating the adjusted
willingness to pay/human capital estimates.
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In the author's opinion, the major advantage of the proposed
approach is that the changes in health risks are valued from
the individual's point of view, as in the willingness to pay
approach. This method attempts to cover, at least in
principle, all economic consequences to the individual
resulting from changes in health risk. However, the method is
only loosely linked with the welfare theory and excludes all
non-economic losses from the analysis.
The adjusted willingness to pay/human capital approach can be
regarded as an extension of the human capital approach with a
mild willingness to pay flavour in it. The method allows one
to estimate the magnitude by which the human capital
estimates should be upgraded if the economic effects of
illness and death are to be analysed from the point of view
of the individuals affected. Basically, the method provides
an answer to the question of how much individuals would, in
principle, be able to pay, if they eventually had to, for
programmes that improve health. This method has not been
commonly applied in practice to value health.
5.4.4 Smoking and the value of health
Assigning a monetary value to the health effects of smoking
is an essential part of social cost calculations in each of
the models defined above. The preceding discussion does not
offer, however, any obvious solution for estimating the value
of smoking-related health effects. The willingness to pay
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approach is theoretically sound and should therefore be
preferred. However, the reliability of the methods used for
deriving the respective estimates remains unsatisfactory. The
human capital approach has the merit of being relatively easy
to apply and it is the most commonly encountered. However,
it, undermines consumers' valuations. So does the societal
variant of the willingness to pay approach. The adjusted
willingness to pay/human capital approach looks at
individuals ability, not willingness, to pay and ignores non-
economic aspects of life, which the willingness to pay
approach, at least in principle, includes.
To what extent the estimated value of health or life is
relevant for assessing the policy relevant costs varies
between models. In the traditional economic model the value
of health is not a relevant cost item for designing policy.
Since, in this model, consumers voluntarily assume risk, and
smoking reveals that consumption benefits surpass the risks.
Therefore, no value should be assigned to life, in order to
avoid double counting (e.g. Mishan 1971, Littlechild and
Wiseman 1984). In accordance with this approach some studies
have estimated the number of deaths only without assigning
any value to the lives lost (e.g DHSS 1972, Atkinson and
Townsend 1977). This would be a valid approach as long as it
is plausible to assume that smokers are fully aware of the
risk they take, they are not addicted and no caring
externalities exists.
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In all other models, one or more of these asumptions does not
hold, and whole or part of the value of health is relevant to
policy. Most of the previous studies have applied the human
capital approach to estimate this item (e.g. Peston 1971,
Shillington 1977, Luce and Schweitzer 1978, Collishaw and
Myers 1984, Hjalte 1984a, Ellemann-Jense 1986, Rice et al
1986), but have not usually noted that only part of this
estimate is relevant for guiding policy.
The approach here is to assume that the human capital
estimates serve as a lower limit for the willingness to pay
estimates and hence a lower limit for the value of life.
Accordingly, we shall evaluate the health effects by the
human capital approach, identify the proportion of these
estimates that is relevant for policy in each of the models
and indicate the implicit lower limit of the caring
externality in order to justify public intervention in each
case.
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6 ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING RELATED MORBIDITY
6.1 Direct consequences
Smoking imposes a large cost burden on the health service
through its negative effect on health. In Canada smoking is
estimated to account for 11.5 % of health care expenditure
(Thompson and Forbes 1983) and in the United States for 7.8 %
(Luce and Schweitzer 1978).
This chapter examines the relationship between smoking and
the use of health services in Finland. It aims at answering
the following questions: does smoking increase the
utilization of health services, is any such utilization
quantitatively and economically important, and which services
are likely to be affected by smoking.
6.1.1 Costs of hospital inpatient care
Smoking appears to impose a considerable strain on the
hospital system. According to studies carried out in the
United States smokers account for about 20 % more bed-days
annually than non-smokers (Oakes et al 1974, Vogt and
Schweitzer 1985). Former smokers also need slightly more bed-
days than non-smokers (Vogt and Schweitzer 1985). Results
obtained in the UK and Switzerland support these findings
(Ashford 1973, Leu and Schaub 1983b).
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Estimates of the cost burden of smoking on the hospital
system vary from 2-5 % of hospital expenditure in Sweden,
Denmark and Switzerland (Leu and Schaub 1983b, Hjalte 1984a,
Ellemann-Jensen 1986) to 8-17 % in the United States and
Canada (Thompson and Forbes 1983, Collishaw and Myers 1984,
Hinds 1986). The great discrepancy between such estimates is
explained by differences in treatment practices, smoking
habits and the estimation methods applied.
The number of bed-days attributed to smoking is usually
estimated by interview surveys or by applying the disease
specific-attributable fractions. Studies based on interview
surveys usually examine utilization of health services by
smokers and non-smokers at highly aggregated levels without
analyzing by disease (Collinshaw and Myers 1984). Smokers'
and non-smokers' bed-days are calculated per capita and the
difference is interpreted to result from smoking. Multiplying
the difference by the number of smokers gives an estimate of
the number of bed-days attributed to smoking. Since studies
based on interview surveys have not generally examined the
utilization of hospital services by disease, and bed-days
have not been standardized for factors other than age and
sex, a very high estimate is often obtained for the number of
bed-days attributed to smoking.
The number of smoking-related bed-days by disease is usually
estimated applying the attributable fractions derived for
smoking-related deaths (Leu and Schaub 1983b, Thompson and
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Forbes 1983, Hjalte 1984a, Ellemann-Jansen 1986, Stoddart et
al 1986), in which case the link between smoking and
hospitalization is assumed to be the same as the link between
smoking and mortality. Multiplying the number of disease-
specific bed-days by the estimated attributable fractions
yields the number of bed-days attributed to smoking.
Estimated in this way the number of bed-days attributed to
smoking often remains very small.
The costs of hospital care attributed to smoking are obtained
by multiplying the number of bed-days attributed to smoking
by the relevant unit costs. Ideally, disease specific cost
figures should be used (Stoddart et al 1986), but in practice
the relevant cost data has not been available, and the
average costs per day have been used as a proxy measure of
the true costs (Collishaw and Myers 1984, Leu and Schaub
1983b, Hjalte 1984a, Ellemann-Jensen 1986). These over- or
underestimate the true costs of treatment, depending on the
disease.
Material and methods
In Finland, smoking-related diseases are treated in general
hospitals (central, district and local hospitals, health
centre wards, tuberculosis sanatoriums and private
hospitals). The number of smoking related bed-days has been
estimated separately for men and women by age group, applying
the relevant disease-specific attributable fractions.
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The study involved persons aged 35-84. The number of bed-days
attributed to smoking was obtained by multiplying the total
numbers of disease, age and sex-specific bed-days by the
corresponding attributable fraction (see Appendix 4).
Smoking-induced costs of hospital care were obtained by
multiplying the number of bed-days attributed to smoking by
disease-specific costs per day which were estimated
separately. Disease-specific costs per bed-day were derived
on the basis of the costs and numbers of bed-days for each
type of hospital and specialty as described in Appendix 5.
The costs also include the estimated capital costs per bed-
day.
The numbers of bed-days were obtained from the hospital
discharge register kept by the National Board of Health
(LaakintOhallitus 1989).
Results
An estimated 224 000 - 302 000 bed-days at general hospitals
were attributed to smoking (Table 13). This is about
1.6-2.2 % of all the bed-days at general hospitals and
corresponds to about 770-1030 hospital beds in use all year
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Table 13. Estimated number of bed-days and costs of hospital
inpatient care attributed to smoking in 1987.
Disease
Attributed
to smoking (%) Smoking related
Males Females Bed-
days
(1000)
Costs
(million
FIM)
Cancer of
Oral cavity 19-39 2-3 2-4
Abdominal cavity 13-33 5 3-6 4-8
Larynx 35 2 2
Lung 80-84 16-22 82-87 103-108
Urinary bladder 16-32 2 5-7 5-9
Coronay heart disease 22-29 Oa 56-71 44-56
Other vascular diseases 14-53 1-5 1-4
Bronchitis 57-92 17-36 71-116 59-96
Emphysema 57-92 13-27 2-4 3-4
TOTAL' 224-302 222-292
1 Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
a Figure is less than half of the measure.
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round. Over two thirds of bed-days attributed to smoking were
due to bronchitis and lung cancer.
Smoking-induced costs of hospital care were estimated to be
FIM 222-292 million in 1987. This is about 2.3-3.0 % of the
total expenditure of general hospital inpatient care. About
95 % of bed-days and costs attributed to smoking resulted
from smoking by men.
Conclusions
An estimated 2.3-3.0 % of costs of hospital inpatient care
were attributed to smoking. This figure is well below, for
example, the 11-17 % estimated for Canada (Thompson and
Forbes 1983, Collishaw and Myers 1984) or the 8 % for the
United States (Luce and Schweitzer 1978, Hinds 1986), but on
a par with the 2-3 % estimated for Sweden, Denmark and
Switzerland (Leu and Schaub 1983b, Hjalte 1984a, Ellemann-
Jensen 1986).
The results reported here support the notion that smoking
imposes an economic strain on the hospital system, but the
impact may be smaller than generally expected. The influence
of reduction in smoking rates on the use of hospital services
and hospital costs is, however, unclear (See Thompson and
Forbes 1983 and 1985, Leu and Schaub 1983b and 1985). A
substantial reduction in smoking would improve the health of
the population and simultaneously increase life expectancy.
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In the long run, the latter effect may be so large that the
influence of reduction in smoking on health care expenditure
may turn out to be marginal (Atkinson and Townsend 1977, Leu
and Schaub 1983b).
6.1.2 Costs of physician care
Smoking appears to increase the use of some forms of primary
medical services. Male smokers or former smokers visit a
physician more often than non-smokers (Ashford 1973, Oakes et
al 1974). In Switzerland it is estimated that male smokers
visit a physician about 8 % more often during a year than
non-smokers (Leu and Schaub 1983b).
The relation between physician visits and smoking is not,
however, indisputable. For women, especially, the relation
appears unclear. Oakes et al (1974) found that women who
smoked visited a physician less frequently than those who did
not smoke. Chetwynd and Raymer (1986) came to the opposite
conclusion.
In the United States Vogt and Schweitzer (1985) did not find
any difference between smokers and non-smokers in the use of
hospital outpatient services. Former smokers did, however,
use outpatient services significantly more than non-smokers.
Smokers seem to use preventive services less frequently than
non-smokers or former smokers (Vogt and Schweitzer 1985).
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This is interpreted to imply that smokers are less interested
in their own health and have a tendency to avoid or to delay
the use of health services.
Estimation of the number of smoking-related physician visits
is usually based on interview surveys, which have been able
to differentiate visits by type but not by illness. Such
studies have consistently attributed about 2-3 % of all
physician visits to smoking (Leu and Schaub 1983b, Collishaw
and Myers 1984).
It is, however, unclear to what extent the observed
differences are due to smoking, because the studies have not
controlled the influence of confounding factors apart from
age and sex.
The impact of smoking on the costs of physician services has
not been studied extensively. In studies touching the subject
costs have been estimated as the product of the utilization
of physician services, the proportion attributed to smoking
and the average cost per visit (Collishaw and Myers 1984, Leu
and Schaub 1983b, Hjalte 1984a, Ellemann-Jensen 1986).
Ideally the costs of physician visits should also be
estimated by diagnosis (Stoddart et al 1986). In practice,
diagnosis-specific cost data have not been available and the
average costs have been applied (Collishaw and Myers 1984,
Leu and Schaub 1983b, Hjalte 1984a, Ellemann-Jensen 1986).
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Material and methods
The relationship between smoking and physician services was
examined in a representative sample of the non-
institutionalised Finnish population. The original interview
survey was carried out by the Social Insurance Institution in
1976 (Kalimo et al 1982). For the purpose of this study the
original sample was limited to persons aged 25 and over
(N=11 677). Utilization of occupational health care physician
services was studied among the working population aged 25-64
(N=8 000). Interviewees were divided into three smoking
groups: non-smokers, former smokers and regular smokers
(persons who had smoked regularly during the year preceding
the interview). Smokers were not divided into sub-groups
according to type of tobacco smoked, number of cigarettes
smoked per day or duration of smoking. The results indicate
utilization of physician services by an average smoker.
As sociodemographic factors like age, sex, education,
occupation and income are associated with both smoking and
utilization of physician services, the impact of these likely
confounding factors on utilization was standardized with the
general linear model (Searle 1971). The numbers of smoking-
related visits were estimated separately for general hospital
outpatient services, health centres, private sector physician
services and occupational health care. The analysis was done
separately for men and women. The significance of smoking in
explaining the utilization of services was tested by the F-
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test. Since the interview survey did not include questions
about alcohol consumption, it was not possible to control the
effect of this.
The proportional share of smoking in the total utilization of
services was calculated on the basis of mean values in the
use of services among smokers, former smokers and non-
smokers. The ratios between mean values in different smoker-
groups were assumed to give the correct distribution in use
between different groups. Use of services induced by smoking
was obtained by deducting from the total use of each group
the use not induced by smoking. Average use not induced by
smoking was in each group assumed to be the same as the
average use by non-smokers.
Proportion of physician visits attributed to smoking - the
attributable fraction (Miettinen 1974) - was estimated
separately for smokers and former smokers with the following
formula:
SOi = pi ( Ki - K3 ) / ( piKi + p2K2 + p3K3 ) ,
where p i
 = proportion of smokers, former smokers and
non-smokers (i=3) in population
Ki
 . average number of physician visits in
smoking-group i.
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The number of visits attributed to smoking was obtained by
multiplying the total number of visits by the attributable
fractions. Smoking induced costs of physician services were
obtained by multiplying the attributed number of visits by
the relevant unit costs.
Total service-specific utilization figures were allocated
between men and women in proportion to means and population
shares. From total figures were deducted the use by persons
aged under 25 estimated in the population survey of the
Personal Doctor Program (Vohlonen 1989) and the remainder was
allocated to different smoking-groups in proportion to their
means and population shares.
The final cost estimation was performed only for those
services where the impact of smoking on utilization was
statistically significant at least at the 10 % level.
The number of visits to general hospital outpatient
departments and the related unit costs were obtained from the
Hospital Statistics (Sairaalaliitto 1988). The numbers of
visits to physicians in health centres and occupational
health care were obtained from the National Board of Health
(Niskanen 1989) and the number of visits made in the private
sector from age- and occupation statistics of the Social
Insurance Institution (Kansanelakelaitos 1988a). Relevant
unit costs per visit were obtained from the cost study of the
Personal Doctor Program (Pekurinen 1989) and from the
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Ministry of Finance (Luoma 1989). The applied cost figures
also cover costs for laboratory-, X-ray- and other
examinations, apart from occupational health care where they
cover only the direct costs of physician services (cost of
labour, office, administration, etc.). The weighted average
of the service specific unit cost figures was used for the
total number of physician visits.
Results
Smoking appears to increase the total number of visits made
to physicians for both men and women (Table 14). The impact
is most pronounced for former smokers. male former smokers
visit a physician on average 22 % more frequently during the
year than male non-smokers. Among female former smokers the
excess figure was 16 % compared to non-smokers. Male smokers
visit a physician on average 7% more often than non-smokers
and female smokers 3 % more often than non-smokers. Smoking
seems to affect utilization of physician services slightly
differently in different sectors.
Smoking seems to increase the number of visits made to health
centre physicians by men, but not women. Male smokers made on
average 16 % more visits to the health centre physician
annually than non-smokers. Former smokers visited the health
centre physician 25 % more often than male non-smokers.
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Smoking also affected the utilization of services provided by
private practitioners among men but, not women. The influence
of smoking seems to be related to quitting smoking, for there
were no differences in numbers of visits between smokers and
non-smokers for either sex. Male former smokers visited a
private practitioner on average 25 % more frequently than
other males.
Smoking increased visits to occupational health care among
women, but not among men. Female smokers and former smokers
had about a third more visits to occupational health care
than non-smokers.
Smoking increased visits to outpatient departments among
women. Female smokers and former smokers had on average a
third more visits to outpatient departments annually than
non-smokers. Smoking did not have statistically significant
influence on visits to outpatient departments among men,
although male smokers made on average 14 % and former smokers
30 % more visits to outpatient departments annually than non-
smokers.
Attributable fractions of smoking in the population aged 25
_
and over in 1987 calculated on the basis of the means
presented in Table 14 are shown in Table 15.
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In relative terms, smoking seemed to have the greatest impact
on utilization of physician services in hospital outpatient
departments and in occupational health care. About 5.8 % of
outpatient visits and 5.7 % of visits to occupational health
care were related to smoking. The influence of smoking on
other physician services was not as significant. About 4.3 %
of all physician visits among persons aged 25 and over were
attributed to smoking.
An estimate of the total number of physician visits and costs
attributed to smoking is presented in Table 16.
In 1987 some 590 000 - 620 000 physician visits were
attributed to smoking. This amounts to about 3.4-3.6 % of all
physician visits. Less than half of the smoking related
physician visits were made to health centres and about one
third to hospital outpatient departments.
Visits to physicians attributed to smoking accounted for an
expenditure of more than 180-190 million marks within
outpatient care in 1987. This corresponds to roughly 3.6-3.8
% of the total expenditure for outpatient care. Less than
half of the burden fell on general hospitals and more than
one third on health centres.
-
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Conclusions
The influence of smoking upon the use of different physician
services varies. Among men, smoking increases the total
number of physician visits and the number of visits to health
centre physicians. Among women, smoking influences the total
number of physician visits as well as the number of visits to
occupational health care and hospital outpatient departments.
On the other hand, smoking does not seem to have any
influence upon the number of visits to outpatient departments
or occupational health care among men, and upon the number of
visits to health centre physicians or private practitioners
among women.
A one-year follow-up study carried out in England (Ashford
1973) resulted in an estimate of approximately the same order
for the influence of smoking on the use of health care
services among men. On the other hand, the study did not
support the excess use hypothesis for all age groups. In
fact, smoking seemed to decrease the number of visits to
physicians and outpatient departments among men aged 60 and
women aged 45. No systematic differences in utilization of
services between former smokers and non-smokers was found.
In an extensive health interview survey carried out in the
United States (see USDHEW 1979) a distinctly smaller
proportion of smokers than non-smokers reported to have
visited a physician five times or more during the year
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preceding the interview. The proportion of those who had
visited a physician often was larger among former smokers
than non-smokers.
For most services, the average number of physician visits
reported in this study are larger for former smokers than for
current smokers. The same phenomenon has been found in
epidemiological studies on smoking and mortality as well as
in some earlier studies on health services utilization (see
USDHEW 1979). This finding suggests that former smokers are
selected.
There was an aim to improve reliability of results in this
study by standardizing the influence of age, sex, occupation,
education and income on the use of health care services. With
respect to unstandardized factors smoking-groups were
presumed to be similar. As smoking is also an indicator of
life-style or way of life, it is likely that there remains
significant comparison bias between smoking-groups even after
standardizing for sosiodemographic factors.
Because the study was based on cross-sectional data, the
results cannot be interpreted to represent a causal
relationship between smoking and utilization of physician
services, but only an association. On the basis of
epidemiological studies on smoking and morbidity it is known
that the morbidity risk in many diseases is bigger for
smokers than for non-smokers, and this leads to more use of
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health care services among smokers. It was not possible here,
however, to analyze whether physician visits were
specifically related to diseases generally associated with
smoking.
The above estimates are based on the assumption that the
influence of smoking on health is directly transmitted to
utilization of health care services, which implies that
differences in utilization between smoking-groups arise only
because there are more symptoms and diseases resulting from
smoking among smokers and former smokers than among non-
smokers. A similar link from smoking to utilization of health
care services has also been assumed in previous studies.
Enactment of the Tobacco Act in Finland in 1976 stimulated a
lively public discussion on the health risks caused by
smoking. As the present interview survey was carried out the
same year, it is unlikely that the interviewees exaggerated
their smoking. Thus it is possible that the proportion of
physician visits attributed to smoking in this study is too
low. Classification of occasional smokers as non-smokers may
have a similar effect.
In the above estimates it was assumed that if no one smoked
-
the mean rates of utilization would equal non-smokers rates
for all smoking-groups. This is of course a reasonable
assumption for estimation purposes. It is not known, however,
what would be, for example, the average use of health
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services among smokers if they did not smoke. As smoking is
an indicator of different life-styles, these average figures
might be larger or smaller than for non-smokers only due to
differences in life-style. It is also possible that former
smokers are in a different way than others worried about
their own health (independently of smoking), and this might
lead to wider use of health services.
Since 1976 the number of physician visits per capita has
grown substantially. In the results it is therefore worth
paying attention in the first place to proportional
differences in the use of services between smoker-groups,
because it is most probable that the proportion of mean
values will remain stable even though the mean values change.
6.1.3 Pharmaceutical expenditure
Only a few studies have estimated smoking related
pharmaceutical expenditure. Some have estimated this on the
basis of hospital expenditure (Thompson and Forbes 1982) or
it has been included in the direct costs of smoking (Luce and
Schweitzer 1978).
In Sweden, Hjalte (1984a) attempted to estimate the
expenditure on prescribed medicines for a few major smoking-
related diseases. He had access to data on the number of
prescriptions issued to patients in non-institutional care
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according to diagnosis. Expenditure data was only available
for a rough diagnosis grouping. Hjalte estimated the
expenditure attributed to smoking by multiplying the
diagnosis-specific expenditure by the respective attributable
fractions of smoking to mortality. According to Hjalte's
estimate about 0.3 % of all pharmaceutical expenditure in
Sweden in 1980 was attributed to smoking.
Materials and methods
The relation of smoking and the use of medicines was studied
with the same methods and data as the physician visits in
section 6.1.2, on the basis of the interview survey data
representing the non-institutionalised Finnish population
(Kalimo et al 1982). The analysis here covered the population
aged 25 and over (N=11 677).
The survey data gives information on the prevalence of use of
medicines but not on pharmaceutical expenditure. At the
national level expenditure data on pharmaceuticals is poor,
and no detailed data by diagnosis is available. Here, the
following approach was adopted. We estimated the proportion
of those who use medicines (prevalence) in different smoking-
groups separately for both sexes and standardized the
proportions for age, education, occupation and income by the
general linear model (Searle 1971). The proportions were
estimated separately for prescribed and over-the-counter
products.
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Attributable fractions of smoking were estimated in the same
way as for physician visits in section 6.1.2. The estimated
attributable fractions were then applied to pharmaceutical
expenditures.
The retail value of prescribed medicines was estimated from
the expenditure refunded by the Social Insurance Institution.
The retail value of over-the-counter medicines was estimated
as the residual of the pharmacies' total sales after
substracting sales of prescribed medicines, veterinary
preparations and non-pharmaceutical products. The
pharmaceutical expenditure attributed to smoking was obtained
by multiplying the total expenditure by the attributable
fractions.
Data on refunds for prescribed medicines were obtained from
age- and occupation statistics of the Social Insurance
Institution (Kansanelakelaitos 1988a) and for total pharmacy
sales from the National Board of Health (Hurme 1989).
Results
Smoking increased the propensity to use all types of
medicines among men and over-the-counter medicines among
women (Table 17). Use of medicines was slightly more
prevalent among male smokers and former smokers than among
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non-smokers. Among male smokers there were about 3 t points
more users of prescribed medicines and about 5 % points more
users of over-the-counter medicines than among male non-
smokers. For male former smokers the corresponding figures
were 7 and 2 t points. There was no statistically significant
difference in the proportion of users of prescribed medicines
between female smoking-groups. Among female smokers the use
of over-the-counter medicines was 5 t points more prevalent
than among female non-smokers. The difference between female
former smokers and non-smokers was 4 t points.
Attributable fractions of smoking for the population aged 25
and over in 1987, estimated on the basis of proportions shown
in Table 17, are presented in Table 18. An estimate of the
pharmaceutical expenditure attributed to smoking is presented
in Table 19.
It was estimated that smoking contributed to 3 t of the use
of prescribed medicines and to 7.3 t of the use of over-the-
counter medicines.
The pharmaceutical expenditure attributed to smoking in 1987
was estimated to be almost 110 million FIM, of which more
than half was due to prescriptions. The smoking related
expenditure was about 3.9 t of the total pharmaceutical
expenditure.
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Table 19.
	 Pharmaceutical expenditure attributed to smoking
by smoking-group in 19871'2
EXPENDITURE (million FIM)
Smokers Ex-smokers	 TOTAL
PRESCRIBED MEDICINES 26 34 60
OVER-THE-COUNTER MEDICINES 37 12 49
1 Standardized for age, occupation, education and income.
2 Includes only the utilization which is statistically
significant at least at 10 % level.
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Everything mentioned about the reliability of the results in
connection with the physician services in section 6.1.2 also
applies here.
6.1.4 Rehabilitation
The costs of smoking related rehabilitation have received
little attention in previous studies, probably because they
have been rated as insignificant compared to other cost
items. Leu and Schaub (1984) estimated the costs of
rehabilitation attributed to smoking as only about 10 % of
the corresponding costs of hospital care.
Materials and methods
Here we examine only those rehabilitation costs borne by the
Social Insurance Institution. The costs were estimated
separately for men and women aged 35-64, by disease and age
group. The disease specific average rehabilitation costs in
different age groups were obtained by dividing the total
rehabilitation costs per disease and age group by the
corresponding number of persons in rehabilitation. The number
of persons in rehabilitation due to smoking was estimated
using the age, sex and disease specific attributable
fractions (see Appendix 4). The costs of rehabilitation
attributed to smoking by disease, age and sex were obtained
by multiplying the number of persons in rehabilitation due to
smoking by the corresponding average rehabilitation costs.
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The data on costs and the number of people in rehabilitation
were obtained from the Social Insurance Institution
(Kansanelakelaitos 1989).
Results
The Social Insurance Institution was estimated to have
financed rehabilitation for about 270 people because of
smoking in 1987 (Table 20). This is about 0.8 % of all the
persons rehabilitated at the expense of the Social Insurance
Institution. Rehabilitation attributed to smoking cost the
Social Insurance Institution about FIM 1.4 million. This is
about 0.5 % of the total rehabilitation costs financed by the
Social Insurance Institution.
6.1.5 Financing of smoking related health expenditure
The financing of smoking related health expenditure has not
been examined in previous studies. This is, however,
essential in order to estimate the external costs.
Materials and methods
In Finland, health expenditure is financed by the state,
municipalities, the Social Insurance Institution, employers
and patients. Sickness funds and insurance companies also
contribute
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to the financing by reimbursing patients' expenditures, but
in practice their contribution to total financing is not
significant (Hakkinen 1988). The proportion of health
expenditure paid by smokers directly is the same as that paid
by the patients.
The financing of smoking related health expenditure by
activity was estimated using financing data from different
statistical sources (Sairaalaliitto 1988, Suomen
kaupunkiliitto 1988, Kansanelakelaitos 1988b) and allocated
to the parties on the basis of their financing shares (see
Appendix 6).
Results
The state and municipalities made the major contribution to
health expenditure attributed to smoking (Table 21). For
smoking related hospital inpatient care they paid about
195-256 million marks, and about 150 million marks for
physician services. Smokers themselves paid about 13-18
million marks or roughly 6 % of the costs of hospital
inpatient care, and 15 million marks or 9 % of the costs of
physician services.
Smokers paid the major part of the pharmaceutical
expenditure, i.e. 71 million marks or two thirds of the
total. The Social Insurance Institution reimbursed almost 40
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million marks of the pharmaceutical expenditure and paid over
one million marks for rehabilitation attributed to smoking.
Of all smoking related health expenditure smokers themselves
paid 99-103 million marks or roughly 17-19 %, with the
remainder being paid mainly by the public sector.
6.2 Indirect consequences
6.2.1 Potential production lost due to sickness absence
A number of studies have investigated the effect of smoking
on absenteeism (Athanasou
in the United States
smokers 15-45 % more
smokers (Holcomb and
1975). It has been estimated that
male smokers have 20-33 % and female
days of absence due to illness than non-
Meigs 1972, Wilson 1973, Van Tuinen and
Land 1986, USDHEW 1979). Former smokers also tend to have
more days of absence due to illness than non-smokers (Holcomb
and Meigs 1972, Wilson 1973, USDHEW 1979). Similar results
have also been obtained in England (Townsend 1987) and
Finland (Pekurinen et al 1989).
At the national level, about 19-21 % of all days of sickness
_
absence have been attributed to smoking in the United States
(USDHEW 1979) and 30 % in Great Britain (Townsend 1987). In
Finland, Pekurinen et al (1989), after standardizing for age,
occupation, education and income, but not for use of alcohol,
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estimated smoking to account for 18 % of all days of sickness
absence. More conservative estimates have also been
presented. In Australia, Athanasou (1979) estimated that at
the most 7 % of men's and 2 % of all days of sickness absence
could be attributed to smoking.
It is not clear, however, to what extent the observed
differences in absenteeism can truly be attributed to
smoking, since most of the studies have not controlled for
confounding factors other than age and sex. Large variation
in the attributable fraction can also be due to other
differences. For example, the variation between countries in
how and to what extent earnings lost due to sickness are
reimbursed by sickness allowance, or how soon a doctor's
certificate is required.
The excess absenteeism arising from smoking has commonly been
estimated by interview surveys or follow-up studies. These
have usually focused on the aggregate level of absenteeism
without specifying it by diagnosis. In the interview surveys
the number of days lost due to sickness have usually been
examined by asking the interviewees how many days they have
been absent from work due to illness during a specified time
period preceding the interview (e.g. Wilson 1973, Pekurinen
et al 1989). In the follow-up studies the number of sickness
days have been examined from various working-time-registers
retrospectively (e.g. Holcomb and Meigs 1972) or
prospectively (e.g. Van Tuinen and Land 1986). In both
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methods the number of days lost due to sickness is estimated
on a per capita basis for smokers and non-smokers and the
excess absenteeism of smokers is interpreted to be due to
smoking. An estimate of the aggregate number of days lost due
to smoking is derived by multiplying the observed difference
by the number of smokers.
Follow-up studies have produced substantially lower (commonly
one third lower) estimates of the number of sickness days
attributed to smoking than interview surveys. Besides the
differences in study populations and methods of data
collecting this is likely to arise from the fact that studies
based on follow-up methods have controlled for variety of
other confounding factors apart from age and sex (e.g.
Holcomb and Meigs 1972). It is likely that studies based on
interview surveys that have not standardised the results for
other factors than age and sex have overestimated the effect
of smoking on sickness absence (Wilson 1973, USDHEW 1979,
Townsend 1987).
The economic significance of smoking related absenteeism has
been sparsely studied. Only a few specific references were
found in the literature (e.g. Weiss 1981). In earlier social
cost studies, costs of smoking related absenteeism were not
analysed separately. Instead, they have, at least partly,
been included in the production losses due to disability
(e.g. Collishaw and Myers 1984, Hjalte 1984a).
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Materials and methods
Three methods were used to assess the impact of smoking on
sickness absenteeism. The low estimate was based on the
number of days covered by the sickness allowance paid by the
Social Insurance Institution, and derived using diagnosis
specific attributable fractions. The high estimate was
derived by analysing the relationship between smoking and
sickness absence in a representative sample of the Finnish
working population. The intermediate estimate combines these
two estimates.
Low estimate. The national sickness insurance scheme
administered by the Social Insurance Institution reimburses
loss of earnings due to sickness. This sickness allowance is
payable to all employed and self-employed people between 16
and 65 for a maximum of 300 working days (Kansanelakelaitos
1988b). Sickness allowance is paid for weekdays, i.e. for six
days per week, but only after an initial waiting period of
eight weekdays, including at least one Saturday and Sunday.
Therefore a maximum of seven working days and ten days of
illness within each spell remain uncovered. So the number of
days covered by sickness insurance underestimates the total
number of days lost due to illness.
The Social Insurance Institution produces data on the number
of days covered by age and diagnosis for males and females
separately, but publishes it only for broad disease
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categories. This study is based on the unpublished diagnosis,
sex and age specific data provided by the Social Insurance
Institution (Kansanelakelaitos 1989).
The number of working days lost due to sickness covered by
the sickness insurance and the number of associated days of
illness were estimated separately for each diagnosis, age and
sex group for people aged 35 to 64 years by a method
described in Appendix 7. The proportion attributable to
smoking was obtained by multiplying the number of days by the
relevant diagnosis, age and sex specific attributable
fractions (see Appendix 4).
This method cannot be used to estimate the number of working
days lost or the associated days of illness for spells
lasting less than eight weekdays, as they do not qualify for
sickness allowance.
High estimate. The relationship between smoking and sickness
absence was examined directly in a representative sample of
the Finnish working population aged 25-64 (N=6 552). The
original interview survey was carried out by the Social
Insurance Institution in 1987 (Kalimo et al 1989).
Interviewees were divided into three smoking groups: non-
_
smokers, former smokers and regular smokers (persons who had
smoked regularly during the year preceding the interview).
Smokers were not divided into sub-groups according to type of
tobacco smoked, number of cigarettes smoked per day or
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duration of smoking. The results indicate sickness absence by
an average smoker.
As use of alcohol and sociodemographic factors like age, sex,
education, occupation and income are associated with both
smoking and sickness absence, the impact of these likely
confounding factors on absenteeism was standardized by the
direct method (Armitage 1971). The analysis was done
separately for men and women.
The proportional share of smoking in total sickness absence
was calculated on the basis of mean values of days of
sickness absence among smokers, former smokers and non-
smokers. The ratios between mean values in different smoking-
groups were assumed to give the correct distribution of
absenteeism between different groups. Sickness absence
related to smoking was obtained by deducting from the total
number of days of sickness absence by smokers and former
smokers the absenteeism not related to smoking, which in each
group was assumed to be the same as the average sickness
absences by non-smokers.
The proportion of sickness absence attributed to smoking -
the attributable fraction (Miettinen 1974) - was estimated
separately for smokers and former smokers with the following
formula:
SOi
 = pi ( SPi
 - SP3 ) / ( piSP/ + p2SP2 + p3SP3 ) ,
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where pi = proportion of smokers, former smokers and
non-smokers (i=3) in the population,
SPi = average number of days of sickness absence in
smoking-group i.
The numbers of working days lost due to smoking were obtained
by multiplying the total number of sickness days by the sex
specific attributable fractions estimated in this study. The
total number of sickness days by sex were obtained from the
unpublished labour force survey data provided by the Central
Statistical Office (Tilastokeskus 1989). Relative sizes of
smoking groups in 1987 were obtained from the health
interview-survey carried out by the Social Insurance
Institution (Kalimo et al 1989).
Intermediate estimate. The low estimate includes only those
diseases which have 'highly probable' causal
smoking while the high
low estimate is likely
the high estimate also
ailments which may not
high estimate includes
relation to
estimate includes all diseases. The
to cover more serious illnesses while
covers minor conditions including
be directly linked with smoking. The
all days of sickness absence. The low
estimate excludes all spells of sick leave lasting less than
eight working days, and yet their share of all absences is
-
significant. Indeed, sick leaves lasting less than eight days
account for nearly 80 % of all spells of sickness absence and
about 34 % of all work-days lost due to illness (Nyman and
Raitasalo 1978).
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The intermediate estimate was derived by assuming that 34 %
of the total work-days lost due to smoking (high estimate)
last less than eight days and that only those spells of sick
leave that last eight days or longer are directly related to
smoking (low estimate). Thus, the intermediate estimate = low
estimate + 0.34 x high estimate. Figure 2 illustrates the
relationship between these three estimates.
The value of potential production lost due to smoking related
sickness absence was estimated by the human capital approach
by transforming the numbers of working day losses to working
years and multiplying them by the average sex specific value
of potential annual production. The value of an individual's
annual production was defined as the sum of his/her earnings,
employer's social security contribution and operating
surplus. The formula for calculating the average value of
annual production and the estimated age- and sex specific
values are given in Appendix 8.
The age- and sex specific earnings data were obtained from
the unpublished income distribution statistics provided by
the Central Statistical Office (Tilastokeskus 1989). Margins
for employer's social security contributions and operating
surplus were estimated from the National Accounts
-(Tilastokeskus 1988a).
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Results
Low estimate. On the basis of the daily sickness benefits
paid by the Social Insurance Institution it was estimated
that about 218 000 - 262 000 healthy days and 156 000 -
187 000 working days were lost due to sickness attributed to
smoking (Table 22). This amounts to about 1.1-1.3 % of all
days of sickness and 1.0-1.3 % of all working days lost due
to illness estimated on the basis of the data provided by the
Social Insurance Institution. The value of potential
production lost due to smoking was estimated to be in the
range of FIM 118-145 million.
High estimate. Smoking appeared to increase the number of
days absent from work due to illness both for men and women
(Table 23). Male smokers were absent from work due to illness
on average about five working days more than non-smokers in
1987. Female smokers were on average four days more absent
from work due to illness than female non-smokers. Also,
former smokers were more frequently absent from work due to
illness than non-smokers. The difference between former
smokers and non-smokers was about three and half working days
for men and about three for women.
The attributable fractions for people aged 25-64 in 1987
estimated on the basis of the means shown in Table 23 are
given in Table 24, which also gives the estimated number of
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Table 22. Estimated number of days of sickness absence and the value
of potential production lost attributed to smoking in
1987, low estimate
Smoking related
Disease
Attributed
to smoking (%) days of working Lost
	  illness days	 production
Males Females
	 (1000)	 lost	 (FIM
(1000)	 million)
Cancer of
Oral cavity 41 3 2 2
Abdominal cavity 22-35 15 0a-2 0a-2 0a-1
Larynx 39 1 1 1
Lung 81-86 38-47 26-28 19-20 14-15
Urinary bladder 1 8 Oa Oa Oa
Coronary heart disease 35-41 10 150-161 107-115 82-93
Other vascular
diseases 10-21 2-4 1-3 1-3
Bronchitis 56-93 26-57 30-53 22-38 16-27
Emphysema 58-93 26-62 6-10 4-7 3-5
TOTAL' 218-262 156-187 118-145
1 Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
a Figure is less than half of the measure.
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Table 23. Days of sickness absence by smoking-group in 19871.2
Days of sickness absence
in a year
MALES
	
FEMALES
Smokers 12.3 16.4
Ex-smokers 11.2 15.0
Non-smokers 7.5 12.3
1 Standardized for age, occupation, education, income and use
of alcohol.
2 I am grateful to Unto Hakkinen for analysing the health
interview-survey data by smoking groups.
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Table 24. Estimated proportion and number of days of sickness
absence and the value of potential production lost
attributed to smoking for people aged 25-64 by
smoking group in 1987, high estimatel
MALES
	 FEMALES	 TOTAL2
PROPORTION OF
ALL DAYS OF
SICKNESS ABSENCE (%)
Smokers 8.5 3.6 12.1
Ex-smokers 3.7 1.3 5.0
Total2 12.2 4.9 17.1
DAYS OF
SICKNESS ABSENCE
(1000 days)
Smokers 1564 665 2228
Ex-smokers 688 235 923
Total 2 2252 900 3152
LOST PRODUCTION
(FIM million)
Smokers 1209 341 1550
Ex-smokers 532 121 652
Total 2 1741 462 2202
1 Standardized for age, occupation, education, income and use
of alcohol.
2 Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
_
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working days lost due to illness attributed to smoking and
associated loss in potential production.
It was estimated that roughly 17 % of all the days of
sickness absence for people aged 25-64 were associated with
smoking. About one fourth of this was related to smoking by
women. An estimated 3.2 million working days were lost due to
smoking related illness. This is about 15.7 % of all days of
sickness absence estimated in the labour force survey
(Tilastokeskus 1989). This proportion is comparable to
estimates published in the United States (USDHEW 1979), but
clearly lower than estimates in Great Britain (Townsend
1987).
The value of potential production lost due to sickness
absence attributed to smoking was estimated to be about FIM
2.2 billion. About eighty per cent of this figure was
attributed to smoking by males.
Intermediate estimate. A combination of the low and high
estimate implies that about 1.2 million working days were
lost due to smoking-related illness in 1987 (Table 25). This
is about 6.1-6.2 % of all days of sickness absence estimated
in the labour force 'survey (Tilastokeskus 1989). The value of
potential production lost due to smoking was estimated to be
in the range of FIM 863-890 million.
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Table 25. Estimated number of days of sickness absence and
the value of potential production lost attributed
to smoking in 1987, intermediate estimate
DURATION OF	 Days of sickness Lost production
SICKNESS ABSENCE 	 absence (1000)
	 (FIM million)
Less than eight days
(0.34 x Table 24) 1065 744
Eight days or longer
(Table 23) 156-187 118-145
TOTAL 1221-1252 863-890
246
Conclusions
Smoking tends to increase the likelihood of sickness absence
for both sexes. On the basis of the Social Insurance
Institution data 1.0-1.3 % of all days of sickness absence
were attributed to smoking. This low estimate is quite close
to the Australian estimate of 2 % (Athanasou 1979). The
15.7 % high estimate based on the survey data is somewhat
lower than the earlier Finnish (Pekurinen et al 1989) and
United States (USDHEW 1979) estimates, and clearly lower than
the UK estimate (Townsend 1987). However, in the latter two
studies the impact of factors other than age, sex and smoking
on absenteeism were not controlled for.
The estimate based on the Social Insurance Institution data
is probably more accurate, in principle, than that based on
the survey data, as the absences were linked to diagnoses in
the former. It is, however, clearly a minimum estimate since
the Social Insurance Institution data excludes all spells of
sick leave lasting less than eight working days, and yet
their share of all absences is significant. The labour force
survey data includes sick leave lasting less than eight days,
which makes it more comprehensive in coverage than the Social
Insurance Institution data. The latter data is, of course,
likely to cover more serious illnesses, as they need to last
longer in order to qualify for sickness allowance.
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The reliability of results in this study was improved by
standardizing the influence of use of alcohol, age, sex,
occupation, education and income on sickness absence. With
respect to unstandardized factors, smoking-groups were
presumed to be similar. As smoking is also an indicator of
life-style or way of life, however, it is likely that there
remains significant comparison bias between smoking-groups
even after standardizing for these factors.
As smoking and drinking are closely related habits and excess
use of alcohol is a common cause of work absenteeism, we also
standardized for this counfounding factor. Controlling for
use of alcohol reduced the previously published Finnish
estimate of attributability (Pekurinen et al 1989) by about
two and half percentage points, from 18.4 t to 15.7 t.
Because the study was based on cross-sectional data, the
results cannot be interpreted to represent a causal relation
between smoking and sickness absence, but only an
association. On the basis of epidemiological studies on
smoking and morbidity it is known that the morbidity risk in
many diseases is bigger for smokers than for non-smokers, and
this leads to more days of sickness absence among smokers
(HeliOvaara 1989). It was not possible, however, to analyze
whether sickness absence was specifically related to diseases
generally associated with smoking. Other comments made in in
connection with the physician services in section 6.1.2 apply
also here.
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The intermediate estimate was designed to combine information
contained in the low and high estimates and will be used to
represent the effects of smoking on sickness absence in
chapter nine of this study.
6.2.2 Potential production lost due to disability
Smoking appears to increase the risk of disability (e.g.
Helitivaara 1989). Extensive population surveys carried out in
the United States, Canada and Great Britain have indicated
that smokers have substantially more days of short- and long-
term disability than non-smokers on average (USDHEW 1979,
Collishaw and Myers 1984, Townsend 1987). In Canada, for
example, about 5 % of all days of disability have been
estimated to be attributable to smoking (Collishaw and Myers
1984).
In Sweden, Hjalte (1984a) studied new disability pensions and
estimated that about 4.5 % of all new pensions granted to
males were attributable to smoking. The corresponding figure
for females was 0.4 %.
The number of cases of smoking related disability is usually
estimated by applying diagnosis, age- and sex-specific
attributable fractions derived for mortality (e.g.
Shillington 1977, Hjalte 1984a). The basic assumption
underlying this analysis is that the link between smoking and
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disability is assumed to be similar to that between smoking
and mortality.
The economic significance of smoking-related disability is
usually described in terms of potential production lost due
to diasability. The value of lost production has been
analysed by applying two different methodologies. In most
studies it has been estimated for the year in question either
on the basis of disability pensions (e.g. Shillington 1977,
Hjalte 1984a) or interview surveys (e.g. Collishaw and Myers
1984). This (prevalence) approach attempts to quantify the
impact of past years' smoking on the current year's
disability. Some studies, on the other hand, have analysed
the effect of current smoking on future disability (incidence
approach) (e.g. Hjalte 19845, Ellemann-Jensen 1986).
Material and methods
This study aimed at estimating the prevalence and economic
consequences of disability attributed to smoking for diseases
commonly attributed to smoking in 1987 for people aged 35-64.
All disability pensions were grouped and analysed together
without dividing them into sub-groups (old and new, granted
for unspecified or specified period). We applied the
prevalence approach which relates disability in 1987 to
smoking in preceding years. The number of disability pensions
in 1987 was estimated as the average of the disability
pensioners at the end of 1986 and 1987 from unpublished data
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provided by the Social Insurance Institution (Kansanelake-
laitos 1989). Hence the results correspond the situation in
mid 1987.
The number of smoking related disability pensions was
estimated by applying the relevant diagnosis, age and sex
specific attributable fractions (see Appendix 4).
The value of potential production lost due to smoking-related
disability in 1987 was estimated by the human capital
approach. The value of a person's annual production was
defined in the same way as in the case of sickness absence in
section 6.2.1. In estimating the value of lost production,
account was taken of the individual's likelihood of being
employed in order to eliminate the effect of unemployment and
labour force participation rates (which vary by age and sex)
on the results. The formula for calculating the average value
of lost production by age and sex is given in Appendix 8.
Results
It was estimated that about 4 600-6 200 individuals were on
disability pension due to smoking related illness (Table 26).
This amounts to about 1.9-2.5 % of all disability pensioners.
_
Disability pensions attributed to smoking
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correspond to 1.7-2.2 million days of illness and 1.0-1.4
working days. The value of potential production lost due to
disability attributed to smoking was estimated to be in the
range of FIM 401-483 million.
6.2.3 Incidence of potential production lost due to sickness
absence and disability
The incidence of lost production has not been analysed in any
of the previous studies. It has been examined only from
society's point of view. Here we attempt to decompose the
lost production on the basis of its composition and
redistribution.
The value of production and its redistribution
The value of an employee's labour input to the employer is
the wage or salary (wage for short) paid plus the employer's
contribution to social security schemes and the operating
surplus. Social security contributions are designed to cover
part of the employee's social security and are paid to
insurance companies by the employer. The operating surplus
covers the employer's other variable costs. The cost of
labour to the employer is wages plus social security
contributions.
The price of labour to the employee equals gross wage. On the
basis of gross wage the employee pays income tax to state and
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municipality and compulsory social security contributions to
the Social Insurance Institution. Most employees belong to
either of the state churches (Lutheran or Orthodox) and pay
church tax to them. Deducting all these taxes and fiscal
charges from the gross wage gives the net wage, which the
employee is free to consume or save.
Earnings vary by age and sex, but are highest for those aged
40-44 for both sexes. However, males have higher earnings
than females in all age groups (Tilastokeskus 1989). The
state income tax paid by the employee depends on his
earnings, tax allowances and the progression of taxation,
which means that high incomes are taxed relatively more
heavily than low incomes. Municipal income tax is
proportional; all tax payers pay the same proportion of their
taxable income in the form of municipal tax which varies
according to the local authority. Each employee pays a fixed
share of his taxable income in compulsory social security
contributions (for national pension and sickness insurance).
The church tax is determined on the same basis as the
municipal tax.
An employer's social security contributions can be statutory
'
or voluntary. Statutory contributions are aimed to cover part
of employees' social security and are paid to insurance
companies by the employer. Statutory contributions are a
fixed proportion of the wage-bill. The employer can also make
voluntary contributions to employees' social security.
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Materials and methods
The incidence of lost production was examined on the basis of
the 'fincancing' shares derived in Appendix 9. The estimated
age- and sex-specific lost production was decomposed into
seven categories on the basis of the redistribution of the
value of production: employers'operating surplus, employers'
contribution to social security schemes, taxes and fiscal
charges paid by employees (state and municipal income tax,
social security contributions and church tax) and employees'
net income.
The proportions of operating surplus and employers' social
security contributions in lost production were derived from
the National Accounts (Tilastokeskus 1988a) and assumed to be
equal for all age and sex groups. The proportions of other
categories were derived from the income and property
statistics data (Tilastokeskus 1988b) for males and females
separately in each age group. In estimating these
proportions, account was taken of varying earning levels,
deductions in state and municipal taxation, place of
residence and membership of state churches by males and
females in different age groups.
Results
The estimated incidence of lost production attributed to
smoking-related absenteeism and disability is shown in Table
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27. Most of the losses (42 %) are borne by smokers themselves
or their families, and roughly a quarter by their employers.
The state and municipalities bear about 17 % of the losses,
and the Social Insurance Institution and other insurance
companies about 15 % together.
The state and municipalities both lose from FIM 45-55 million
to FIM 220-227 million in tax revenues. From FIM 80-95
million to FIM 400-410 million worth of social security
payments are lost by the Social Insurance Institution and
other insurance companies as a result of sickness absence and
disability attributed to smoking.
6.3 Income transfers
6.3.1 Sickness allowances
The Social Insurance Institution pays earnings-related
sickness allowance as compensation for loss of earnings due
to illness. This benefit is payable to all employed and self-
employed people between 16 and 65 who are incapable of doing
their ordinary work or any comparable work because of
illness, for a maximum of 300 working days as described in
section 6.2.1 (Kansanelakelaitos 1988b). The sickness
allowance is assessed on the basis of the official earnings
for the previous tax year, and is taxable income.
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The sickness allowance is payable to the employee. If,
however, the employer pays the sick pay, the allowance is
paid to the employer. In 1987 about 46 % of such allowances
were paid to the employer (Kansanelakelaitos 1988b).
Materials and methods
Sickness allowances attributed to smoking were estimated by
two methods. The low estimate was derived on the basis of the
sickness allowances paid by the Social Insurance Institution
for people aged 35-64. The proportion attributable to smoking
was obtained by multiplying the benefits paid by the relevant
diagnosis, age and sex specific attributable fractions (see
Appendix 4).
The high estimate was derived on the basis of the sex-
specific attributable fractions for sickness absence shown in
Table 24. The total benefits paid to males and females aged
25-64 were multiplied by these fractions in order to estimate
the benefits paid due to smoking. The data on sickness
allowances paid according to diagnosis, age and sex was
provided by the Social Insurance Institution (Kansanelake-
laitos 1989). The intermediate estimate was derived in the
same way as in chapter 6.2.1.
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Results
It was estimated that the Social Insurance Institution paid
. sickness allowances attributable to smoking for at least
177 000 - 211 000 days (low estimate), for 1.1 million days
(intermediate estimate) and at most for 2.8 million days
(high estimate) in 1987 (Table 28). This implies that at
least 1.2-1.4 % and at most some 16.2 % of all days of
illness compensated by the Social Insurance Institution were
related to smoking.
The smoking-related sickness allowances paid by the Social
Insurance Institution in 1987 range from FIM 36-43 million to
FIM 395 million, which equal 1.5-1.8 % and 16.6 % of all the
sickness allowances paid. Allowances paid to employers due to
smoking range from FIM 17-20 to 182 million and those paid to
employees range from FIM 19-23 to 213 million.
6.3.2 Disability pensions
The disability pension paid by the Social Insurance
Institution is a minimum social security benefit payable due
to disability. Disability pension is payable to all people
aged 16-64 who on account of disease, defect or injury are
unable to maintain themselves by their usual work or any
other kind of work which, considering their age, occupation,
education and place of residence, would be suitable for them
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Table 28. Estimated number of days compensated and sickness
allowances paid due to illness attributable to
smoking by the Social Insurance Institution in 1987
Smoking related
Disease days of	 sickness
illness
	 allowances
compensated (FIM million)
(1000)
LOW ESTIMATE
Cancer of
Oral cavity 2 Oa
Abdominal cavity 0a-2 Oa
Larynx 1 Oa
Lung 21-23 5
Urinary bladder Oa Oa
Coronary heart disease 122-130 25-27
Other vascular
diseases 2-3 0a-1
Bronchitis 24-42 4-7
Emphysema 5-8 1-2
TOTAL' 177-211 36-43
INTERMEDIATE.  ESTIMATE 1102-1136 170-177
HIGH ESTIMATE (All diseases) 2 384 395
1 Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
a Figure is less than half of the measure.
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(Kansanelakelaitos 1988b). Disability pension is granted for
a specified or unspecified period. Disability pension is not
earnings-related but is integrated with other pensions which
reduce or cancel the supplementary component of the
disability pension. Thus the disability pensions paid by the
Social Insurance Institution cover only part of the pensions
payable due to disability.
Materials and methods
The smoking related disability pensions paid by the Social
Insurance Institution to people aged 35-64 were estimated by
multiplying the disability pensions paid by the relevant
attributable fractions (see Appendix 4). The data on
disability pensions paid by diagnosis, age and sex were
provided by the Social Insurance Institution (Kansanelake-
laitos 1989).
Results
It was estimated that in 1987 the Social Insurance
Institution paid FIM 46-64 million in disability pensions
attributable to smoking (Table 29). This amounts to 1.4-1.9 %
of all disability pensions paid by the Social Insurance
Institution.
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Table 29. Estimated disability pensions paid by the Social
Insurance Institution attributable to smoking in
1987
Disability pensions
Disease	 attributed to smoking
(FIM million)
Cancer of
Oral cavity	 Oa
Abdominal cavity
	
Oa
Larynx	 1
Lung	 3
Urinary bladder
	 Oa
Coronary heart disease
	 24-29
Other vascular
diseases	 Oa
Bronchitis
	 18-30
Emphysema
	 Oa
TOTAL1
	46-64
1 Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
a Figure is less than half of the measure.
,
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7 ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING RELATED MORTALITY
7.1 Indirect consequences
7.1.1 Potential production lost due to premature deaths
Smoking is considered the single most important preventable
cause of death in industrialised countries (USDHEW 1979, Leu
and Schaub 1983a, STM 1987). A high number of premature
deaths is attributed to smoking in many countries. In Sweden,
for example, nearly 7 000 smokers aged 35-84 are estimated to
die prematurely every year because of smoking (Hjalte 1984a).
This is over 20 % of all deaths in that age group. In Denmark
12 % of all deaths in the same age group are attributed to
smoking (Ellemann-Jensen 1986), while in Canada smoking is
reckoned to account for 17 % of all deaths among people aged
15 and over (Collishaw and Myers 1984).
The number of deaths attributable to smoking has generally
been estimated in a similar way in previous studies (e.g.
Shillington 1977, Collishaw and Myers 1984, Hjalte 1984a,
Ellemann-Jensen 1986, Rice et al 1986) on the basis of
attributable fractions. The numbers of deaths by age, sex and
diagnosis have been multiplied by the respective attributable
-
fractions, which have been estimated on the basis of
diagnosis-specific relative risks and the prevalence of
smoking among the population, as described in section 5.2 and
Appendix 4.
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The economic consequences of smoking related deaths are
usually described in terms of potential production lost due
to premature deaths (e.g. Shillington 1977, Collishaw and
Myers 1984, Hjalte 1984a, Leu and Schaub 1984, Ellemann-
Jensen 1986, Rice et al 1986). As was mentioned earlier in
section 5.3, under certain, very restrictive assumptions,
these human capital estimates can be interpreted to reflect
the lower limit of an individual's willingness to pay for
life.
Material and methods
Here we attempt to estimate the number of premature deaths
and the associated loss in working years, life-years and
potential production attributable to smoking in 1987 for
people aged 35 and over. The number of deaths attributable to
smoking was estimated by multiplying the number of deaths in
various diagnosis, age and sex groups by the corresponding
attributable fractions (see Appendix 4). The numbers of
working years and life-years lost due to premature deaths
were estimated by the methods described in Appendix 10. The
number of deaths was obtained from the causes of death
statistics (Tilastokeskus 1989b).
The value of potential production lost due to premature
deaths was estimated by the human capital approach. The value
of production lost due to an individual's premature death was
defined as production the individual would have produced over
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his remaining life-time had he not died prematurely. The
present value of an individual's life-time production was
derived by discounting the value of future production to the
present value allowing for the expected working-years and
expected production in various phases of life. Expected
working years were estimated on the basis of survival
probabilites. The value of a person's annual production was
defined in the same way as sickness absence in section 6.2.1.
In estimating the value of an individual's future production
an allowance was made for anticipated growth in productivity
and an individual's probability of being employed at various
ages. The latter refinement was to eliminate the effect of
unemployment and labour force participation rates, which vary
by age and sex, on the results. The formula for calculating
the average value of lost production by age and sex is given
in Appendix 8.
Age- and sex specific survival probabilities were derived
from vital statistics (Tilastokeskus 1989b) by the method
suggested by Chiang (1968). The age- and sex specific
earnings data were obtained from the unpublished income
distribution statistics provided by the Central Statistical
Office (Tilastokeskus 1989). Margins for the employer's
social security contributions and operating surplus were
_
estimated from the National Accounts (Tilastokeskus 1988a)
and added to the earnings. The Economic Planning Centre's
estimate of 2.4 % (Parkkinen and Jarviti 1988) was used for
the anticipated annual growth in productivity. We used a 4 %
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discount rate, which is the same as used by Vinni (1982) and
falls within the 2-6 % suggested by the Helsinki Business
Research Institute (LTT 1984). Age- and sex specific
employment probabilities were estimated from the labour
statistics (Tyi5voimaministerit5 1988).
Results
An estimated 3 440-4 920 premature deaths were attributed to
smoking in 1987 (Table 30). Over one third of the deaths were
within working age, and 3 % were women. The results imply
that about 7.5-10.7 % of all deaths of those aged 35 and over
and 12.7-17.2 % of those aged 35-64 were attributed to
smoking. An estimated 49 100 - 69 600 life-years and
10 300 - 14 800 working-years (Table 31) were lost due to
smoking related premature deaths. The value of potential
production lost due to smoking was estimated to be in the
range of FIM 800-1 192 million.
7.1.2	 Incidence of potential production lost to premature
deaths
The incidence of lost production has not been analysed in any
of the previous studies. It was examined with the same
_
classification and methods as in section 6.2.3. The results
are shown in Table 32.
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Table 30. Estimated number of premature deaths attributed to
smoking in 1987
Disease
Attributed
to smoking (%)
Premature deaths
attributed to smoking
Males Females Age group Age group
35+	 35-64
Cancer of
Oral cavity 19-39 10-20 10
Abdominal cavity 17-38 5 70-150 40-70
Larynx 34 20 10
Lung 80-83 15-20 1400-1470 530-570
Urinary bladder 15-30 2 20-40 10
Coronary heart disease 19-30 1 1460-2360 680-1000
Other vascular
diseases 13-57 40-170 10-50
Bronchitis 58-92 15-30 390-630 70-110
Emphysema 58-92 15-31 30-60 10
TOTAL1 3440-4920 1350-1840
1 Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
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Table 31. Estimated number of life-years, working-years and
potential production lost due to premature deaths
attributed to smoking in 1987
Disease Life-
	
Working- Present
years	 years	 value of
lost	 lost	 lost
production
(FIM
million)
Cancer of
Oral cavity 200-400 60-110 5-9
Abdominal cavity 1210-2470 300-610 22-48
Larynx 210 30 2
Lung 19510-20820 3420-3690 246-264
Urinary bladder 240-460 40-70 3-5
Coronary heart disease 22790-35850 6070-9460 495-805
Other vascular
diseases 540-2190 90-330 7-26
Bronchitis 4000-6540 200-500 18-30
Emphysema 380-630 40-60 2-4
TOTAL' 49070-69560 10330-14850 800-1192
1 Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
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Most of the losses (41 %) are borne by smokers or their
families, and roughly a quarter by their employers. The state
and municipalities bear about 9 % of the losses in terms of
lost tax revenues, while the Social Insurance Institution and
other insurance companies account for about 15 % together.
Both the state and municipalities lose FIM 70-105 million in
tax revenues, while FIM 120-180 million worth of social
security payments are not received by the Social Insurance
Institution and other insurance companies as a result of
premature deaths attributed to smoking.
7.2 Income transfers
7.2.1 Family pensions
Family pension is payable to the relatives of a deceased
person. Family pensions include the widow's pension payable
to women under 65, and the orphan's pension (Kansanelake-
laitos 1988b). Widow's pensions comprise a starting pension
followed by a maintenance pension. A widow's starting pension
is payable for six months after the death of her husband. The
maintenance pension is payable when her six-month starting
pension ends if she has a child under 16 who is entitled to
orphan's pension (widowed mother's maintenance pension) or if
she is childless and aged 40-64 with limited income
(childless widow's maintenance pension).
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Orphan's pension is payable to all half and full orphans
under 21 who cannot maintain themselves, for example because
they are studying. Different rates of benefit are paid to
half and full orphans.
Here we examine only those family pensions paid by the Social
Insurance Institution in the event of male deaths attributed
to smoking.
Materials and methods
Estimates of the amount paid in family pensions were based on
the deaths of men between the ages of 35 and 64. When
estimating the widow's pensions it was assumed that she
belonged to the same age-group as her dead husband. Widows'
starting pensions were estimated separately for each age
group by multiplying the average starting pension by the
number of smoking related deaths, allowing for the
probability that the deceased man was married.
Widowed mother's maintenance pensions were estimated up to
the age of 64 and discounted to their present value.
Estimation allowed for the probability that the dead man was
married, the probability that he had children under 16, the
widow's survival probability and the number of children under
16 she was likely to have at different ages.
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Childless widow's maintenance pensions were estimated up to
the age of 64 and discounted to their present value.
Estimation allowed for the probability that the dead man was
married, the probability that she had no children and the
widow's survival probability.
The present value of orphans' pensions was estimated on the
assumption that it would be paid for eight years. The average
pension was estimated as the weighted mean of the average
pensions for half and full orphans. Estimation allowed for
the probability that the dead man was married and the
probability that he had children under 20. The formulae for
estimating the family pensions are given in Appendix 11.
We used a 4 % discount rate and assumed a 2 % annual real
growth rate in pensions. Age-specific average pensions were
obtained from the age- and occupation statistics (Kansanela-
kelaitos 1988a). Age-specific survival probabilities for
females were derived from the vital statistics (Tilastokeskus
1989b) by Chiang's method (1968). The probabilities that the
men were married and had children, and that a widow lived
alone were estimated from the population statistics
(Tilastokeskus 1988).
Results
About 1 270-1 740 male premature deaths between the ages of
35 and 64 were attributed to smoking in 1987. It was
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estimated that FIM 62-88 million was paid in family pensions
by the Social Insurance Institution because of these deaths
(Table 33). Of this sum about 92 % was widows' pensions and
the rest orphans' pensions.
7.2.2 Avoided health care expenditure and social security
benefits
When a person dies prematurely, society loses his potential
contribution to production and the taxes and fiscal charges
payable on it, but avoids health care costs, pensions and
other social security benefits that a person would have
received during his remaining life-time if he had not died
prematurely. Taxes, pensions and other social security
benefits are income transfers that do not as such increase
the resources available to society. They only redistribute
existing income within society. However, in political
decision-making distributive issues are of major concern.
Taxes and other revenues lost due to lost production
resulting from premature deaths were estimated in section
7.1.2. In this section we examine the avoided health care
costs and social security benefits.
Previous studies have not specifically addressed the problem
of avoided health care costs and social security benefits.
Some studies have analysed the life-time health care
expenditures by smokers and non-smokers with conflicting
results (Leu and Schaub 1983b, Thompson and Forbes 1983).
273
›-n
,-I
-H
5
CO
4-1
0 $4 Ea
10 M C
-H 4-)	 a)
3 U) MI
ca
4 PO 0)
16 ,-11
O
0
I-4
0
4-)	 0.1	 0 0 r-I LC)(0 4-) 4-1 If)
a) CU 0 .X I I I
4-) '0 A 0 0 0 0(0 9-1	 5 I-I N CO
E W	 I-I	 C1) I-I
-1-1 r-I 4-)
4-) (ti 4-)	0
(n Z	 a:i 4-)
W
ra
..-i
co
04
.—.
a)
Cc)
u)	 c
Cl)
	 N-1	 ()
a) ca 0 0
r-I -	 0 0
10 3 -H -H
r-i
	 o 4-)	 ca O
r_i NI
,--1
0
r-I
-H r0 C 0
4 -H 0 0
CO C_) 3 0 04
>
4-)
0
a)
U)
a)
Cm
c
co -,-1	 u)
ro -	 z c
a) IA 0 o
Cli 3	 0 -r-I -1-1 LO 01 C,-
..... 0 4 4-) ul I I I
it, 4-)	 C	 0 1-1 n10 l0
U) HOQW)
0 3 E 0 04
0
-H
U) 0) CD
0	 ca 0 0
a)	 - --I o
Cc)	 I-I
I
LC)
	 H	 N
1	 1
v 0ko
,--1	 1-1
t".
I	 CO
If)
N
1-1	 I	 CI)
r-I
0
N
N
8
Ln
If)
N
co
8
N
0
•:11
N
,-1
1 -
0
N
N
,-i
a)
0
0
al
$-1
0(a
0
H
-III
d
E-1
0
El
ko
I
T-1
N
,--1
I
N
.--I
r-I
I
al
tr)
1--1
I
0
.-1
cy)
1-1
I
Li-)
,--1
kip
N
I
0
N
CO
CO
I
N
kO
I-I
CO
-r-I
C.) CO	 CO
0
U)
-	 C
C 0
CO	 -r-I
I-I
1
,-I
N
I
N
I I-I 1-1
N
1
CL)
4
.U)
a C '16
t--I r-I Ln
4-) S-1	 a)
0 al
›*1
X)
a)	 ell	 al	 •71	 ON	 •;II
Cc)	 V	 •:11	 If)	 LC)	 n0
I	 I	 I	 I	 i	 i
to 0 LC) 0 to 0
cr)	 NII	 •:11	 lt,	 LO	 n0
v
N
.	 N
or)
c
-,-1
ro
c
o
o$.4
o
4-)
a)
V
co
.-1
CO
4-)
0
4-)
0
4--)
V
V
CO
4-)
0
Z
>1
CO
E
U)
1-1
a)
A
E
0
Z
I-I
Studies analysing the economic effects of reduced smoking
(e.g. Atkinson and Townsend 1977) have also examined the net
effects of the reduction in smoking related deaths on health
care expenditure, government finances and pension
expenditure. Atkinson and Townsend (1977) predicted that
reduced smoking would result in a slight fall in health care
expenditure and a substantial growth in pension expenditure.
Further, when the various income transfers are included, the
net effect on government finances would be positive.
Materials and methods
Here we analyse the impact of smoking related premature
deaths on health care expenditure and social security
benefits for people aged 35-84. Health care expenditure was
decomposed into expenditure on hospital care, physician
services and pharmaceuticals. Avoided expenditure on
physician services was analysed separately for hospital out
patient care, health centres, occupational health care,
private practitioners and private sector examinations and
treatments. Pharmaceutical expenditure was decomposed into
expenditure on prescribed medicines and over-the counter-
medicines. Age- and sex specific life-time hospital
expenditure was derived on the basis of the number of bed-
days and average cost per day by hospital type. Expenditure
on different physician services was derived on the basis of
the age- and sex specific utilization figures and average
costs per visit. Pharmaceutical expenditure was estimated
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similarly. The method for estimating the avoided life-time
health care expenditure by age and sex is described in more
detail in Appendix 12.
Social security benefits were estimated separately for
sickness benefits and pensions. Sickness benefits were
divided into sickness allowances and refunds of medical
expenses which were further sub-divided into refunds of
physicians' services, examinations and treatments, medicines
and transportation services. Estimation of the life-time
sickness benefits by type was based on the age- and sex
specific figures on paid benefits. The method used is
described in detail in Appendix 13.
Pensions paid were used as a basis for calculating the
pensions for males and females of different ages. The
pensions cover the old age and disability pensions paid by
the Social Insurance Institution and other occupational
pensions paid by the private sector, state, municipalities
and other public sector agencies. The analysis does not cover
pensions paid under special schemes (e.g. industrial or
military injuries) nor the costs of voluntary pensions. The
analysis covers 87 % of the total expenditure on pensions.
The method for estimating the avoided life-time pensions by
age and sex is described in Appendix 14.
The estimation methods allowed for survival probabilities and
anticipated real growth in health care expenditure (2.4 %
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annually), pensions (2.0 %) and other social security
benefits (2.4 %). Health care expenditure avoided due to
deaths attributed to smoking was obtained by multiplying the
age and sex specific deaths by the respective present values.
Avoided social security benefits were estimated in the same
way.
Results
An estimated 3 260-4 640 premature deaths for people aged 35-
84 were attributed to smoking in 1987. This implies that due
to smoking related deaths FIM 350-500 million expenditure was
avoided in hospital care, FIM 30-50 million in physician
services and FIM 50-70 million in pharmaceutical expenditure
(Table 34).
The present value of avoided social security benefits was
estimated to be FIM 1 320-1 850 million, of which sickness
benefits accounted for FIM 55-74 million and pensions
FIM 1 270-1 770 million. Over one third of the pensions
avoided was payable by the Social Insurance Institution
(Table 35).
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Table 34. Estimated health care expenditure (present value)
avoided due to deaths attributed to smoking in 1987,
FIM million.
Age group	 Premature
	 Avoided due to smoking
deaths
attributed	 hospital costs of pharma-
to smoking	 costs	 physician ceutical
services expenditure
35-39 10-50 1-5 0-1 0-1
40-44 70-110 7-11 1-2 1-2
45-49 130-150 14-16 2-3 3
50-54 210-300 24-33 3-5 4-6
55-59 360-470 41-53 5-7 7-9
60-64 570-750 65-86 7-9 10-13
65-69 520-750 58-84 5-7 8-11
70-74 560-830 61-91 4-7 7-10
75-79 510-740 52-75 3-5 5-7
80-84 330-480 30-44 1-2 2-3
TOTAL' 3260-4640 351-497 33-47 47-66
1 Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
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Table 35. Estimated social security benefits (present value)
avoided due to deaths attributed to smoking in 1987,
FIM million.
Avoided due to smoking
Age group
Paid by the SII2
	Pensions
	
 paid by
refunds	 sickness
	 pensions other
of medical allowances
	 organizations
expensis
35-39 0-1 0a-1 2-7 3-14
40-44 1-2 2-3 10-15 22-35
45-49 2-3 3 19-23 44-52
50-54 4-5 4-5 36-50 77-109
55-59 6-8 4-5 63-82 132-173
60-64 9-11 2 98-131 200-265
65-69 7-10 - 83-119 151-217
70-74 6-9 - 75-112 111-165
75-79 4-6 - 53-78 58-84
80-84 2-3 - 20-27 13-19
TOTAL1 41-57 14-20 456-641 811-1133
1 Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
:
2 The Social Insurance Institution.
a Figure is less than half of the measure.
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8 OTHER ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING
8.1 Cost of fires
Some previous studies have also estimated the costs of fires
caused by tobacco (Shillington 1977, Luce and Schweitzer
1978, Collishaw and Myers 1984, Ellemann-Jensen 1986). The
problem here is to decide whether the costs would have arisen
if no one had smoked. It can be argued that fires associated
with tobacco are not caused by smoking as such, but rather by
careless handling of tobacco by some smokers. On the other
hand, if tobacco products did not exist they could not be
handled carelessly and this provides grounds for arguing that
the fires are caused by smoking.
Cigarettes and other tobacco products caused 274 fires in
1987. Insurance companies paid out FIM 9.3 million damages
for fires caused by tobacco (Tilastokeskus 1989). According
to the Federation of Finnish Insurance Companies, property in
Finland is underinsured by an average of 13 % (Berg K-E
1988). Insurance, therefore, covers only about 87 % of the
value of property. The damages paid by individuals are on
average 6 % of the damage covered by insurance (Berg K-E
1988). In addition, the damages paid by the various insurance
associations are about 11 % of the fire damage shown in the
official statistics (Berg K-E 1988). On the basis of this
information we can estimate that in 1987 tobacco caused FIM
12.2 million fire damages, of which insurance companies paid
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FIN 10.3 million and smokers paid the rest, assuming that
smokers compensated all the damage paid by individuals
(Appendix 15).
This figure is clearly an underestimate as it does not
include forest fires and costs of extinguishing fires.
Official statistics do not allow assessment of tobacco's
contribution to these costs. Deaths from fires caused by
smoking are not included in the estimated fire damages
either.
8.2 Costs of health education and research
On the basis of the Tobacco Act part of the excise tax
received is used to finance health education and research as
well as to fund anti-smoking campaigns. The tax earmarked for
this purpose is currently 0.45 % of the estimated annual
yield of the tobacco tax. Table 36 shows how the earmarked
tax was used in 1987 and the estimated proportion directly
aimed at preventing and reducing smoking (Piha 1989). Part of
the appropriation has been used for general health education
supporting smoking prevention.
,
The FIN 5.6 million shown in Table 35 does not cover all
costs of health education and research associated with
smoking. There is no data on the costs incurred by local
authorities, hospitals, research institutes or voluntary
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Table 36. Use of the earmarked tax in 1987 (FIM 1000)
Purpose	 Measures aimed	 Total
directly at	 appropriation
reduction
in smoking
Administration 405 632
Training 63 247
Research and follow-up 1 430 1 745
Health education programmes
and mass media 3 747 5 671
Publications 143 480
TOTAL 5 588 8 775
Source:	 Piha (1989).
:
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organizations. However, the appropriation derived from the
Tobacco Act is the most significant source of fincance for
smoking related health education (Piha 1989).
8.3 Cleaning costs and additional investments
Tobacco smoke, butts and ash make the environment dirty and
may lead to additional cleaning cost in homes and public
places. Smoking may cause additional costs to restaurants,
Finnair (international flights) and Finnish Rail due to extra
ventilation, maintenance and cleaning. Precautions against
fires caused by smoking have to be taken in buildings and
transportation.
Separate rooms are often reserved for smoking at work, in
other public premises, in transportation (e.g. Finnish Rail,
Finnair's international flights) etc. in order to reduce the
harm and inconvenience caused to non-smokers by smoke and
other factors as a result of smoking. No data is available on
the additional investments needed to build and maintain
separate smoking premises.
In some restaurants smokers have their own area. In others,
_
smoking is totally forbidden, while in some one can smoke
anywhere. Smoking on Finnair's domestic flights is forbidden,
but it is allowed on international flights. Finnish Rail has
decided to set aside 8 % of their new carriages for smokers.
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The same applies to the old carriages that need repair but
figures for these investments are not available. Smoking on
buses and coaches is forbidden on regular services, but if a
coach is hired smoking may be allowed, although there are
some that do not even have ashtrays.
There no reliable estimates of the costs due to this source.
In principle, the costs of material damage due to smoking can
be estimated by applying the approach outlined in Appendix
16.
8.4 Costs and benefits at work-place
Smokers may be less or more efficient than non-smokers at
work. The opposite arguments here are that due to smoking
breaks and smoking-related complications smokers as a group
may exhibit lower productivity than non-smokers in the same
job. On the other hand, the stimulating effects of smoking
may make smokers more productive than non-smokers while at
work. Which of these effects dominate is an empirical matter
that has not been thoroughly researched.
Whether or not there will be external costs or benefits
:
arising from this issue depends on the way in which wage
rates are determined. If the wage rate reflects an
individual's productivity then smokers would bear all the
costs/benefits and no external costs/benefits would arise.
If, on the other hand, wages are determined via collective
284
bargaining, the wage paid to those who do not smoke will be
based on the productivity of the average worker and there
will be external costs/benefits. Smokers would gain/lose and
non-smokers would lose/gain. The magnitude of the loss/gain
depends on the actual productivity difference between smokers
and non-smokers as well as on the prevalence of smoking.
Appendix 17 indicates how the costs due this source may be
derived.
8.5 Disbenefits due to addiction
It is apparent that smoking creates disbenef its to those who
would be willing to give up smoking, but cannot do because of
addiction. In a recent Finnish health survey (N=752) 58 per
cent of current smokers claimed to have attempted to stop
smoking sometimes in the past (20 per cent during the
previous six months) without success (Vohlonen 1989), severe
withdrawal symptoms being one of the major reasons for
failure. For economic analysis, the strength of smoking-
dependency may be depicted by smokers willingness to pay for
means which may help free themselves from dependency.
In the health survey mentioned above, those who had attempted
-.
to stop smoking were asked if they would be willing to pay
for means to enable them to give up smoking entirely. About
46 per cent (27 % of smokers) were willing to pay an average
of FIM 1550 for such means. This implies that the estimated
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welfare loss due to addiction may be around FIM 428 millionl,
which amounts to about 10 per cent of total consumer
expenditure on tobacco in 1987. This willingness-to-pay
estimate may be interpreted to represent the value of
smoking-caused disbenefit (DBA), which smokers would prefer
to live without.
1 There were 3976000 persons aged 15 and over in Finland
in 1987 (Tilastokeskus 1988c). About 26 per cent of this
population smoked regularly (Kalimo et al. 1989, Tilasto-
keskus 1988c).
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9 HEALTH AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING
IN FINLAND IN 1987
9.1 Summary of the main findings
Health and resource consequences
Smoking was associated with 3440-4920 premature deaths in
1987, over one third being due to smoking by individuals aged
35-64 (Table 37). An estimated 49070-69560 life years were
lost due to smoking. Smoking-related sickness absence and
disability caused around 3.0-3.7 million days of illness.
Physician visits attributed to smoking corresponded to 200-
210 physicians' annual work load in 1987 (Table 38). Smoking-
related in-patient hospital care required a capacity
equivalent to one and a half or two average central
hospitals.
Social costs and benefits
Total social costs of smoking were estimated to amount to FIM
4.5-5.0 billion in 1987, of which nearly half was due to
indirect costs (Table 39). The social costs slightly exceed
the minimum estimate of the social benefits of smoking, as
approximated by consumer expenditure on tobacco.
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Table 37. Main health consequences of smoking in Finland in
1987.
HEALTH EFFECT DUE TO SMOKING PROPORTION
AS ESTIMATED	 OF TOTAL
IN THIS STUDY	 (%)
Low High	 Low High
esti- esti-	 esti- esti-
mate mate	 mate mate
Individuals in rehabilitation 270 270 0.8 0.8
Days of illness due to
sickness absence (x1000) 1360 1410 6.8 7.1
Individuals on disability
pension 4600 6150 1.9 2.5
Days of illness due to
disability	 (x1000) 1680 2250 _a
Premature deaths (35* years) 3440 4920 7.21112.1'
Premature deaths (35-64 years) 1350 1840 2.8' 3.8'
Life years lost to
premature deaths 49070 69560 — a
a Not estimated.
b 7.5-10.7 % of all deaths in age group 35 and over.
' 12.7-17.2 % of all deaths in age group 35-64 years.
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Jobs in tobacco industry
Jobs in tobacco trade
Bed-days in hospitals (x1000)
Hospital beds engaged
Physician visits (x1000)
Working days lost to
sickness absence (x1000)
Working days lost to
disability (x1000)
Working years lost to
premature deaths
Table 38. Main resource consequences of smoking in Finland
in 1987.
RESOURCE EFFECT DUE TO SMOKING PROPORTION
AS ESTIMATED	 OF TOTAL
IN THIS STUDY	 (%)
Low High	 Low High
esti- esti-	 esti- esti-
mate mate	 mate mate
1230 1230 a
224 302 1.6 2.2
770 1030 2.6 3.5
590 620 3.4 3.5
1221 1252 6.1 6.2
1010 1350 -b
10330 14850 -b
a Figure is less than half of the measure.
b Not estimated.
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Table 39. Main social costs of smoking in Finland in 1987
(FIM million).1
COST ITEM Low
estimate
High
estimate
INDIRECT COSTS 2424 2494
RESOURCES DEVOTED TO 1436 1436
PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION
DISBENEFITS DUE TO ADDICTION 428 428
HEALTH EXPENDITURE 524 594
- Inpatient care 222 292
- Outpatient care 193 193
- Pharmacauticals 109 109
- Rehabilitation 1 1
OTHER DIRECT COSTS 18 18
- Health education 6 6
- Fires 12 12
INDIRECT COSTS 2063 2564
LOST PRODUCTION DUE TO 2063 2564
- Sickness absence 863 890
- Disability 401 483
- Premature death 800 1192
TOTAL SOCIAL COSTS2 4469 5040
1 Detailed breakdown is presented in Appendix 18.
2 Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
_
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Financial consequences
Ignoring tobacco excise, expenditure due to smoking outweighs
the financial savings due to it (Table 40). However, due to
tobacco excise smoking appears profitable to the public
sector, mainly to the state. For local authorities the net
outcome is minus FIM 180 million.
Institutional and final external costs
Smokers themselves pay the major part of the social costs of
smoking (Table 41). The estimated institutional external
costs amount to about 37-40 % of the total social costs. When
smokers' contribution to the financing of the institutions
concerned is accounted for, smokers pay two thirds of the
total social costs. The estimated final external costs are
about 31-33 % of the social costs. The magnitude of the
institutional and final external costs is clearly lower than
proceeds from tobacco excise.
9.2 Limitations of the study
Estimating the health and economic consequences of smoking at
:
aggregate level is always difficult and the results subject
to uncertainty. This also holds good for the estimates at
hand. At various stages a whole number of restricting
assumptions had to be made.
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Table 40.	 Main financial consequences of smoking in Finland
in 1987	 (FIM million). 1,2
REVENUE (+)/
EXPENDITURE (-) ITEM
Low
estimate
High
estimate
DIRECT CONSEQUENCES -678 -790
- Health expenditure -395 -456
- Social security benefits -278 -329
- Other direct expenditure
-6 -6
INDIRECT CONSEQUENCES 389 629
- Tax revenue lost -486 -605
- Avoided health expenditure 364 516
- Avoided social security benefits 511 718
NET REVENUE (tobacco excise
excluded)3 -289 -161
PROCEEDS FROM TOBACCO EXCISE 2162 2162
NET REVENUE (tobacco excise
included)3 1873 2001
1 Includes revenue and expenditure effects on state, local
authorities and the Social Insurance Institution.
2 Detailed breakdown is presented in Appendix 18.
3 Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
2012
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Table 41. Institutional and final external costs of smoking in
Finland in 1987 (FIM million).1
Institutional	 Final
external	 external
costs	 costs
Low
esti-
mate
High
esti-
mate
Low
esti-
mate
High
esti-
mate
DIRECT COSTS 440 506 338 389
INDIRECT COSTS 1208 1502 1038 1290
TOTAL2 1649 2008 1376 1679
Proportion of the
total social costs (%) 37 40 31 33
1 Detailed breakdown is presented in Appendix 18.
2 Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
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The quantitative impact of smoking on morbidity and mortality
was estimated by applying fairly cautious assumptions
throughout the study. Mortality ratios between smokers and non-
smokers were based on three well-known non-Finnish studies
carried out in the 1960's and early 1970's. The consumption of
tobacco products increased significantly thereafter, both in
the countries in question and in Finland, although it
subsequently declined or at least stabilized in the late
1980's. Longer follow-up studies have suggested the mortality
ratios to be somewhat higher than used in this study and there
is some evidence that they may have increased as a function of
the follow-up time (Rogot and Murray 1980).
This study has covered the main diseases associated with
smoking, but omitted, for example, the possible health
consequences of passive smoking. No attempt was made to
quantify and value the pain and suffering endured by smokers
and their families in cases of illness and death. Nor was any
consideration given to the smoker's valuation of his own life.
Also, investments in smoking premises, as well as the costs of
extra cleaning and ventilation, and costs and benefits at the
work-place were omitted. On the other hand, not all beneficial
effects of smoking, such as consumer surplus, were included.
For all these reasons, the estimated effects may be regarded to
indicate only the lower limit of the health and economic
consequences of smoking.
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9.3 Is there a case for government intervention?
There does not seem to be a case for government intervention to
correct for financial externality (Table 42). It seems likely
that smokers as a group pay the external costs they generate to
others, irrespective of what is assumed about addiction and
awareness of the health risks.
There does, however, seem to be a case for intervention to
correct for other market failures. The intervention criteria
are clearly positive for three of the five models. For modified
economic model 3 the criterion is ambiguous.
If consumers are fully informed about the health risks and not
addicted to tobacco (traditional economic model), then
government intervention may not be justified on economic
grounds. However, if the value of the caring externality
exceeds FIM 230 000 per life lost due to smoking, or FIM 16 000
per life year lost, then intervention may also be justified in
this case.'
If consumers are unaware of the health risks, but not addicted
to tobacco (medical model and modified economic model 1), then
there may be a case for government intervention to correct for
the lack of information.
1 These figures are well below those reported in
Table 12 on money invested to save lives, or for coronary
artery bypass surgery per life-year gained.
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If consumers are unaware of the health risks and addicted to
tobacco (modified economic model 2), then there may be a case
for government intervention to correct for the lack of
information and dependency.
If consumers are fully informed about the health risks and
addicted to tobacco (modified economic model 3), the
situation is ambiguous. The high estimate would justify
intervention while the low estimate would not. However, if
the value of caring externality exceeds FIM 68 000 per life
lost due to smoking or FIM 4 800 per life year lost, then
intervention may also be justified in this case. 1 Government
intervention should be directed to prevent addiction and to
help smokers to give up smoking.
-.
1 These figures are well below those reported in
Table 12 on money invested to save lives, or for coronary
artery bypass surgery per life-year gained.
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10 CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study was to outline a framework for
analysing the economic consequences of smoking from the point
of view of different parties and to examine these
consequences empirically. Our investigation of the health and
economic consequences of smoking in Finland in 1987 leads to
six main conclusions:
(1) It appears that it is not possible to create an
unambiguous framework which would be suitable for all
circumstances. It is, indeed, possible to estimate the social
costs of smoking, but it is not feasible to determine
unambiguously which proportion of these costs is relevant for
designing policy towards smoking. In particular, the
estimated costs of smoking vary considerably depending on
which economic framework is used.
(2) A theoretically correct economic analysis of the costs of
smoking depends on the assumptions made with regard to
dependence and information among consumers.
(3) Smoking appears to have a relatively greater impact on
'
public health than on health care resources. Smoking seems to
be a major source of illness and premature death while its
impact on health services utilization appears smaller than
generally expected.
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(4) The estimated social costs slightly exceed the social
benefits of smoking. The result is inconclusive, however,
since both estimates represent the lower limit of the broader
social costs and benefits of smoking. It seems evident,
nevertheless, that smoking is profitable to the public
sector, apart from local authorities.
(5) Smokers themselves pay the major part of the estimated
social costs of smoking. It seems likely that smokers as a
group pay the external costs they generate to non-smokers and
relevant institutions, irrespective of what is assumed about
addiction and awareness of the health risks.
(6) There does not appear -co be a case for government
intervention to correct for financial externality.
There does seem, however, to be a case for intervention to
correct for the caring externality, imperfect information and
tobacco addiction. The appropriate measures for each case are
outlined in the first part of this study.
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PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION
AND DEMAND
Benefits to smokers
- Resources devoted
to production and
distribution
- Proceeds from excise
duty
MORBIDITY
Total health care costs
Cost of hospital care
Costs of outpatient care2 -
Cost of medicines2	 -
- Prescribed medicines
- Over-the-counter-
medicines
Sickness benefits
Costs of rehabilitation
Disability benefits
MORTALITY
Widow's and orphan's
pensions
+
-
+	 + +	 -
_ -
	
_
-
--
- _
- - - -
_ -	 - -
_
- - _ - _ -
- - - _ - -
- -
APPENDIX 1: ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SMOKING ANALYSED IN PREVIOUS STUDIES
Table A1.1. Direct economic effects of smoking analysed in previous
studies [Benefit (+), Cost (-)].
EFFECT	 SWEDEN ENGLAND USA CANADA OTHERS
Study'	 1234  5678 910 11 12 13 14 15
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Table A1.1. ... continue [Benefit (+), Cost (-)].
EFFECT	 SWEDEN ENGLAND USA CANADA OTHERS
Study'	 1234  5678 910 11 12 13 14 15
OTHER DIRECT EFFECTS
Fire damages
Costs of health education
and research	 -
Costs of cleaning and
extra ventilation
Investments to smoking
premises
1 Numbers refer to the following studies: 1 = Lindholm (1973),
2 = Johnsson (1980), 3 = Hjalte (1984a), 4 = Hjalte (1984b), 5 =
Peston (1972), 6 = DHSS (1972), 7 = Atkinson and Townsend (1977),
8 = Cohen (1984), 9 = Luce and Schweitzer (1978), 10 = Rice et al
(1986), 11 = Shillington (1977), 12 = Thompson and Forbes (1982),
13 = Collishaw and Myers (1984), 14 = Ellemann-Jensen (1986),
15 = Leu and Schaub (1984).
2 Costs have not been broken down in detail.
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Table A1.2. Indirect economic effects of smoking analysed in
previous studies [Benefit (+), Cost (-)].
EFFECT	 SWEDEN ENGLAND USA CANADA OTHERS
Study'	 1234  5678 910 11 12 13 14 15
MORBIDITY
Lost production due to
- Sickness absence	 _	 - -	 _ - -	 - - -	 -
- Disability	 - -	 -
Extra costs to employers
Lost tax-revenues due to
- Sickness absence
- Disability
MORTALITY
Lost production	 - - _	 -	 -
Avoided health care
expenditure
Lost tax-revenues
Avoided pensions
Other avoided social
security benefits
OTHER INDIRECT EFFECTS
1 Numbers refer to the following studies: 1 = Lindholm (1973),
2 = Johnsson (1980), 3 = Hjalte (1984a), 4 = Hjalte (1984b), 5 =
Peston (1972), 6,= DHSS (1972), 7 = Atkinson and Townsend (1977),
8 = Cohen (1984), 9 = Luce and Schweitzer (1978), 10 = Rice et al
(1986), 11 = Shillington (1977), 12 = Thompson and Forbes (1982),
13 = Collishaw and Myers (1984), 14 = Ellemann-Jensen (1986),
15 = Leu and Schaub (1984).
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APPENDIX 2: AN INDIRECT METHOD FOR ESTIMATING THE pj:s
The public sector finances most of its expenditure by tax
revenue. Tax systems differ from country to country, but a
feature common to all systems is that tax revenue is
collected by taxing income, consumption, production or sales.
By decomposing the relevant tax categories into smokers' and
non-smokers' contributions it is possible to estimate the
p i :s. The relevant taxes here are taxes based on income and
consumption. Income taxes are paid by smokers and non-smokers
alike. Their separate contributions can be estimated if the
prevalence of smoking is known by income groups. The relevant
consumption tax here is the tobacco excise levy which can be
interpreted as compensating for the external costs of
smoking, though the fiscal motive has traditionally dominated
tobacco taxation policies in Finland (Pekurinen and Valtonen
1987).
Tax categories
By denoting the average taxable income in income group i by
y i , the number of people in the income group by N i , and the
prevalence of smoking by p i , the total taxable income Yi in
income group i is
Y i = Niyi = piNiyi + ( 1 - pi )Niyi,
where piNiyi = total taxable income earned by smokers in
income group i,
(1 - pi )Niyi = total taxable income earned by non-smokers in
' income group i.
-
For the purpose of this study, taxes based on income can be
grouped into the following six categories: state income tax
(central government), municipal tax (local authorities),
sickness insurance premium, national pension contribution,
church taxes and other taxes. In Finland, sickness insurance
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premium and national pension contribution are paid to the
Social Insurance Institution. Church taxes are paid either to
the Lutheran or the Orthodox church. The total amount of
income taxes paid by the income group i (T i ) is thus
T i = aiCG Yi 	 aiLGYi	 aiSIYi	 aiNPYi	 aiCYi	 alOYi
T1
	 TiCG	 TiLG	 T13I	 T iNP	 T 1C	 TLC)
Where aics 
• 
average state income tax rate in
income group i (%),
aIJA average municipal tax rate (%),
aiS1	 sickness insurance premium (%),
aiNp national pension contribution (%),
church taxes (%),
proportion of other taxes on income (%),
total state income tax paid by income group i,
total municipal income tax paid by
income group i,
total sickness insurance contribution paid by
income group i,
= total national pension contribution paid by
income group i,
Tic = total church taxes paid by income group i,
Tio = total amount of other taxes paid by income
group i.
Total amount of taxes j collected from all income groups is
of which the amount
( 2.1 ) T i 3	 EaiipiNiyi
is paid by smokers and the amount
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aic =
aw =
T icc =
TiLG =
T is/ =
(2.2) ;NS 
= Eaii ( 1 - Pi )NiYi
i
by non-smokers.
Decomposing public sector revenues
The public sector has a variety of other sources of revenue
than those based on taxpayers' incomes. In order to derive
estimates for the pi :s it is sufficient to consider the
financing structure of the state, municipalities, state
churches, as well as the Social Insurance Institution, which
runs both the public sickness insurance and the national
pension schemes in Finland.
The total state revenue (Gc ) can be defined as the sum of the
total proceeds from income tax (Tm ), from the tobacco excise
(TEX), and from other revenues from individuals (X cl ) and
other sources (Xm):
( 2.3 ) Gc = Tm
 + TEX + Xci + Xm.
The municipalities' total revenues (GL ) include proceeds from
the municipal income tax (T w ), state subsidies (SSLO and
other revenues from individuals (Xu ) and other sources (Xw):
(2.4) GL = Tw + SSIX + XLI + XL0'
The total revenue of the Social Insurance Institution (SII)
is made up of employees' sickness insurance premiums (T u ) and
national pension contributions (T rip ), employers' sickness
_
insurance premiums ( Es1 ) and national pension contributions
( EN? ), the state's contribution to sickness insurance (CGu),
the state's (CGNO
 and municipalities' (LG r,p ) contribution to
national pensions, and other revenues to finance sickness
insurance (X31 ) and national pensions (Xrip):
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(2.5) SII = Ts/ + Tre E31 + ENP + CG= + CG„,, + LGre
+ X=
 + X.
The total revenue of the state churches (CT) is made up of
the church taxes from individuals (CT I ) and corporations
(CT,):
(2.6) CT = CT I + CT,.
Derivation of the pj:s
The total state revenue can be decomposed into smokers' and
non-smokers' contributions by formulae (2.1)-(2.3). Assuming
that other revenue derived from individuals (X,1 ) is
distributed between smokers and non-smokers in proportion to
their population shares, (2.3) can be decomposed as follows
(2.7) G, = Tm + TEX + X= + Xm
= Tms + Tm" + TEX + pX= + (1 - p)X= + Xm
= Tms + pX=
 + TEX + T,G" + (1 - p)X=
 + Xm
= [Eai„piNi fyi } + pX= + TEX]
[Ect0(1 — pi)Nifyi) ÷ ( 1
 — p)xci
The terms in the first brackets in (2.7) refer to the amount
of state revenue collected from smokers. The second brackets
give the non-smokers contribution. Dividing the terms in the
first brackets by the total state revenue (GO gives the
smokers' share B,G in (5). Thus
( 2.8 ) pm = [E	 + pX,/
 + TEX] /G„-
where p is the prevalence of smoking among income earners.
The non-smokers' share in (4) is then 1 - B,m.
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Municipalities' revenue can be decomposed in the same way by
formulae (2.1), (2.2) and (2.4)
(2.9) GL = TLC + SSLG + Xu + XLc
= TLGS 	 TLC"	 SSLGS	 ssLGNS 	 PXLI + ( 1 - p ) xLi
= TLGS + SSLGS 	 pki + TLGNS 	 SSLGNS	 ( 1 - p ) XLI + XL0
[ CtiLGPiNiYi
	PCGSSLG	 PXLI]
+ [EaiLG (1 - p i )Niyi + ( 1 - 13cG)SSLG
+ (1 - p)Xu
 + XL0].
The terms in the first brackets indicate the total amount of
municipal taxes and other revenues paid by smokers and the
terms in the second brackets indicate those paid by non-
smokers. Dividing the terms in the first brackets by the
total municipal revenue (G L ) gives us the smokers' share PLC
in (5). Thus
(2.10) PLC = [EaiLGp iNiyi + P cGSSLG + pXu ] /GL.
The non-smokers' share in (4) is then 1 - pLG •
The same method can be used to decompose the revenue of the
Social Insurance Institution (SII) into smokers' and non-
smokers' contributions. Smoking-related benefits paid by the
SII fall into either of the two categories: sickness benefits
or pension benefits. The revenue collected to finance
sickness benefits can be decomposed by formulae (2.1), (2.2)
and (2.5) as follows
(2.11) SII G1 = T51 + E51 + XG1
= iDSIS	 ESIS	 TSI NS	 ESINS
	 XSI
= Eai5IPAY1	 EP11\11ar1( 2 171) -1E51 4- PCGICGSI
[ aisI ( 1 - p),N iy, + 2.(1 _ p i ) N lyi ( Ey)-3.Es,
+ (1 - pcocGsi+ x51],
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where the first three terms indicate smokers' contribution to
financing sickness insurance and the terms in the brackets
indicate non-smokers' contribution. Dividing the first three
terms by the total amount of sickness insurance contributions
(SII 91 ) gives the smokers' share p s, in (5). Thus
(2.12) NI = [ I aisipiNiyi	 Ep iNiyi ( Ey /. ri Esi + p cGCGsi ] /Si's' .
The non-smokers's share in (4) is 1 - pSI
In the same way we can derive the smokers' share in financing
national pensions by formulae (2.1), (2.2) and (2.5). The pNp
is
(2.13)	 13Np = EaiNpPiNiYi
	EPiNiYi EYi riErip	 PcGCGNp
+ P LG LGNP ] "511
and the non-smokers' share is 1 - pNP •
Smokers' share in financing churches' expenditure can be
derived by formulae (2.1), (2.2) and (2.6). The pc is
( 2.14 ) pc =	 EaicpiNiyi /CT .
and the non-smokers's share is 1 - pc.
Thus we have derived all the relevant p j :s in (4) and (5).
Substituting ( '2.8), (2.10), (2.12), and (2.14) for p j :s in (5)
we can estimate the proportion of the costs - of service i
borne by smokers, i.e.
Pis
	=	 13 ccPics	PLGPiLG
	13cPic	 PiP
= [ EaNi fyi } + pXci + TEX] piCG/Gc
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+ [ZaiLGPAYi + PcGSS LG	 PXLi ] PiLG/GL
+ EpiNiyi( EYi -1Esi + PcGCGsz Pisi S I Isz
+ [ 2 aicp iNiyi ]p ic/CT + pip.
The proportion of the costs borne by the third parties is
= 1 -
By substituting (2.8), (2.10), and (2.12)-(2.14) for p j :s in
(6) and (7) we can estimate the institutional external costs
by parties and derive the final external costs of smoking.
The prevalence of smoking in 1987, the p in (2.7)-(2.10), was
estimated from a representative sample (N = 13 130) of the
non-institutionalised Finnish population aged 15 and over.
The original interview survey was carried out by the Social
Insurance Institution in 1987 (Kalimo et al 1989). The total
amount of income related taxes paid to various taxing
institutions by smoking groups, the T ii :s in (2.7)-(2.14), was
estimated by identifying the smoking status of each
individual in the sample and inspecting the amount of taxes
they had paid to each institution in 1987 from the national
tax registry'. The other tax and financing information
required, the Xi :s, SS i :s,	 Ci:s, and the TEX in (2.7)-
(2.14), was derived from various official statistics (Valtion
... 1990, Kansanelakelaitos 1988b, Kirkkohallitus 1988). The
estimates for the p j :s derived in this study are given in
Table A2.1.
1 I am grateful to Unto Hakkinen for analysing the national
tax registry data by smoking groups.
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Table A2.1. Final financing of the public institutions concerned
by smoking groups in 1987 (%)
Smokers Former Non-
	 Othersi Total
(Pi )	 smokers smokers
OPTION A.	 Tobacco excise is icluded in the state revenue. i.e. tobacco excise is not ear-narked
State 2 23.94 16.47 43.94 15.64 100.00
Municipalities 3 23.00 17.26 43.51 16.22 100.00
SII 4 27.22 20.18 47.45 5.14 100.00
State churches' 24.63 20.33 44.73 10.30 100.00
OPTION B.
	 Tobacco excise is not icluded in the state revenue. i.e. tobacco excise is ear-narked
State2 22.31 16.83 44.89 15.98 100.00
Municipalities 3 22.53 17.37 43.78 16.32 100.00
SII 4 26.93 20.25 47.62 5.20 100.00
State churches' 24.63 20.33 44.73 10.30 100.00
Prevalence of
smoking (%) 25.27 18.18 56.55 100.00
1 Mainly firms
2 Central government
3 Local authorities
4 Social Insurance Institution
5 Lutheran and Orthodox
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APPENDIX 3: DISEASES EXAMINED IN THE STUDY
The names and ICD-9 codes (9th Revision of the International
Classification of Diseases, Injuries and Causes of Death) of
the diseases examined in this study as defined by
LaakintOhallitus (1986) are given below.
Cancer of the oral cavity:
Malignant neoplasm of lip (140)
Malignant neoplasm of tongue (141)
Malignant neoplasm of major salivary glands (142)
Malignant neoplasm of gum (143)
Malignant neoplasm of floor of mouth (144)
Malignant neoplasm of other and unspecified
parts of mouth (145)
Malignant neoplasm of oropharynx (146)
Malignant neoplasm of nasopharynx (147)
Malignant neoplasm of hypopharynx (148)
Malignant neoplasm of other ill-defined sites within the
lip, oral cavity and pharynx (149)
Cancer of the esophagus and pancreas:
Malignant neoplasm of esophagus (150)
Malignant neoplasm of pancreas (157)
Cancer of the larynx (161)
Cancer of the lung:
Malignant neoplasm of trachea, bronchus or lung (162)
Malignant neoplasm of pleura (163)
Cancer of the urinary bladder (188)
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Coronary heart disease:
Acute myocardial infarction (410)
Other acute and subacute forms of ischaemic
heart disease (411)
Old myocardial infarction (412)
Other forms of chronic ischaemic heart diseases (414)
Other vascular diseases:
Aortic aneurysm (441)
Other peripheral vascular diseases (443)
Chronic bronchitis (491)
Emphysema (492)
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APPENDIX 4: ATTRIBUTABLE RISKS
Attributable risks are used in several sections of this
study. The attributable risk indicates the fraction of the
total number of people affected by a given disease which is
due to exposure to the influence of a risk factor e.g.
smoking. The attributable risk can be expressed as follows
(Miettinen 1974):
(4.1)	 Slijk =
( r11 _ 1 ) pl i j
(rlijk - 1 )plii + 1
where Sl ijk = the proportion of cases of disease k in age-
group i and sex j that are due to smoking,
riiik = the relative risk for smokers of age i and sex
j to contract the disease k as compared with
non-smokers,
pl„ = the proportion of smokers in the population in
age-group i and sex j.
The attributable risk (4.1) was calculated for all the
diseases mentioned in Appendix 3.
The joint attributable risk was calculated for smokers and
former smokers for the four major diseases commonly thought
to be causally related to smoking (ICD-9 codes 162&163, 410-
412 & 414, 491 and 492) by the following formula (Miettinen
1974):
(4.2) S2„ k =
..	 ( r liik - 1 )plij + ( r2iik - 1 )p2ij
( r isk _ 1 ) p l i j + ( r 2 i jk _ 1 ) p2i j ÷ 1
where S21jk = the proportion of cases of disease k in age-
group i and sex j that are due to current or
former smoking,
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r2I.J1c = the relative risk for former smokers of age i
and sex j to contract the disease k as compared
with non-smokers,
p2ij = the proportion of former smokers in the
population in age-group i and sex j.
The age, sex and diagnosis specific relative risks derived
from the three prospective epidemiologic studies are given in
tables A4.1 and A4.2 for smokers and in table A4.3 for former
smokers. The relative sizes of smoking groups used in this
study are given in table A4.4. The age, sex and diagnosis
specific attributable risks estimated in this study on the
basis of the data given in tables A4.1-A4.4 are given in
tables A4.5 and A4.6 for smokers and in table A4.7 jointly
for smokers and former smokers.
The relative risks, the rl and r2 1ik , were obtained from
three major epidemiologic studies (Hammond 1966, CederlOf et
al 1975, Doll and Peto 1976) and the relative sizes of
smoking groups, the plij and p2ii , in Finland from Kalimo et al
(1982).
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Cancer of
Oral cavity (140-149) D&P <
H <
	
13.0 	 >
	
2.9 	 >
11.67.8
Lung (162-163)
	 D&P <
H <
C	 <
Urinary bladder (188) D&P <
H <
C	 <
14.0
	 > <
7.0
2.1
3.0
1.8
>
>
>
6.6 11.4
Brochitis (491) and
	
D&P <
emphysema (492)	 H	 <
C	 <
24.7
	 > <
1.6
Table A4.1. Relative risks of male smokers as compared to male
non-smokers for different illnesses (ICD - 9 code)
obtained in three studies
AGE GROUP
Study'
35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75-84 85+
Esophagus (150)
Pancreas (157)
Larynx (161)
D&P < 	  4.7 	 >
H < 	  1.7 	 >
D&P <	 1.6
H <	 2.7	 > <	 2.2
C	 <	 3.1
H <
	 9.0
>
>
>
>
Coronary heart disease D&P
	 8.7 3.1	 1.5	 1.3	 1.0	 1.0
(410-412&414)
	 H	 1.0 2.8
	 1.8	 1.5	 1.2	 1.2
C	 1.0 2.6	 1.7 < 	  1.7 	 >
Ca	 2.6 1.7
Aortic aneurysm (441)
	 D&P < 	
 6.6
H < 	
 2.6 
	 > <
	 4.9
C	 < 	
 1.6
Other peripheral
vascular diseases (443) H
	 < 	
 1.2 
	
>
>
>
>
_
1 D&P = Doll and Peto (1976), H = Hammond (1966), C = CederlOf et
al (1975).
4 Attributable risks for the latter of the successive five year age
groups.
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Table A4.2. Relative risks of female smokers as compared to female
non-smokers for different illnesses (ICD-9 code)
obtained in three studies
AGE GROUP
Studyl
35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75-84 85+
Cancer of
Pancreas (157)
	 C	 < 	  2.5 
	 >
Lung (162-163)
	 D&P < 	
 5.0 	 >
H	 < 	
 2.2 	 >
C	 < 	
 4.5 	 >
Urinary bladder (188) C
	 < 	
 1.6 	 >
Coronary heart disease
	 H	 1.0	 2.0	 1.7	 1.4
	 1.2	 1.2(410-412&414)
	 C	 1.0
	 1.0	 2.6	 < 	
 1.1 
	 >
Ca
	2.6
	 1.1
Brochitis (491) and	 D&P < 	  10.5 
	 >
emphysema (492)	 H	 < 	
 4.9 	 >
C	 1.0	 1.0	 1.7	 < 	
 2.2 	 >
Ca
	1.7
	 2.2
1 D&P = Doll and Peto (1976), H = Hammond (1966), C = CederlOf et
al (1975).
a Attributable risks for the latter of the successive five year age
groups.
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Table A4.3. Relative risks of former smokers as compared to non-
smokers for different illnesses (ICD - 9 code) obtained
in three studies
Study'
AGE GROUP
35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75-84 85+
MALES
Lung cancer (162-163) D&P 7.2 7.5 6.9 6.4 4.6 4.6
C 4.8 5.2 5.3 5.0 5.0 5.0
Coronary heart disease D&P 4.3 2.0 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2(410-412&414) C 1.1 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3
Ca 1.8 1.5
Brochitis (491) and D&P 14.3 15.5 15.0 14.0 11.2 11.2
emphysema (492) C 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.4
FEMALES
Lung cancer (162-163) D&P 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.1
C 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.1
Coronary heart disease C 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0
(410-412&414) Ca 1.3 1.0
Brochitis (491) and D&P 2.9 2.6 2.1 1.5 1.2 1.2
emphysema (492) C 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2
Ca 1.4 1.4
1 D&P = Doll and Peto (1976), C = Cederltif et al (1975).
° Attributable risks for the latter of the successive five year age
groups.
_
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Table A4.4. The estimated proportion (%) of smokers, former smokers
and ever smokers in the Finnish population by age and
sex in 1976.
AGE GROUP
25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75-99 Total
MALES
Smokers	 44.5 41.3 41.9 34.4 30.8 15.0 39.2
Former smokers
	 22.8 25.4 33.3 43.4 41.8 48.9 32.0
Never smoked
	 32.8 33.4 24.8 22.1 27.4 36.1 28.8
N	 1415 1199 1361 935 572 180 5662
FEMALES
Smokers
	 29.2 16.6 14.3 9.1 3.7 0.7 15.4
Former smokers
	 14.3 9.0 6.9 6.2 3.5 2.2 8.3
Never smoked
	 56.5 74.3 78.8 84.7 92.8 97.1 76.3
N	 1310 1329 1415 1033 655 273 6015
Source: Kalimo et al (1982).
_
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Table A4.5. Attributable risks (%) for different illnesses (ICD-9
code) estimated in this study for male-smokers by age in
1987
Studyl
AGE GROUP
35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75-84 85+
Cancer of
Oral cavity (140-149) * D&P 41.6 41.7 40.2 39.4 32.1 32.1
H 22.2 22.4 20.0 18.6 11.2 11.2
Esophagus (150) * D&P 30.2 30.4 28.0 26.6 17.8 17.8
H 11.7 11.8 10.1 9.3 5.0 5.0
Pancreas (157) D&P 19.9 20.1 17.1 15.6 8.3 8.3
H 41.1 41.5 36.8 26.5 14.9 14.9
C 46.4 46.8 41.9 39.3 24.0 24.0
Larynx (161) * H 38.4 38.5 36.7 35.6 27.3 27.3
Lung (162-163) D&P 84.3 84.5 81.7 80.0 66.1 66.1
H 73.9 74.1 70.2 76.5 61.4 61.4
C 71.2 71.5 67.4 64.9 47.4 47.4
Urinary bladder (188) D&P 31.2 31.5 27.5 25.3 14.2 14.2
H 44.7 45.1 40.3 37.6 22.7 22.7
C 24.8 25.1 21.6 19.8 10.7 10.7
Coronary heart disease D&P 76.1 46.8 14.7 8.5 0.1 0.1(410-412&414) H 0.0 43.1 22.4 12.2 3.5 3.5
C 0.0 40.1 19.4 17.7 9.5 9.5
Ca 39.8 22.7
Aortic aneurysm (441) D&P 69.8 70.1 65.8 63.3 45.7 45.7
H 40.1 40.4 35.8 54.7 37.0 37.0
C 19.9 20.1 17.1 15.6 8.3 8.3
Other peripheral
vascular diseases (443) H 6.9 7.0 5.8 5.3 2.6 2.6
Brochitis (491) and D&P 90.7 90.8 89.1 87.9 78.0 78.0
emphysema (492) H 69.6 69.9 65.6 76.2 61.0 61.0
C 19.9 20.1 17.1 15.6 8.3 8.3
_
1 D&P = Doll and Peto (1976), H = Hammond (1966), C = Cederltif et al
(1975).
a Attributable risks for the latter of the successive five year age
groups.
* 50 % of the excess cases of smokers attributed to other factors.
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Table A4.6. Attributable risks (%) for different illnesses (ICD-9
code) estimated in this study for female-smokers by age
in 1987
Studyl
AGE GROUP
35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75-84 85+
Cancer of
Pancreas (157) C 19.9 17.7 12.0 5.3 1.0 1.0
Lung (162-163) D&P 39.9 36.4 26.7 12.9 2.7 2.7
H 16.6 14.6 9.8 4.3 0.8 0.8
C 36.7 33.4 24.2 11.5 2.4 2.4
Urinary bladder (188) C 9.1 7.9 5.2 2.2 0.4 0.4
Coronary heart disease H 0.0 12.5 5.9 1.6 0.1 0.1(410-412&414) C 0.0 0.0 12.7 0.4 0.1 0.1
Ca 18.6 0.9
Brochitis (491) and D&P 61.2 57.6 46.4 26.0 6.2 6.2
emphysema (492) H 39.2 35.7 26.1 12.6 2.7 2.7
0.0 0.0 6.0 4.3 0.8 0.8
Ca 9.1 9.8
1 D&P = Doll and Peto (1976), H = Hammond (1966), C = Cederllif et al
(1975).
a Attributable risks for the latter of the successive five year age
groups.
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Table A4.7. Attributable risks (%) for different illnesses (ICD-9
code) estimated in this study for smokers and former
smokers by age and sex in 1987
Study'
AGE GROUP
35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75-84 85+
MALES
Lung cancer (162-163) D&P 86.1 86.7 85.5 84.4 78.3 78.3
C 79.2 80.8 81.1 80.0 80.0 80.0
Coronary heart disease D&P 76.7 50.0 23.1 16.7 13.0 13.0
(410-412&414) C 9.1 44.4 33.3 28.6 23.1 23.1
Ca 44.4 33.3
Brochitis (491) and D&P 93.0 93.5 93.3 29.9 91.1 91.1
emphysema (492) C 47.4 54.5 58.3 56.5 58.3 58.3
FEMALES
Lung cancer (162-163) D&P 47.4 41.2 33.3 16.7 9.1 9.1
C 37.5 33.3 23.1 9.1 9.1 9.1
Coronary heart disease C 0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
(410-412&414) Ca 23.1 0.0
Brochitis (491) and D&P 65.5 61.5 52.4 33.3 20.0 20.0
emphysema (492) C 28.6 23.1 23.1 16.7 9.1 9.1
Ca 28.6 28.6
1 D&P = Doll and Peto (1976), C = CederlOf et al (1975).
a Attributable risks for the latter of the successive five year age
groups.
-
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APPENDIX 5: COSTS OF HOSPITAL INPATIENT CARE BY DIAGNOSIS
In Finland, costs of hospital inpatient care by diagnosis are
not available. It is highly unlikely that the cost per day of
smoking related diagnoses would equal the average cost.
Therefore a special two-stage method was developed to
estimate these approximately. Estimation of the diagnosis
specific costs per day was based on the hospital discharge
register data and data on hospital costs.
In the first stage, the distribution of bed days by hospital
type and specialty was estimated for each diagnosis from the
hospital discharge data. Hospitals were classified into six
categories: university hospitals, other central hospitals,
district hospitals, specialist-led health centre hospitals,
ordinary health centre hospitals, and other hospitals. All
hospital types were classified into nine specialties:
internal medicine, surgery, gynecology, pediatrics, ENT,
skin- and veneral diseases, tuberculosis, lung diseases and
other specialties. The distribution of bed days by diagnosis
was obtained by the following formula
(5.1) aiik	 = HDijk/E EHDijk,
Jk
where a
	
the proportion of bed-days in hospital type j
in specialty k of all bed-days for diagnosis
HDijk =	 the total number of bed-days for diagnosis i
in specialty k in hospital type j.
In the second stage, the diagnosis specific cost per bed-day
was estimated as a weighted average of the cost per day by
hospital type and specialty, using the proportions derived by
(5.1) as weights. The estimated cost per bed-day for
diagnosis i (ACi ) was obtained by
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(5.2) ACi
	
EaJi AC-lt-
Jk
where ACjk
	= the cost per bed-day in specialty k in
hospital type j.
Detailed data on the number of bed-days by diagnosis in
various types of hospitals by specialties were obtained from
unpublished hospital discharge register data provided by the
National Board of Health (Laakinttihallitus 1989). Cost data
were derived from the Hospital Statistics (Sairaalaliitto
1988) and from the Financial Statistics of Health Centres
(Suomen kaupunkiliitto 1988).
Cost per day by specialty in university hospitals, other
central hospitals and district hospitals for the eight
specialities specified above was obtained directly from the
Hospital Statistics (Sairaalaliitto 1988). Cost per day in
other specialties was calculated as the weighted average of
the cost per day in excluded specialties, using the number of
bed-days as weights. Reliable specialty costs were not
available for health centre hospitals and other hospitals and
therefore average cost per day was used as a proxy. Average
cost per day in specialist-led and ordinary health centre
hospitals was obtained directly from the Financial Statistics
of Health Centres (Suomen kaupunkiliitto 1988). Cost per day
in other hospitals was approximated by the weighted average
of the cost per day in tuberculosis-, local- and private
hospitals, using the number of bed-days as weights. The
average capital costs per bed-day were estimated on the basis
of the capital costs by the type of hospital applying the
two-stage method described above. The estimated diagnosis
specific costs per bed-day are given in Table A5.1.
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Table A5.1.	 Diagnosis specific cost per bed-day in 1987
used in the study
Diagnosis ICD-9 code Cost per
bed-day
(FIM)
Cancer of
Oral cavity 140-149 1237.70
Esophagus 150 913.30
Pancreas 157 1262.20
Larynx 161 1143.50
Lung 162&163 1262.20
Urinary bladder 188 1262.20
Coronary heart disease 410-412&414 787.40
Aortic aneurysm 441 810.80
Other diseases of the
peripheral vessels 443 680.30
Bronchitis 491 830.10
Emphysema 492 1126.40
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APPENDIX 6: HEALTH CARE FINANCING
Distribution of the economic burden arising from the health
care expenditure attributed to smoking was estimated using
the best available information on health care financing. The
proportion of health care expenditure financed by different
parties was derived from various statistical sources. Smoking
related health care expenditure was allocated between
different parties on the basis of the estimated financing
shares. The financing shares shown in Table A6.1 include the
capital costs of hospitals and health centres.
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APPENDIX 7: WORKING DAYS LOST TO SICKNESS AND THE ASSOCIATED
DAYS OF ILLNESS
The number of working days lost to sickness absence and the
number of associated days of illness were estimated separately
for each diagnosis, age and sex group for people aged 35 to 64
years on the basis of sickness allowances paid by the Social
Insurance Institution.
Sickness allowance is paid for weekdays, i.e. for six days per
week, but only after an initial delay of eight weekdays,
including at least one Saturday and Sunday. Therefore a
maximum of seven working days or ten days of illness within
each spell remain uncovered. So the number of days covered by
sickness insurance underestimates the total number of days
lost due to illness. The following procedures were developed
to estimate the total number of days lost due to illness.
Lost working days. Since a normal week has on average five
working days, 5/6 of the days covered by the sickness
insurance are working days. Allowing for the waiting period,
the number of working days lost due to illness can be
approximated with the following formula
5
(7.1) WDuk
 = 7SPijk
 + —DIuk
6
where WDuk
 = the number of working days lost in age group i
by sex j due to illness k,
SPuk
 = the number of spells of illness covered by the
sickness insurance in age group i by sex j due
to illness k,
DIuk
 = the number of days covered by the sickness
insurance in age group i by sex j due to illness
k.
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Days of illness. The sickness allowance is not payable for
Sundays. Thus, the sickness insurance covers 6/7 of the days
of the week. Allowing for the waiting period, at least nine
(at most ten) days of illness within each spell remain
uncovered. The number of days of illness associated with
sickness absence can be approximated with the following
formula
7
(7.2) SDijk = 98Puk + —DIiik
6
where SDijk = the number of days of illness in age group i by
sex j due to illness k.
Unpublished diagnosis, sex and age specific data provided by
the Social Insurance Institution (Kansanelakelaitos 1989) were
used for the number of spells of illness, the SPuk 's, and the
number of days covered by the sickness insurance, the DIuk.
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APPENDIX 8: LOST PRODUCTION
Production losses were estimated for sickness absence,
disability and premature deaths. The formulae used for
estimating production losses are given below. In order to
simplify matters the subscripts defining sex have been
omitted.
The annual value of individual's production
The annual value of production of a person belonging to age
group i (wi ) was defined as follows:
( 8.1 ) w i	= ( 1 + p1 + p2)Wi,
where pl
 = operating surplus as a percentage of wages and
salaries in the economy,
P2 = employer contribution to social security
schemes as a percentage of wages and salaries
in the economy,
Wi
 = average annual earnings of a person belonging
to age group i.
The value of production lost per person
Sickness absence. For the low estimate the value of
production lost per day due to sickness absence by a person
belonging to age group i (1p') was obtained by
-
(8.2) lpli
 = wi/d,
where d - the number of working days in a year.
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For the high estimate the value of production lost per day
due to sickness absence for persons aged 25-64 was calculated
as a weighted average of age specific production losses,
using the number of employed persons as weights. The
estimated lost production per day for persons aged 25-64 was
FIM 773 for males and FIM 513 for females.
Disability. Production lost due to disability was estimated
only for one year and was defined for a person belonging to
age group i as follows
lfi
 - uei
(8.3)
	 1p 2 1
 =	 wi( 	 )
Pi
where 1p2i
 = expected value of production per year of a
person belonging to age group i,
lfi
 = labour force in age group i,
uei
 = unemployed persons in age group i,
Pi
 = mean population in age group i.
Premature deaths. The present value of production lost by the
age of 65 due to premature death of a person belonging to age
group i was derived by applying the method suggested by
for estimating life-expectancy:
lfi - uei
Pi
	
if - uej
 1 + p
	 lj
+ Y[(1 - aj _ i )nj _ i + aj nj ]wj ( 	 )( 	
1 + r 1
lfu
 - ue, 1 + p
+ awnwww ( 	 )( 	 )w-
Pw
	1 + r
expected present value of production per year
of a person belonging to age group i,
Chiang (1968)
(8.4) 1p3i
where 1p3
	
=
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a i =
n i -
p =
r =
lj =
fraction of last age interval of life lived by
a person who has died in age group i,
the length of an age interval i,
anticipated growth in productivity,
discount rate,
number of survivors at age interval j of those
alive at age interval i.
The total value of lost production
The total value of production lost due to smoking related
sickness absence, disability and premature deaths was
calculated in the same way in all cases.
The total value of production lost in age group i by sex j in
disease k due to cases attributed to smoking (LPs iik ) was
calculated as follows
( 8.5 )	 LPBijk	 CijklPSij
where Cuk = the number of cases (sickness absence,
disability, premature deaths) of disease k
attributed to smoking in age group i and sex j.
The total value of production lost in disease k due to cases
attributed to smoking (LP%) is
(8.6) LP% = E.ELPsijk
I J
and the total value of production lost attributed to smoking
(LP') is
(8.7) LP' = ELP810
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The proportion of operating surplus and employers' social
security contribution, the pl and p2 , were derived from the
National Accounts (Tilastokeskus 1988a) and assumed to be
equal for all age and sex groups. The age- and sex specific
earnings data, the Wu 's, were obtained from the unpublished
income distribution statistics provided by the Central
Statistical Office (Tilastokeskus 1989d). The number of
working days, d, per year was assumed to be 220. Age and sex
specific data on labour force and unemployment, the lfu's and
ue 's I were obtained from the labour statisticsIA 
(TyOvoimaministerit5 1988). Age- and sex specific survival
probabilities, the ln/lu's, were derived from the vital
statistics (Tilastokeskus 1989a) which also provided the mean
populations, the Pu t s. The length of the age interval, the
ni , was five years. The fraction of last age interval of life,
au 's, were obtained from Chiang (1968).
The Economic Planning Centre's estimate of 2.4 % (Parkkinen
and JarviO 1988) was used for the anticipated annual growth
in productivity. We used a 4 % discount rate, as did Vinni
(1982), which falls between the 2-6 % suggested by the
Helsinki Business Research Institute (LTT 1984).
The value of production lost due to sickness absence,
disability and premature death per person by age and sex is
given in Table A8.1.
_
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Table A8.1.
	 The value of production lost due to sickness
absence, disability and premature death per person
in 1987.
Production lost due to
SEX
Age
Sickness absence Disability	 Premature death,
(FIM per person (FIM per person present value
per day)	 per year)	 (FIM per person,
4 % discount
rate)
Males
35-39 833 167 494 2 877 681
40-44 891 177 547 2 246 573
45-49 831 161 554 1 575 970
50-54 778 136 725 954 077
55-59 772 97 573 441 329
60-64 667 44 956 110 396
65+ 0 0 0
Females
35-39 531 101 153 1 799 150
40-44 563 110 059 1 403 761
45-49 542 102 068 968 599
50-54 512 87 008 557 865
55-59 481 54 169 231 780
60-64 411 20 401 51 916
65+ 0 0 0
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APPENDIX 9: INCIDENCE OF LOST PRODUCTION
The incidence of lost production was estimated separately for
sickness absence, disability and premature death by age and sex.
The estimated age and sex specific lost production was
reclassified into seven categories on the basis of the
redistribution of the value of production: employers' operating
surplus, employers' contribution to social security schemes,
taxes and fiscal charges paid by employees (state and municipal
income tax, social security contributions and church tax) and
employees' net income.
Operating surplus and employers' contribution to social security
schemes
The value of an employee's labour input to the employer is the
wage or salary (wage for short) paid to the employee plus the
employer's contribution to social security schemes, and
operating surplus. Social security contributions are aimed to
cover part of the employee's social security and they are paid
to insurance companies by the employer. The operating surplus
covers the employer's other variable costs. The cost of labour
to the employer is the wage plus the employer's social security
contributions.
An employer's social security contributions can be statutory or
voluntary. Statutory contributions are meant to cover part of
the employee's social security (employees' pensions scheme,
national pension insurance, national sickness insurance,
industrial injuries insurance and unemployment insurance) and
are paid to insurance companies by-the employer. Statutory
contributions are a fixed proportion of the-wage-bill. The
employer can also make voluntary contributions to an employee's
social security.
The proportions of operating surplus and employers' social
security contributions in lost production were assumed to be
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equal for all age and sex groups and they were estimated in the
following way
(9.1) osik =	 PkWi/wi
 = PkWi/( 1 1- P1 + P2)Wi
wriere osik
 = the proportion of operating surplus
(1=1)/employers' contribution to social security
schemes (i=2) in the production lost by a person
belonging to age group i,
Pk	 = operating surplus/employers' contribution to
social security schemes as a percentage of wages
and salaries in the economy,
Wi	= average annual earnings of a person belonging to
age group i,
wi
	= the annual value of production of a person
belonging to age group i.
Taxes, fiscal charges and net income
The price of labour to the employee equals gross wage. On the
basis of gross wage the employee pays income tax to state and
municipality and compulsory social security contributions to the
Social Insurance Institution. Most of the employees belong to
either of the state churches (the Lutheran or the Orthodox) and
pay church tax to them. Deducting all these taxes and fiscal
charges from the gross wage gives the net wage, which the
employee is free to consume or save.
Earnings vary by age and sex. Earnings are highest for those
aged 40-44 regardless of sex. However, males have higher
_
earnings than females in all age groups (Tilastokeskus 1989d).
The state income tax paid by an employee depends on his
earnings, tax deductions and progression of taxation. Due to
progression those on high income are taxed more heavily than
those on low income. Municipal income tax is a proportional tax;
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all tax payers pay the same proportion of their income. Besides
earnings and tax allowances, the municipal tax also depends on
his place of residence, which determines the tax rate. Each
employee pays a fixed share of his income subject to municipal
taxation in compulsory social security contributions (for
national pension and sickness insurance). Church tax is
determined in the same way as the municipal tax.
By estimating the proportion of various taxes and fiscal charges
in the income subject to state taxation it is possible to
roughly take into account the variations in earning levels
according to age and sex (hence progression of state income
tax), deductions in state and municipal taxation, place of
residence and belonging to state churches.
The proportion of state income tax in the earnings was estimated
separately for males and females by age group as follows
(9.2) t"
 = T /YIA .
	ii
	where t 	 the proportion of state income tax in age group i
of sex j,
T"
 = the total value of state income tax paid by sex j
in age group i,
	
Y
	 the total income subject to state income taxation
in age group i of sex j.
The proportion of state income tax in the production lost by age
group i and sex j (tlp " ) was obtained by
(9.3) tlp" = (1 - os2 - os2)t".
_
The proportions of municipal income tax, church tax and
compulsory social security contributions in the production lost
by age and sex was obtained in the same way applying the
formulae (9.2) and (9.3).
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The proportion of net income (dip) in the production lost by age
group i of sex j was obtained as a residual
4
(9.4)	 dlpij = 1 - os l - os2 -
kml
The data for deriving the proportions of operating surplus and
employers' social security contributions in lost production, the
os i and os2 , were given in Appendix 8. The proportions of other
categories were derived from the income and property statistics
data (Tilastokeskus 1988b) separately for males and females in
each age group.
The incidence of production lost due to sickness absence and
disability (shown in Table A9.1) was estimated by multiplying
the age and sex specific production losses by the proportions
derived with the method described.
The incidence of production lost due to premature deaths was
estimated by a three-stage method. First, the annual value of
production of a person estimated by (8.1) was broken down into
parts by applying the proportions derived by formulae (9.1)-
(9.4). Second, the present value of various parts of lost
production by age and sex was estimated by applying the formula
(8.4). Finally, the proportion of each part in the present value
of lost production was calculated. The proportions used in the
study are given in Table A9.2.
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APPENDIX 10: WORKING YEARS AND LIFE YEARS LOST DUE TO
PREMATURE DEATH
The numbers of working and life years lost due to premature
death were derived by applying the method suggested by Chiang
(1968) for estimating life-expectancy. To simplify matters,
subscripts referring to sex have been omitted.
The number of years lost per person
Working years. The number of working years lost by the age of
65 due to premature death of a person belonging to age group
i was estimated by the following formula
w	
ii	 lwi.,
( 10 . 1 ) ewi
 = a in, + E.[ ( 1 -	 + an]— + an
imi+1
where ei = expected working years of a person belonging to
age group i,
ai
 = fraction of last age interval of life lived by
a person who has died in age group i,
ni
 = the length of an age interval i,
lj = number of survivors at age interval j of those
alive at age interval i.
Life years. The number of life years lost due to premature
death of a person belonging to age group i was estimated as
follows
( 10 . 2) ei = a n +
_„__„	 [ (1 -	 + ainj]—
where ei
	expected length of life of a person belonging
to age group i.
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The total number of years lost
The total number of life years lost in age group i by sex j
from disease k due to premature deaths attributed to smoking
(LEijk ) was calculated as follows
(10.3) LEijk	 Diikeii
where Dip, = the number of premature deaths of disease k
attributed to smoking in age group i and sex j.
The total number of life years lost in disease k due to
premature deaths attributed to smoking (LE k ) was obtained by
summation
(10.4) LEk
 = E.ELEijk
i
and the total number of life years lost due to premature
deaths attributed to smoking (LE) by
(10.5) LE = ELEk.
The total number of working years lost was calculated in the
same way.
Data sources for estimating the e ui
 in (10.1) and ei
 in (10.2)
were given in Appendix 8. The estimated number of working and
life years lost due to premature death used in this study are
given in Table A10.1.
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Table A10.1 The number of expected working years and life
years lost due to premature death in 1987 used
in this study
SEX	 Life expectancy 	 Expected
Age
	 working years
MIEHET
	
35-39	 37.50	 25.61
	
40-44	 32.96	 20.90
	
45-49
	 28.56
	
16.26
	
50-54	 24.33	 11.67
	
55-59	 20.39	 7.11
	
60-64	 16.75
	 2.46
65-69	 13.52	 -
70-74	 10.62	 -
75-79
	 8.24	 -
80-84	 6.28	 -
85+	 4.87	 -
NAI SET
	
35-39	 44.87	 26.86
	
40-44	 40.07
	 21.97
	
45-49	 35.31	 17.09
	
50-54	 30.71	 12.27
	
55-59	 26.13	 7.42
	
60-64	 21.76
	 2.54
65-69	 17.61	 -
70-74	 13.79	 _
75-79	 10.45	 -
80-84	 7.74	 -
85+	 5.69	 _
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APPENDIX 11: FAMILY PENSIONS
Family pension is payable to the relatives of a deceased
person. Family pensions include a widow's pension, payable to
women under 65, and an orphan's pension ( Kansanelakelaitos
1988b). Widow's pensions comprise a starting pension followed
by a regular maintenance pension. Widowers are not entitled
to this pension.
Family pensions resulting from smoking related premature
deaths in males was estimated separately for the four pension
categories: widow's starting pension, widowed mother's
maintenance pension, childless widow's maintenance pension
and orphan's pension. When estimating a widow's pension it is
assumed that she belongs to the same age-group as her dead
husband.
Widow's starting pension. A widow's starting pension is
payable for six months after the death of the deceased.
Pensions attributed to smoking were estimated on the basis of
the number of smoking related deaths in men, the probability
that the deceased man was married and the average starting
pension as follows
(11.1) WSPi
 = 6Dipmiwspi
where WSPi
 = widow's starting pensions due to deaths
attributed to smoking in males belonging to age
group i,
Di
	= the number of deaths attributed to smoking in
males belonging to age group i,
Pmi
 = probability that a man belonging to age group i
_
is married,
wsPi = the average monthly widow's starting pension in
age group i.
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Widowed mother's maintenance pension. A widow's maintenance
pension is payable to a woman after her six-month starting
pension ends if she is a widowed mother with a child under 16
who is entitled to orphan's pension. Widowed mother's
maintenance pensions were estimated up to the age of 65 and
discounted to their present value. Estimation took the
following into account: the probability that the dead man was
married, the probability that he had children under 16,
widow's survival probability and the number of children under
16 she was likely to have at different ages. The present
values of these pensions were estimated by the following
formula
(11.2) WMPi = Dipmipcipvmpi
where WMPi	= widowed mother's maintenance pensions due to
deaths attributed to smoking by males
belonging to age group i,
pc i 	= the probability that the widow of a deceased
man belonging to age group i has a child
under 16 who is entitled to orphan's pension,
PvmPi = expected present value of widowed mother's
maintenance pension for widows belonging to
age group i.
The term pvmpi was estimated by applying the method suggested
by Chiang (1968) for estimating life-expectancy
(11.3) pvmp i
 =
w	 1 + s	 1 i
-
ainimpi + :Fd.( (1 - a)n 	 + ajnj]mpj( 	 )ii_
J m i.+1	 1 + r	 li
_
1 + p	 li
+ awnwmPw( 	 )w-i_
1 + r	 li
	
Where ai
	= fraction of last age interval of life lived by
a woman who has died in age group i,
	
fl .
	
= the length of an age interval i,
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mpi = the average annual maintenance pension of a
widowed mother belonging to age group i,
s	 = anticipated real growth in widow's pension,
r	 = discount rate,
1	 = number of survivors at age interval j of thosei
women alive at age interval i.
Childless widow's maintenance pension. Widow's maintenance
pension is also payable to a childless woman if she is aged
40-64 and with limited income. Childless widows' maintenance
pensions were estimated up to the age of 65 and discounted to
their present value. Estimation took the following into
account: the probability that the dead man was married, the
probability that she had no children and widow's survival
probability. These pensions were estimated by the formula
(11.2) with appropriate modifications. The term pc i in (11.2)
was defined as the probability that the widow had no children
and the term pvmpi
 in (11.2) as the expected present value of
a childless widow's maintenance pension, which was estimated
applying formula (11.3).
Orphan's pension. Orphan's pension is payable to all half and
full orphans under 16 as well as those between 16 and 21 who
cannot maintain themselves, e.g. because they are studying.
Different rates of benefit are paid to half and full orphans.
The average orphans's pension was estimated as the weighted
mean of the average pensions for half and full orphans.
Orphans' pensions were estimated on the assumption that they
would be paid for eight years. Estimation allowed for the
probability that the dead man was married and that he had
children under 21. The pensions were discounted to their
present value. These pensions were estimated by the formula
_
(11.2) with appropriate modifications. The term pc, in (11.2)
was defined as the probability that the deceased man had
children under 21 and the term pvmp i
 in (11.2) as the expected
present value of an orphan's pension, which was estimated
applying formula (11.3).
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We used a 4 % discount rate and assumed a 2 % annual real
growth rate in pensions. Age-specific average pensions were
obtained from the age- and occupation statistics
(Kansanelakelaitos 1988a). Age-specific survival
probabilities for females were derived from the vital
statistics (Tilastokeskus 1989a) by the method of Chiang
(1968). The probabilities of the men being married and with
children, and of a widow being childless were estimated from
the population statistics (Tilastokeskus 1988h).
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APPENDIX 12: EXPECTED LIFE-TIME HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE
There is no data on health care expenditure by age and sex in
Finland. Therefore a specific method was developed to
estimate the expected life-time expenditure by age and sex in
various health services.
The expected health care expenditure was estimated separately
for hospital care, physician services and pharmaceuticals.
Expected expenditure on physician services was broken down
into five categories: hospital outpatient care, health
centres, occupational health care, private practitioners and
private sector examinations and treatments. Pharmaceutical
expenditure was broken down into expenditure on prescribed
medicines and over-the counter-medicines.
The formulae used for estimating the expected life-time
expenditure by age and sex are given below. In order to
simplify matters subscripts referring to sex have been
omitted.
Expected life-time health care expenditure by age and sex
Hospital inpatient care. The expected life-time expenditure
on hospital inpatient care by age and sex was determined by
applying the Chiang's method (1968) for estimating life-
expectancy
k	 1 + t	 li
(12.1) ec i . ainici 4- E.[ ( 1 - a1 ) ni _ 1 + aj nj ] c1 ( — ) i-i-
J u i+1	 1 + r	 li
_
where ec i = the present value of expected life-time
expenditure on hospital inpatient care for a
person belonging to age group i,
ai	= fraction of last age interval of life lived by
a person who has died in age group i,
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n1
	
= the length of an age interval i,
ci	= average annual expenditure on hospital
inpatient care for person belonging to age
group i,
t	 = anticipated annual growth in real costs of
hospital inpatient care (assumed to be the same
for all hospitals),
r	 = discount rate,
1	 = number of survivors at age interval j of those
i
alive at age interval i.
The age and sex specific annual expenditure on hospital
inpatient care, the c i 's in (12.1), were estimated on the
basis of the distribution of bed-days by age and sex in
various types of hospitals as follows
1 m
(12.2) ci 
= — E-diiPp
Pi j=i
where dij = the number of bed-days in hospital type j by
persons belonging to age group i,
pi	= the cost per bed-day in hospital type j,
P i	 = mean population of age group i.
The data on the number of bed-days by age and sex in various
types of hospitals, the d " 's, were obtained from the
unpublished hospital discharge register data provided by the
National Board of Health (Ldakinte5hallitus 1989). Cost data,
the pi 's, were derived from the Hospital Statistics (Sairaa-
laliitto 1988) and from the Financial Statistics of Health
Centres (Suomen kaupunkiliitto 1988). We assumed a 2.5 %
_
growth in real costs of hospital care. Data sources for
estimating other elements in (12.1) were given in appendix 8.
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Physician services. The expected life-time expenditure on
physican services by age and sex was estimated separately for
each sector by a formula similar to (12.1)
k	 1 + U	 lj
( 12.3 ) eci. = ainici. 4- 21(1 - a_ 1 )n 1 + an] cj 5 ( 	 )-i-
J .. 1.4. 1.	 1 + r	 li
where ec i. = the present value of expected life-time
expenditure on physician services in sector s
for a person belonging to age group i,
c 	 average annual expenditure on physician
services in sector s for person belonging to
age group i,
u	 = anticipated annual growth in real costs of
physician services (assumed to be the same for
all sectors).
The age and sex specific annual expenditure on physician
services by sectors, the c ia 's in (12.3), were estimated on
the basis of the distribution of physician visits by age and
sex as follows
di.
(12.4) c
	 — pa,
Pi
where dia = the number of physician visits in sector s by
persons belonging to age group i,
P.	 = the cost per physician visit in sector s.
The numbers of physican visits to general hospital outpatient
departments, health centres and occupational health care by
age and sex, the d ia 's, were obtained from the unpublished
survey data collected for the Personal Doctor Program
(Vohlonen 1989). The cost per visit, the pa 's, were obtained
from various sources (Sairaalaliitto 1988, Pekurinen 1989,
Luoma 1989) and were assumed to be the same for all age and
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sex groups. Included in these figures are the costs of
laboratory-, X-ray- and other examinations, apart from
occupational health care where they cover only the direct
costs of physician services (cost of labour, office,
administration, etc.). We assumed a 2.4 % growth in real
costs of physician services. Data sources for estimating
other elements in (12.3) were given in appendix 8.
The c's for services provided by the private sector were
obtained directly from the age- and occupation statistics of
the Social Insurance Institution (Kansanelakelaitos 1988).
Pharmaceuticals. The expected life-time expenditure on
pharmaceuticals by age and sex was estimated separately for
prescribed medicines and over-the-counter medicines by
applying the formulae (12.3) and (12.4) with appropriate
modifications. The product d ial% in (12.4) was replaced by
pharmaceutical expenditure by age and sex.
Expenditure on prescribed medicines by age and sex was
obtained from the age- and occupation statistics of the
Social Insurance Institution (Kansanelakelaitos 1988a). The
per capita expenditure on over-the-counter medicines was
assumed to be the same for all age and sex groups and
estimated as follows. The total expenditure on over-the-
counter medicines was defined as the pharmacies' total sales
minus the sales of prescribed medicines, veterinary
preparations and non-pharmaceutical products. The per capita
expenditure on over-the-counter medicines was obtained by
dividing the total expenditure by the mean population.
Unpublished data on the value of pharmacies' total sales was
provided by the the National Board of Health (Hurme 1989).
_
'Avoided' health care expenditure
The health care expenditure 'avoided' due to premature deaths
attributed to smoking were estimated separately for each of
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the services examined and for each age and sex group. The
total expenditure 'avoided' in age group i by sex j in
service s due to premature deaths attributed to smoking
(EXAJ.Js ) was calculated as follows
(12.5) EXAIJ, = Dec
where D	 = the number of premature deaths attributed to
smoking in age group i and sex j.
ecij, = the present value of expected life-time
expenditure on service s for a person belonging
to age group i of sex j.
The total expenditure 'avoided' in service s due to premature
deaths attributed to smoking (EXAB ) was obtained by summation
(12.6) EXA, = HEXAus
i
and the total expenditure 'avoided' due to premature deaths
attributed to smoking (EXA) by
(12.7) EXA = EEXAs.
8
The present values of expected life-time expenditure, the
ecij .'s, used in this study are given in Table Al2.1.
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APPENDIX 13: EXPECTED LIFE-TIME SICKNESS INSURANCE BENEFITS
The expected sickness insurance benefits were estimated
separately for sickness allowances and refunds of medical
expenses which were broken down into refunds of physicians'
services, examinations and treatments, medicines and
transportation services.
The formula used for estimating the expected life-time
sickness insurance benefits by age and sex and the type of
benefit is given below. In order to simplify matters
subscripts refering to sex have been omitted. The expected
life-time benefits were determined by applying the method of
Chiang (1968) for estimating life-expectancy
k	 1 + U	 li
( 13.3 ) esbis = ainisbis + E
 .  (l - a1 )n1 + ainj ] sbia ( 	 )i-i-
J-1+1	 1 + r	 li
where esb is
 = the present value of expected life-time
sickness insurance benefits of type s for a
person belonging to age group i,
ai	= fraction of last age interval of life lived by
a person who has died in age group i,
n	 = the length of an age interval i,i
sbis
	= sickness insurance benefits of type s per
capita in age group i,
u	 = anticipated annual real growth in sickness
insurance benefits (assumed to be the same for
all benefits),
r	 = discount rate,
1	 = number of survivors at age interval j of thoseJ
alive at age interval i.
The average annual sickness insurance benefits used to
calculate the sbis 's by age and sex were obtained from the age-
and occupation statistics of the Social Insurance Institution
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(Kansanelakelaitos 1988a). We assumed a 2.4 % growth in real
sickness insurance benefits. Data sources for estimating other
elements in (13.3) were given in appendix 8.
The sickness insurance benefits 'avoided' by the Social
Insurance Institution due to premature deaths attibuted to
smoking were estimated separately for each of the benefit
examined and for each age and sex group by applying the
formulae (12.5)-(12.7). The present values of expected life-
time benefits, the esbu B 's, used in this study are given in
Table A13.1.
_
356
Table A13.1 Estimated present value of expected life-time
sickness insurance benefits in 1987, FIM, 4 %
discount rate
SICKNESS
	 REFUNDS OF MEDICAL EXPENSES
SEX	 ALLOWANCES 
	
Age
	 Private
	 Private Prescribed Trans-
physician examina- medicines porta-
services tions and
	 tion
treatments	 services
MALES
35-39 27 487 961 1 758 12 221 2 571
40-44 25 947 924 1 716 12 512 2 626
45-49 22 823 876 1 638 12 574 2 669
50-54 17 579 813 1 510 12 324 2 699
55-59 10 083 743 1 359 11 694 2 674
60-64 3 090 665 1 178 10 542 2 577
65-69 - 577 982 9 148 2 407
70-74 - 467 748 7 280 2 109
75-79 - 360 538 5 514 1 770
80-84 - 236 338 3-587 1 256
FEMALES
35-39 22 308 2 068 3 228 15 226 2 779
40-44 20 655 1 891 3 027 15 582 2 811
45-49 17 638 1 691 2 747 15 621 2 816
50-54 13 028 1 468 2 376 15 277 2 794
55-59 6 986 1 259 1 999 14 496 2 719
60-64 1 989 1 081 1 635 13 238 2 594
65-69 - 895 1 279 11 512 2 368
70-74 - 703 942 9 237 2 028
75-79 - 512 638 6 891 1 620
80-84 - 312 370 4 312 1 092
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APPENDIX 14: EXPECTED LIFE-TIME PENSIONS
There are no published Finnish data on the value of expected
life-time pensions of different types paid to an average
person of age i of sex j. Therefore a specific two-stage
method was developed for the purpose. In the first stage, the
average annual pensions of different types paid to an average
pensioner were estimated for different age and sex groups. In
the second stage, the expected life-time pensions of different
types by age and sex were estimated.
Average annual pensions
Most pensioners receive both the national pension (old age or
disability pension) and the employee pension, but some receive
only the national pension and others only the employee
pension. In order to examine the incidence of pension
payments, the first task is to determine the proportions of
these three options in the average pension and the second task
is to allocate these proportions among the payers. The
national pension is paid by the Social Insurance Institution
and the employee pension by the employers, which are here
grouped into private sector, state, municipalities and other
public organisations (e.g. the church, Bank of Finland, Post
Office Bank etc.). Thus we have five types of pension payers.
The monetary value of these five categories in the average
pension was derived in the following way.
The monetary value of the simultaneous national pension and
employee pension in the average pension in age group i of sex
j (KT" ) was estimated as follows
(14.1)	 KT
	 tkUKE
where KE"
 = the average annual pension in age group i by
sex j,
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tk"
 = the proportion of pensioners receiving both
national pension and employee pension in age
group i by sex j.
The monetary share of the employee pension in pension (14.1)
in age group i of sex j (TY" ) was estimated as follows
(14.2) TY"
 = tm"KT"
where tm"
 = the proportion of employee pension in the
average pension of a person receiving both
national pension and employee pension in age
group i by sex j.
The monetary share of the national pension paid by the Social
Insurance Institution in pension (14.1) in age group i of sex
j (KL" ) was obtained as residual
(14.3) KL„ = KT"
 - TY".
The monetary share of the national pension as a pensioner's
only pension benefit in the average pension in age group i of
sex j (VIC„) was estimated as follows
(14.4) VK"
 = vk"KE„
where vk = the proportion of pensioners receiving only
national pension in age group i by sex j.
The monetary value of the employee pension as a pensioner's
only pension benefit in the average pension in age group i of
sex j (VT) was estimated in the same way _
(14.5) VT" = vt„KE„
where vt"
 = the proportion of pensioners receiving only
employee pension in age group i by sex j.
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Thus, the national pension paid by the The Social Insurance
Institution covers
(14.6) K" 	= KLIJ + VKIJ
and the employee pension
(14.7) T" 	= TY"
 + VT".
of the average pension in age group i of sex j (AP" ) which
equals
(14.8) AP" = K"
 + T".
The employee pensions, the T" 's, are paid by the employers
(private sector, state, municipalities and other public
organisations). The monetary share of the average employee
pension paid by various party s in age group i by sex j (T313)
was estimated as follows
(14.9) T,„	 = tsij T IJ
where t,„ = the proportion of pensioners receiving employee
pension from party s in age group i by sex j.
The number of pensioners and the average annual pensions were
estimated as the average of the figures at the end of 1986 and
1987. Hence the figures correspond to the pensions in mid
1987. The data on the number of pensioners and the average
annual pensions were obtained from various published and
unpublished sources (Eldketurvakeskus and Kansaneldkelaitos
1988).	
-
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Expected life-time pensions
Expected life-time pensions were estimated separately for each
of the five types of pensions mentioned earlier in this
section. The formula used for estimating the expected life-
time pensions by age and sex and the type of pension is given
below. In order to simplify matters subscripts referring to
sex have been omitted. The expected life-time pensions were
estimated by applying the Chiang's method (1968) for
estimating life-expectancy
1+ s
( 14.10) epit = ainipitqi
	 E.[ (1 -	 + aini]pitqi(
	
1 r
where epit
 = the present value of an expected life-time
pension of type t for a person belonging to age
group i,
ai
	= fraction of last age interval of life lived by a
person who has died in age group i,
ni	= the length of an age interval i,
Pit = average annual pension of type t for a person
belonging to age group i (estimated by (14.6)
and (14.9)),
qi	 = the probability that a person belonging to age
group i is a pensioner,
= anticipated annual real growth in average
pensions ( assumed to be the same for all
pensions),
= discount rate,
1	 = number of survivors at age interval j of those
alive at age interval i.
The probability for a person to be a pensioner, the (L i 's, were
estimated from the pension statistics (Elaketurvakeskus and
Kansanelakelaitos 1988). We assumed a 2 % real growth in
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average pensions. Data sources for estimating other elements
in (14.10) were given in appendix 8.
The pensions 'avoided' by different parties due to premature
deaths attibuted to smoking were estimated separately for each
of the pensions examined and for each age and sex group
applying the formulae (12.5)-(12.7). The present values of
expected life-time pensions, the ep's, used in this study
are given in Table A14.1.
_
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Table A14.1	 Estimated present value of expected life-time
pensions in 1987, FIM, 4 % discount rate
SEX	 PENSIONS	 EMPLOYEE PENSIONS PAID BY
	 TOTAL
Age
	 PAID BY	
	
 PENSIONS
THE SOCIAL Private State 	 Munici- Other
INSURANCE sector
	 pali-	 public
INSTITUTION
	 ties	 organi-
sations
MALES
35-39 124 258 211 269 49 601 22 801 2 223 410 152
40-44 134 936 232 867 54 881 25 031 2 442 450 156
45-49 146 648 255 035 60 363 27 206 2 673 491 925
50-54 158 895 275 458 65 490 28 965 2 907 531 715
55-59 168 667 282 522 68 917 28 811 3 070 551 987
60-64 169 912 265 016 67 014 23 647 2 922 528 511
65-69 157 359 219 069 56 432 15 622 2 400 450 883
70-74 132 237 150 613 39 295 9 347 1 720 333 211
75-79 105 088 86 922 22 966 4 597 1 031 220 604
80-84 55 199 29 475 8 428 1 298 382 94 781
FEMALES
35-39 188 376 124 412 21 074 17 258 1 494 352 614
40-44 205 388 136 206 23 081 18 889 1 633 385 197
45-49 223 497 148 009 25 003 20 525 1 778 418 812
50-54 242 610 159 122 26 601 22 078 1 929 452 341
55-59 256 409 160 996 26 569 22 490 2 022 468 486
60-64 257 759 145 979 22 387 19 965 1 911 448 000
65-69 234 249 112 762 15 636 13 824 1 409 377 881
70-74 186 708 70 866 10 234 7 179 757 275 744
75-79 131 111 35 120 5 897 3 012 341 175 481
80-84 56 781 9 447 2 130 707 98 69 163
_
363
APPENDIX 15: COST OF FIRES
Many studies include estimates on the fire costs caused by
smoking (e.g. Shillington 1977, Luce and Schweitzer 1978,
Collishaw and Myers 1984). Here the magnitude of the external
costs depends on who bears the costs and how the fire
insurance is financed. Fire damages (FD), are made up of two
components: fire indemnity (IN) paid by the insurance company
and the premium paid by the insured (DD), i.e.
FD = IN + DD.
If a smoker i harms his own property and no compensation is
paid (INi
 = 0) then there will be no external costs as he
bears all of them (FD i
 = DD). If compensation is paid there
will be institutional external costs equal to compensation
FD is - DD! = IN!.
Summing all damages paid to smokers gives the total
institutional external costs in this case (IN)
(15.1) INs =
If harm is caused to third parties then there will be
external costs equal to the damage
FD iss = INiss + DDiss.
Summing all fire costs caused by smoking and suffered by non-
smokers gives the value of the total damages (FDiss)
(15.2) FD" =	 EFT)if's =	 + DD") = IN" + DD".
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Adding up (15.1) and (15.2) gives the total costs of smoking-
caused fire damages to third parties (CFD)
CFD = INS
 + FD"
= INS
 + INNS
 + DDNs.
That is, the institutional external costs associated with
smoking-caused fires equal the damages paid by insurance
companies plus non-smokers deductibles.
-
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APPENDIX 16: MATERIAL DAMAGE DUE TO SMOKING
Material damage to third parties includes that caused by
tobacco smoke and ash to clothes, furniture, carpets, as well
as the cost of cleaning up tobacco butts and ash. Part of the
material damage falls on third parties either in terms of
higher prices (private sector) or taxes (public sector). The
quantitative significance of external costs due to this
source is not clear but in principle they can be estimated as
follows.
Consider first the private sector. Private sector here
refers only to firms. It is reasonable to assume that the
costs of material damage will eventually be included in
retail prices. The retail price (p) is a sum of the original
price without a smoking factor (p,) and the smoking-caused
mark-up (n)
p . (1 + n)po.
Ultimately, the extent of external costs depends on how the
value of the retail sale of commodities including the smoking
mark-up is divided between smokers and non-smokers. Assuming
that smokers' share of the value of commodities sold by firm
i (q i ) is Osi then the value of the retail sale of the firm i
(S i ) can be decomposed as follows
(16.1) S i = p ig i = (1 + n i ) piogi = (1 - ni ) pio [Osigi + (1 - Osi)gi]
and rearranging terms (16.1) becomes
Si = Pioqi + BsiniPioqi + ( 1 - 8si)TtiPioqi,
where the first term indicates the value of the retail sale
not affected by smoking, the second term indicates the
smoking related costs paid by smokers and the third term
gives an estimate of the final external costs due to smoking-
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caused damage. Thus, in the case of firm i, the costs to third
parties (DCi ) are
( 16.2 ) DC i =	 ( 1 - Os i )
Summing the costs in (16.2) over all firms gives an estimate of
the total costs of material damage in the private sector paid
eventually by third parties
DC	 2. ( 1 - 8s i
 )mipioqi.
Consider next the public sector. Here the magnitude of the
external costs depends on which authority is responsible for
maintenace of the services affected. If taxes include a mark-up
(t,) as a compensation for smoking-caused damage, then the total
tax revenue (T) can be expressed as
= (1 + ts ) T.,
where T, is the tax revenue without smoking-damage. The extra tax
burden caused by smoking related damage (t,T„) can be decomposed
to smokers' and non-smokers' contributions by authority as
follows
CO	 t LOT	 4- SII	 cTsi	 TNP	 EsI	 Ern. )	
• 
CT= tT +	 4.,	 CO S	 LO	 L'S
= tsCG 13 cG + ( 1 — Pca Tcs + t	 P iz	 ( 1	 PLO) TLG
▪ tsSII 
PSI
	 ( 1 _ 132)]Ts,
	
tssII [ pNp	 (
 
1 _ pNp ) TNp
▪ tsSII [ E 
sI	
Espi	 tsC pc + (
	
P) ] CT
=	 [ tsCG p T	 sLG
CC CO
	
t	 j.	 tn	 m CVLG'LG	 'Ssil VSI	 'SP	 s cC I r
▪ sC G ( 1 - Pc0 ) T 0 + t5L0 ( 1 - PLC ) TLG
• t:11
 ( 1 
— PSI ) TS,	 ( 1 — Pre ) T tIP	 ESI	 ENP)
+ tsc ( 1 - Pc )CT] ,
where the pj :s, Tj :s and Ej :s are as defined in Appendix 2.
Terms in the first brackets indicate the costs borne by smokers
and the terms in the second brackets indicate the extra taxes
t,T,
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paid by third parties to cover the costs of smoking caused
damage. The extra taxes collected from other parties than
smokers by the state (DT), municipalities (DT L ), the Social
Insurance Institution (DTsu ), and the state churches (DT) are
DT CG = t SCG (
 1	 PCG ) TCG
DTLG = tgLG ( 1	 PLC ) TLC
DTSII 
= t 
SSII [ (
 1	 PS/ ) TSI
DT C = tsC( 1	 MCI' •
+ ( 1	 f3Np ) TN? +4'Es1	 EN?]
-
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APPENDIX 17: PRODUCTIVITY-DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN SMOKERS
AND NON-SMOKERS
Smokers may be less or more efficient than non-smokers at
work. The opposite arguments here are that due to smoking
breaks and smoking-related complications smokers as a group
may exhibit lower productivity than non-smokers in the same
job. On the other hand, the stimulating effects of smoking
may make smokers more productive than non-smokers while at
work. Which of these effects dominate is an empirical matter
that has not been extensively researched.
Whether or not there will be external costs or benefits
arising from this issue depends on the way in which wage
rates are determined. If the wage rate reflects an
individual's productivity then smokers would bear all the
costs/benefits and no external costs/benefits would arise.
If, on the other hand, wages are determined via collective
bargaining, the wage paid to those who do not smoke will be
based on the productivity of the average worker and there
will be external costs/benefits. Smokers would gain/lose and
non-smokers would lose/gain. The magnitude of the loss/gain
depends on the actual productivity difference between smokers
and non-smokers as well as on the prevalence of smoking.
Denote the average annual wage rate reflecting individual's
productivity in occupation i by Wis for an average smoker and
by WINS for an average non-smoker. If the prevalence of
smoking in occupation i is pi , the average wage rate based on
the productivity of an average worker (Wi ) is the weighted
average of smokers' and non-smokers' productivity-based wage
rates, i.e.
_.
(17.1)	 Wi	 = piWis + ( 1 - pi ) WiNs
. WINS + pi ( WiS
	 WINS) .
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It is obvious from (17.1) that if 0 < p i
 < 1 and if WiS WINS
then WiS pc W WINS. When p i approaches zero Wi approaches WINS.
When p i approaches unity Wi approaches Wis . A non-smoker's
loss/gain (wl i") can now be defined as the difference between
the collectively-determined wage rate (W i ) and the non-
smokers's productivity-based wage rate wiNS )	 e
(17.2) WliNS	 wiNS = pi ( WiS 	 WINS)
Given the prevalence of smoking, a non-smokers's wage
loss/gain is bigger as smokers' and non-smokers' productivity
differential increases. Given the difference in productivity,
the more prevalent smoking is, the larger is a non-smoker's
wage loss/gain.
The total wage loss/gain to non-smokers in occupation i
wLiNS ) is the average loss/gain in (17.2) multiplied by the
number of non-smokers (NS i ) employed in occupation i, i.e.
	
WLiNS = WliNSNSi = p i ( WiS 	 ( 1 - pi )Ni
= Pi( 1 - Pi ( WiS	 WiNS Ni
where Ni is the total number of people employed in occupation
i.
The total wage loss/gain to all non-smokers (WL) is the
loss/gain summed over all occupations, i.e.
wLNS 	 = E.wLiNs	 E.p i (1 - p i )( W is - WiNS Ni
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REVENUE (+)/
EXPENDITURE (-) ITEM
DIRECT CONSEQUENCES
HEALTH EXPENDITURE
- Inpatient care
- Outpatient care
- Pharmaceuticals
- Rehabilitation
SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
- Sickness allowances
- Disability pensions
- Widow's and orphan's pensions
OTHER DIRECT COSTS
INDIRECT CONSEQUENCES
LOST TAX-REVENUES DUE TO
- Sickness absence
- Disability
- Premature death
AVOIDED HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE
EXPENDITURE DUE TO
- Hospital care
- Physician services
- Pharmaceuticals
AVOIDED SOCIAL SECURITY
BENEFITS DUE TO
- Refunds of medical expenses
- Sickness allowances
- Pensions
NET REVENUE (tobacco excise
excluded)
PROCEEDS FROM TOBACCO EXCISE
NET REVENUE (tobacco excise
included)
Table A18.2. Main financial consequences of smoking in Finland
in 1987 (FIM million).'
Low
estimate
High
estimate
-678 -790
-395 -456
-195 -256
-160 -160
-38 -38
-1 -1
-278 -329
-170 -177
-46 -64
-62 -88
-6 -6
389 629
-486 -605
-202 -209
-93 -112
-190 -284
364 516
308 437
27 39
28 40
511 718
41 57
14 20
456 641
-289 -161
2162 2162
_
1873 2001
1 Includes revenue and expenditure effects on state, local
authorities and the Social Insurance Institution.
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Table A18.3.
	 Data for deriving institutional external costs
due to smoking in Finland in 1987 (FIM million).
Smokers	 Other parties TOTAL1
Low
esti-
mate
High
esti-
mate
Low
esti-
mate
High
esti-
mate
Low
esti-
mate
High
esti-
mate
DIRECT COSTS 1965 1970 440 506 2406 2476
Cost of production
and distribution 1436 1436 1436 1436
Disbenefits due to
addiction 428 428 428 428
Health expenditure 99 103 425 490 524 594
Other direct costs 2 2 16 16 18 18
INDIRECT COSTS 855 1062 1208 1502 2063 2564
Lost production 855 1062 1208 1502 2063 2564
TOTAL' 2820 3031 1649 2008 4469 5040
(%) 60 63 37 40 100 100
1 Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Main trends in the Finnish tobacco markets
1.1.1 Consumption
Finnish males have traditionally been heavy smokers.
Finland's cigarette consumption was the highest in the world
in the 1920s, and much higher than in the other Nordic
countries until the late 1930s (Lee 1975, Nordic Council
1975). In the 1920s and 1930s the consumption of cigarettes
was about 1300-1400 cigarettes per capita (people aged 15 and
over). After the Second World War consumption continued to
increase rapidly. Growth stopped in 1976, probably as a
result of substantial price increases and the public debate
provoked by legislative measures. Since 1977 the average per
capita consumption has remained virtually unchanged (Figure
1).
The prevalence of smoking in the adult population has changed
in a manner similar to other developed countries: the
proportion of smoking men has decreased since the 1960s but
has remained steady during the last ten years at about 35 per
cent. Smoking among women has become more popular, and the
_
proportion of smoking women has gradually increased to about
20 per cent (STM 1987). Smoking among adolescents decreased
between 1973 and 1981
392
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but subsequently appeared to rise once again. During the past
few years a great number of smokers have switched to tobacco
products containing less harmful substances.
At present the total consumption of tobacco products is
divided between three product groups: manufactured cigarettes
(90 % of total consumption in 1987), pipe tobacco (9 %) and
cigars (1 %). Light cigarettes (containing less than 10 mg
tar) now account for one third of cigarette consumption
(Tilastokeskus 1988).
1.2.2 Prices and revenues
The change in the real price of tobacco in FIM from 1950 to
1989 is shown in Figure 2. Three distinct phases can be
distinguished. The real price of tobacco products increased
from 1950 to 1968, and then fell until 1975. Tobacco prices
rose substantially in 1975-76 1 , but since 1977 annual
increases in the real prices have been modest.
The price of tobacco is controlled by the government by means
of an excise tax levied on tobacco products. Decision-making
takes a number of factors into account: the state budget,
income agreements, curbing inflation, cost developments in
trade and industry, etc. No special attention has been
1 In 1976 the real price of cigarettes was 27 per cent
higher than in the previous year. The rise in the real price
of pipe tobacco and cigars was 49 per cent and 8.5 per cent
respectively.
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paid to the public health objective of controlling the demand
for tobacco (ACHE 1985).
Since the late 1970s a major goal of economic policy has been
to curb inflation. The price of tobacco has been regulated in
accordance with this objective. The price structure of
tobacco products has also been manipulated by altering the
proportions received by the retail trade, the tobacco
industry and taxes to ensure sufficient profit margins for
retailers and to maintain employment levels in the tobacco
industry. The price structure of tobacco products has been
substantially altered in favour of the retail trade and
tobacco industry over the past few years.
Tobacco is a significant source of government revenue. In
1987, taxes on tobacco accounted for 3.2 per cent of all
government revenues derived from taxes and other duties.
Taxing tobacco is a simple way of raising revenue.
1.2.3 Anti-smoking publicity
Anti-smoking publicity in Finland has long and extensive
history. Numerous restrictions have been imposed on the
promotion and advertising of tobacco products. The National
_
Board of Health published a short report on the health risks
of smoking in 1964 following the publication of the U.S.
Surgeon General's report the same year, and put forward
proposals covering the main issues. The year 1964 was
396
dedicated to the promotion of healthy lifestyles and a
comprehensive information campaign was undertaken. Tobacco
advertising on television was banned in 1971.
In the 1970s attitudes towards smoking swung from one extreme
to the other: at the beginning of the decade there was a very
pro-smoking discussion, with older students seriously
demanding their adult right to smoke at school, for instance.
The atmosphere then changed drastically, and the Tobacco Act
came into force in 1977 after an extensive public debate
about the health risks of smoking.
The Tobacco Act of 1977 imposed major restrictions on
advertising and the availability of tobacco and was one of
the first attempts in the whole world to establish a
comprehensive strategy to reduce smoking by legislation.
Advertising and sales promotion of tobacco and the sale of
tobacco products to persons under 16 were prohibited by the
Tobacco Act (Leppo 1978). Smoking in public places (buses,
trams and trains, kindergartens and schools, reception and
waiting rooms of public offices, showrooms, and sport events
open to children) was strictly prohibited or limited. Upper
limits were set on the harmful components of tobacco
products. Labels warning of health damage from smoking were
made compulsory on all retail tobacco product packages. Half
a percent of the tobacco tax revenue was to be set aside
annually in the State budget for the development of health-
397
oriented tobacco policies; health education, research and
evaluation. Pricing policy was excluded from the Tobacco Act.
1.2 The purpose and the structure of the study
The main purpose of this study is to examine whether the
demand for various tobacco products can be affected by policy
measures. The specific purpose of the study is
(1) to estimate the demand elasticities of tobacco
products in Finland,
(2) to analyse the effects of anti-smoking publicity
and various advertising bans independently on the
demand for tobacco, and
(3) to test the appropriateness of alternative demand
models for explaining the demand for tobacco products.
The main differences between this and other non-Finnish
studies are that the possibility of asymmetric demand
responses to changes in prices and income are examined, the
stability of the estimated elasticities in respect to major
price increases is tested, and the analysis is extended to
the three broad tobacco categories; cigarettes, pipe tobacco
and cigars.
-
Furthermore, explicit analysis of the effects of anti-smoking
publicity and tobacco advertising bans, as well as testing
the validity of the constant elasticities implicitly assumed
398
in earlier investigations distinguishes this study from the
previous Finnish studies on tobacco demand.
The study is divided into the following chapters. Relevant
demand models to be tested are derived in chapter two.
Previous studies are reviewed in chapter three. The empirical
demand functions are specified in chapter four. Materials and
methods of the study are introduced in chapter five.
Empirical results of the study are reported in chapter six.
The results are discussed in chapter seven. Conclusions and
policy implications of the study are outlined in chapter
eight.
-
399
2 FORMULATION OF THE DEMAND MODELS
2.1 The basic model
A natural starting point for a demand analysis is to assume
that the demand for a product is a function of its price, all
other consumer prices and the consumers' disposable income.
As in most previous studies in the area, our starting point
is a general single-equation, log-linear specification of the
demand function which is compatible with this idea:
n
( 1 )	 lnQi = ai + eilny + Eaiklnpk + U i ,
where Qi is the quantity of tobacco product i consumed in
period t, y is income in period t, Pk is the price of
commodity k in the period t, ei is the income elasticity, eik
is the cross-price elasticity of the kth price on the demand
of tobacco product i, and ui is the error term which
incorporates the effects of the all excluded independent
variables in the demand function.
As the number of parameters to be estimated in equation (1)
is high, reducing the degrees of freedom, some prior
restrictions are necessary in order to estimate the equation.
Setting the majority of the cross-price elasticities at zero
is an obvious solution, though not theoretically an
400
attractive one, as price elasticities contain both income and
substitution effects. While the latter may be zero for
unrelated goods, such as tobacco and butter, there is no
reason to suppose the former to be non-zero. This problem may
be solved by decomposing the cross-elasticities according to
the Slutzky equation (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980):
(2) elk = e lk
	 eiwk
where e*ik is the compensated cross-price elasticity and w k is
the budget share. Substituting (2) into (1) we get
(3) lnQi = a i + e i (lny - Ewklnpk )	 Ee*ikinpk +
k=1	 k=1
As the expression Ywklnpk
 can be interpreted as the logarithm
k=1
of a general price index p (3) becomes
( 4)	 lnQ = ai + eiln(y/p) + ye*iklnpk +
k=1
which gives the demand in terms of real income and
compensated prices. Imposing the homogeneity restriction
Ee*ik = 0 allows us to deflate all prices in (4) by the
k=1
general price index p.
Thus we get
(5)
	
lnQi = a1 + e iln(y/p)	 Ee*jkln(pk/p) + ui
keK
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and denoting real valued independent variables by capital
letters, (5) becomes
(6)	 lnQi = ai + eilnY	 Ee*jklnPI, + u.
keK
In (5) and (6) the price variables are restricted to close
substitutes and complements. This procedure is now acceptable
since there is no reason not to rule out zero substitution
between unrelated goods. Model (6) is the most commonly
applied model in the demand analysis of a single good. The
advantage of the model is that its parameters have a simple
interpretation. Estimated parameters indicate directly the
values of price and income elasticities.
Elasticities indicate how many percentage points the demand
tends to change as a result of a one percent change in price
or income when other influences have been controlled for.
Knowledge of elasticities is valuable to all interested
parties: the producers, distributors and the Ministry of
Finance; and in the case of tobacco and other potentially
hazardous substances, to the Ministry of Health.
2.2 Habit formation
It is widely acknowledged that tobacco causes psychological
and physical dependency. Smoking easily becomes a habit
difficult to abandon. The basic model does not take account
of the effects of habit formation directly on the demand.
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Indirectly, its effects are seen in the low elasticity
estimates; the demand for tobacco is not very responsive to
price increases. It is not possible, however, to isolate the
direct effect of habit formation in the basic model.
Furthermore, the model (6) is completely static, which means
that consumption is assumed to adjust instantaneously, within
a given period, to the new equilibrium level when prices and
income change. If the price of a tobacco product increases
during a certain period, the demand for that product is
supposed to react 'immediately' and to assume its new
equilibrium value during the same period. In the case of
goods which are characterized by habit formation the above
assumption may be too strong; ideally we would have liked to
take account of the habit forming nature of tobacco in our
specification of the demand functions.
While we are neither interested in explaining why the smoking
habit evolves, nor in the actual habit forming process, it is
of great interest to examine its effect on the demand for
tobacco, as habit formation clearly determines the extent to
which the demand can be influenced by various policy
instruments.
Marshall (1927, p. 807) discussed the effects of habit
formation on the demand analysis, suggesting that:
u ... the increase in consumption arising from a fall in
price is gradual: and further, habits which have once
grown up around the use of a commodity while its price
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is low, are not quickly abandoned when its price rises
again."
The three ideas introduced here
(1) adaption to a change in prices is gradual; there is
a partial adjustment,
(2) the effect of habits is positive, i.e. demand
increasing,
(3) the movement along a demand curve is irreversible
when habits have developed in the meantime,
lead to three different models incorporating the habit
forming nature of tobacco: the partial adjustment model, the
habit stock model, and the addiction asymmetry model. All of
these are discussed in turn.
2.2.1 The partial adjustment model
The simplest way to reformulate the basic demand model (6) is
to postulate a partial adjustment scheme assuming that the
actual level of demand (1nQ it ) adjusts gradually to the
desired level (1nCfit):
( 7 )	 lnQi, - lnQ, = O i ( 1nO*it - lnQ1.t_ 1 ) ,
_
with 0 < 8i < 1. Suppose that the desired demand is a linear
function of the same variables as in equation (6):
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(8) lnQait = ai + eilnY, + Ee*iklnPkt
 + uit,
keK
then after solving (7) for lnWit
 and substituting it into (8)
we arrive at the demand function
(9) 1nOit = ai6 i + ei6 1 1nYt + Ee*ikOilnPkt
keK
+ (1 - 6 i )lnQ i.
 + wit,
where wit = Equ and which does not include the unobservable
variable lnWit.
Postulating the partial adjustment scheme we have introduced
lagged consumption into our model, which implies that testing
the statistical significance of the coefficient of the lagged
consumption variable is equal to testing the hypothesis that
the consumption of tobacco adjusts gradually to changes in
prices and income.' The smaller the estimated coefficient of
the lagged consumption variable Q, the faster actual demand
will reach the desired level. When 6i = 1, in the model (9),
the coefficient of the lagged endogenous variable is zero,
and the model is reduced back to the basic model (6), thus
implying total and immediate adjustment and also equal short
run and long run elasticities.
_
1 In fact we test whether the short-term response to
price changes, for example, given by e * ik6 i , would be smaller
than that faced in the long-run, eik.
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2.2.2 The habit stock model
In the partial adjustment model (9) habits enter into the
demand function indirectly through past decisions which are
reflected in the lagged consumption variable. Houthakker and
Taylor (1970) introduce habits explicitly into the demand
function postulating a model in which smoker's current demand
for tobacco depends not only on income and prices, but also
on a psychological stock of smoking habits that a consumer
has built up over his smoking life.
This unmeasurable stock of habits is represented by a 'stock
variable' S it , which describes a consumer's current smoking
habits as the result of past behaviour. The model is defined
by two structural equations, one for the quantity demanded:
( 10 )
	 Qit = 130i + PliS it 	 R2iIrt	 E. PkiPkt	 uit
keK
and the other for a state variable which relates the net
change in the psychological stock of smoking habits at time t
to the flow of purchases minus depreciation of the stock
which is assumed to occur at a constant rate 6i:
( 11 )	 = Qit - OiSit.
The stock variable represents the strength of habit, and it
is expected that p ik > o by the argument that the more a
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consumer has smoked in the past, the more he will want to
smoke currently.
In practice we cannot observe or measure the state variable
S it , but that does not cause any problems, since we can
eliminate it from the equations. From the two structural
equations, the following dynamic estimating equations, in
discrete time, can be derived:1
(12) Qit	 acm.	 aiiMt	 EakiA.Pkt	 EakiLiPk. t-1
keK	 keK
EaniQ 	 + vit
keK
where A. is the difference operator, 11.c t = xt - xt_/ , 1.1 is a
non-linear expression in the structural coefficients, and vit
is the disturbance term of the reduced form.
Estimates of the structural coefficients pji , may be derived
from the estimated coefficients of the reduced form, a il. and
but the latter must be estimated subject to the non-linear
restriction that the ratios of the coefficient of each lagged
independent variable to the coefficient of the corresponding
first difference of that variable are constrained to be equal
to Li.
1 The estimating equations for the three tobaccoproducts are derived explicitly in Appendix 1, in which it is
also shown how the estimates of the structural parameters pij
and oi may be derived from the aii and Li.
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As in the partial adjustment model, the demand for tobacco
does not adjust immediately to changes in prices and income,
and furthermore current consumption is positively influenced
by consumption in the more or less recent past, that is, by
the psychological stock of smoking habits accumulated. Given
tastes and income, a smoker's current consumption will be
affected by the stock, i.e. the more he has smoked in the
past, the more he will smoke currently. In this model, unlike
the partial adjustment model (9), the estimated parameter an/
of the lagged consumption variable does not measure the speed
of adjustment, nor has any particular interpretation been
given to it. The difference of the estimated coefficients 6i
and	 (ki = 6 1 - pu ) gives an estimate of the adjustment
coefficient, that is, k is the portion of the desired change
in the stock of habits that takes place in one interval
(Phlips 1974). The greater the rate of depreciation 8, the
faster they wear off and the faster habits adjust to their
equilibrium level.
2.2.3 The addiction asymmetry model
While the partial adjustment model (9) and the habit stock
model (12) can be interpreted to incorporate the habit
forming nature of smoking through their dynamic structure,
'V
they suffer from the same shortcoming. The consumer's
response to changes in prices and income are assumed to be
symmetric, that is, the strength of his reaction to declining
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and increasing prices will be equal, despite the habits he
has developed.
Following Marshall (1927) and Scitovsky (1976, 1978), among
others, it can be argued that the asymmetric rather than the
symmetric response to changes in prices and income may well
be a typical feature of consumption of goods, particularly,
of those goods such as tobacco and alcohol for which a
psychological and physiological dependency may exist. This
asymmetry stems from the consumer's tendency to acquire
habits of consumption more easily than to abandon them
(Scitovsky 1976, 1978). This has an important consequence for
the slope of the demand curve: the curve becomes kinked so
that the response to a price rise becomes less elastic than
to a price fall (Figure 3), which in turn, would have
significant policy implications.
Recently, Young (1982, 1983) has suggested a ratchet model
which provides direct estimates of the degree of asymmetry to
price and income changes. The major economic assumption
distinguishing the ratchet model from the habit stock model
is that consumers revise their consumption habits in discrete
terms. The demand curve is saw-toothed, given a series of
price changes (Figure 4).
_
The demand curve is kinked at the prevailing price,
irrespective of past price changes. Thus the model assumes
that new smokers are encouraged to enter the market in the
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event of any price decrease, and that habits thus formed are
assumed to persist when prices subsequently rise. Hence,
price variation expands the tobacco markets.
The adjustment process can be modelled by a price
decomposition method suggested by Wollfram (1971), which can
be summarized briefly as follows.
A linear asymmetric demand function, corresponding to the
symmetric demand function
Qit = ao i + aiiPit + a2jYt + uit
will be
(13) Qit = Poii + PiiPRit + P2I.PF1t 4- P3iYRt + Nil/Ft + Ilit F
where PR, the sum of all period-to-period rises in P. is
defined as
t
PR 	 24.1c( Pik
with
	 (1)1, = 1, if Pik > Pi.k..1
_
0, otherwise
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Price
Quantity
Figure 3. Asymmetric response to price change
Price
Quantity -
Figure 4. Saw-toothed time-path of the demand
and PFit , the sum of all period-to-period falls in P it , is
PFit	( Pik - P i,k-1) r
k=.1
with Ou	1, if Pik < PLIc-1
0, otherwise.
In the log-linear specification of the addiction asymmetry
model the variable PRt is defined as
P t	 Pt
PRit	 f 	  > 1
PR 1, otherwise
and the variable PF t as
P t	 Pt
PR
	
PFLt _i	 . if 	  < 1
P i.t-I.	 Pi.t-1
PF i , otherwise •
Variables YRt , the income rising series, and YFt , the income
falling series, are defined in similar ways. If the demand
for product i exhibits aspects of addiction asymmetry, then
13ul	
and 1133i1 >
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Noting that Pit = Pio + PRit + PFit and Yt = Yo + YRt + YF t , where
P io and Yo are values of prices and income in the initial
period, and substituting for PR i , and YF t in equation (13) the
model can be re-specified in linear form as follows"
(14) Qit 
=	 Poi + PliPit + 13* 21 13Fit + 13 31Yt + 13*41YRt 4- uit•
and in log-linear form as
(15) lnQ it = poi + B ulnPit + B* 2i lnPFit + 133i lnYt + 13"4i lnYRt + uit,
where rn .
 
1321 — Rii and P *4i = P3i — I3 4i •
The usual t-statistic of the estimated coefficients rn and 13*4i
(with Ho: 13 2i = 0, Ho : 13 *41 = o) provides an appropriate test of
the equality of the slope parameters. Addiction asymmetry, with
respect to both price and income change is confined if rn < 0
and 13 4i > o.
While the ratchet specification offers a simple means of
exploring asymmetric consumer responses, it should be noted
that no account is taken of erosion of memory of distant price
1 It is straightforward to expand models (14) (15) to
include the prices of close substitutes and complements. This
is done when the empirical estimating equations are
specified.	
_
2 Young (1982, 1983) also specifies an alternative model
where the behavioural hypothesis is that new smokers are
captured only at record low prices and/or record high income.
We shall not, however, pursue this hypothesis further in this
study.
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and income changes in models (14) and (15). The partial
adjustment model (9) and the habit stock model (12) do not
suffer from this omission. This problem can be solved by
respecifying the models to incorporate the partial adjustment
to the desired level of demand, as in the model (9), which
implies the following estimating equations:
(16)	 Qit =	 13 0 o+ Rii8 i.Pit + 3*218 iPFit + 1331.8iYt
+ raio iYRt + ( 1 - 6 )0i	 i.t-1 + uit'
( 17 ) lnQit = poi 8i + pijOilnPit + 13 *2i8i1nPFit + 133jOilnYt
+ r4i6 i lnYRt + ( 1 - O i )1nQi.t_i + uit.
The models (16) and (17) imply that consumers adapt to a
price or income change gradually, but movement along the
demand curve is irreversible when smoking habits have
developed. Consumers' asymmetric response is not only a brief
phenomenon but may persist in the long run.
While the habit stock model (12) can be utilized to model the
stock adjustment by the consumer, the main novelty of models
(14) and (15) is in that they directly isolate the effects of
an asymmetric response to changes in prices and income on the
market demand.
-
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2.3 The future effects of current consumption
In all the above models the consumer is assumed to take
account of past decisions only, but they do not allow him to
take account of the future effects of his present decisions.
In particular, they do not allow for his reactions to an
increasing flow of information about the undesirable side
effects of smoking. When consumers have incomplete knowledge
the number of smokers is higher and they are induced to
purchase more tobacco products than had they been adequately
informed.
Anti-smoking publicity increases the flow of information
about the adverse health effects of smoking, allowing
consumers to reevaluate the characteristics of tobacco and
adjust consumption accordingly, which will shift the demand
curve. This in turn requires a reformulation of the demand
equations (6), (9), (12), (14) and (15). Ideally it would be
desirable not simply to postulate an adjustment to a static
equilibrium level of demand, but to derive the optimal
adjustment path from utility maximizing behaviour. As the
consumer's response to increased information is likely to
depend on his past smoking history and hence on the age at
which he receives the information regarding the hazard, it
would seem impossible to incorporate this f
-act into the above
models. However, the theoretical analysis of Ippolito (1981)
implies a simple solution to the problem.
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Ippolito studies the effects of new information on the
optimal life cycle consumption of hazardous goods within the
investment in health framework. The addictive nature of
tobacco is ignored in the model, but that does not affect the
predictions of the model. The starting point of the analysis
is that the utility associated with the consumption of a
hazardous good is traded for an increase in life expectancy
or a reduction in the likelihood of illness. Thus the
individual's decision to reduce or to give up smoking can be
regarded as one aspect of his overall decision to invest in
health.
Ippolito shows that a U-shaped life time consumption path is
consistent with rational behaviour for consumption of tobacco
products. The shape of the consumption path is explained by
the age and discount effects. The age effect increases
consumption over time; the expected cost of dying in terms of
expected future utility is decreasing as an individual ages.
The discount effect acts in the opposite direction. As each
cigarette is consumed, the risk associated with further
consumption increases. As the individual ages, the likelihood
of dying from other causes increases, hence he will discount
the future consumption of tobacco in favour of current
consumption, that is, it is optimal to smoke before the risk
of dying from other causes becomes significant.
Of these two factors, age is the primary factor determining
consumption. The health cost of smoking depends on the
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expected number of years remaining in life as well as the
past smoking history. Because of the long latent period
between exposure and onset of a disease, as in the case of
lung cancer, it is optimal to smoke several years when young,
ignoring the addictive nature of tobacco, to abstain while
middle-aged and start again in old age when the shadow price
of consumption is small if not zero.
Moreover, those who have smoked excessively for many years
before the revealing of the health hazards know there is a
probability that they have already triggered the development
of, for example, lung cancer during that period. Since their
chance of dying is now higher than otherwise, their health
cost of current smoking is less, thus they will consume more
than otherwise.
The predictions of Ippolito's model indicate that, depending
on age, it is not always optimal to reduce consumption; it
may in fact be optimal to increase consumption after
receiving information about the health hazards.'
Ippolito then relates the predictions of her model to
aggregate consumption statistics. Assuming that the age
profile of the population remains unchanged over time, then
at the time of the hazard announcement indiRriduals would
1 A similar conclusion was also reached by Atkinson
(1974), who showed that while the spread of information about
the health hazards reduces the number of smokers, it may
increase consumption among young continuing smokers where
publicity is directed particularly at the risk in later life.
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adjust their consumption of tobacco as a function of age;
once the information has been received by individuals, there
will be an initial drop in the average consumption rate. As
time passes, the average consumption rate should rise until
reaching an equilibrium which is less than the
preannouncement rate. This erosion of the initial reduction
reflects the smaller average reaction required to compensate
for past non-optimal behaviour.
As consumption decisions are reflected in consumption
statistics, the above analysis suggests that the effects of
the possible exogenous changes in tastes due to increased
knowledge of the health risks of smoking can be incorporated
into the models (6), (9), (12), (14) and (15) by adding two
dummy variables to the estimating equations; one being a
dichotomous variable (demand shift DS) taking the value zero
before the announcement of the new information and one after,
which measures the initial effect, the other being a time
trend (relapse rate RR), taking zero values before the new
information, which reflects the erosion of the initial
effect.
Assuming only a single announcement of the new information
about the health risks of smoking, the estimating equations
become:	 -
(18) lnQit * 1= aci + eilnYt + Ea ik-Ln4-nkt + anDS + a2iRIR. + uit
keK
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(19) lnQit
 = aoi8 1 + ejOi lnYt + Ee*ikO ilnPkt + (1 - 6)1nQ1.t..1
keK
+ a11 8 iDS + a21 8 1RR + uit
(20) Qit = aoi + ailA.Yt + aiiLiYt_i + E-akiA-Pkt
keK
+ YakiX*1APk, t-1
kEK
+ aniQi.t-i + an,LiDS + an+2,iRR + ui,
(21) Qit = Poi + PiiPit + P *2iPFit + P3iYt + P*4iYRt
+ p sips + N iRR + uit
( 22 )	 Qit	 =	 Poi6 1. ÷ Pii6 iPit + 13*21. 8 iPFit + 13 31. 6 iYt + 13*41.81.YRt
+ (1 - 8 1 ) Q1.t..1 + p 51 t5 1DS + 13 618 1RR + uit•
The equations (18) and (19) are also estimated in linear form
and the equations (21) and (22) in log-linear form.
_
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3 PREVIOUS STUDIES
Previous studies have centered on estimating the demand
functions either for the aggregate tobacco consumption or for
cigarettes only. Static specification of the basic demand
model (18) has been commonly applied and deemed satisfactory
to describe the demand for tobacco products in various
countries (Atkinson and Skegg 1973, 1974, Johnston 1980,
Kouytsouyannis 1963, McGuinness and Cowling 1975, Rimpela and
Kuuluvainen 1976, Russel 1973, Sehm 1977, Sumner 1971,
Valtonen 1982, Witt and Pass 1981). In the U.S. the demand
for cigarettes seems to be compatible with the partial
adjustment hypothesis (19) (Fujii 1975, 1980, Hamilton 1972,
Warner 1977, 1981).
Empirical results do not generally lend support to the habit
stock model (20) (Comanor and Wilson 1974, Leu 1984) which is
also found unsatisfactory in econometric studies on the
demand for alcohol (Comanor and Wilson 1974, Duffy 1980). The
addiction asymmetry hypothesis (22) is confirmed by Young
(1983), who found strong asymmetric responses to changes in
cigarette prices and income in the U.S.
Empirical findings of all the previous studies are consistent
in that the demand for cigarettes appears -CO be rather
inelastic with respect to its own price, and income
elasticity is small but positive and significant (Table 1).
The studies suggest that own-price elasticity lies between
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Table 1. Price and income elasticities of the demand for
cigarettes in some European countries.
Study	 Price	 Income
Elasticity Elasticity
Finland
Rimpela and Kuuluvainen (1976) - 0.36 + 0.29
Sehm (1977)
- 0.33 + 0.39
Valtonen (1982)
- 0.35 + 0.1b
United Kingdom
Sumner (1971)
- 0.25 4- 0.48
Atkinson and Skegg (1973)
- 0.25 + 0.50
Witt and Pass (1981)
- 0.32 + 0.13
Switzerland
Leu (1984) - 0.50 + 0.80
_
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-0.2 and -0.6 both in the U.K. and in the U.S. (Atkinson and
Skegg 1973, 1974, Fujii 1975, 1980, Hamilton 1972, Harris
1980, Johnston 1980, Kouytsoyannis 1963, Lewit and Coate
1982, McGuinness and Cowling 1975, Peto 1974, Russell 1973,
Sumner 1971, Warner 1977, 1981, Witt and Pass 1981). In
Finland it is about -0.35 (Rimpela and Kuuluvainen 1976, Sehm
1977, Valtonen 1982).
The results obtained by Young (1983), who respecified Fujiits
model (1980) to allow for asymmetric responses to changes in
prices and income, suggest that the symmetric elasticities
derived in the previous studies may be somewhat misleading.
His findings indicate consumers to be more sensitive to
declining prices and increasing income than to rising prices
and declining income. They also imply that increasing the
price of cigarettes may be less effective in reducing smoking
than has been previously assumed. There is also some
evidence that male and female smokers differ in their
responses to changes in prices, though this is conflicting.
In the U.K. cigarette price elasticity appears to be small
for women and insignificant for men (Atkinson and Skegg 1973,
1974), while in the U.S. the price effect appears to be
larger for males than for females (Lewit and Coate 1982).
Smoker's responsiveness to price changes also seems to depend
on the age of the smoker. Lewit and Coate (1982) found
significant differences in price elasticities between age
groups in a cross-sectional study on the U.S. The adult price
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elasticity of the demand for cigarettes was -0.42, which
corresponds with the results of time series studies. The
price appears to have its greatest effect on the smoking
behaviour of young smokers, particularly males (whose price
elasticity is -1.4) and it seems to operate primarily on the
decision to smoke (price elasticity -0.28) rather than via
adjustments in the quantity of cigarettes smoked (price
elasticity -0.10) (Table 2). In particular, the decision by
males under 25 years old to start smoking regularly is price
elastic, which is consistent with the notion that smoking is
addictive behaviour starting in youth.
Demand equations for tobacco products other than cigarettes
have been estimated in only two Finnish studies (Rimpeld and
Kuuluvainen 1976, Valtonen 1982). In Finland cigarettes and
pipe tobacco are close substitutes, which is based on the
fact that the price of hand-rolled cigarettes is about half
of the price of manufactured cigarette. Currently about 50-60
per cent of pipe tobacco is used in hand-rolled cigarettes.
Demand for pipe tobacco is very sensitive to changes in
cigarette price. The cross-elasticity is about two (Valtonen
1982).
Advertising has a small but significant effect on the demand
for tobacco. In the U.K. a 10 per cent increase in
advertising appears to increase cigarette consumption by 1
per cent in the short run (McGuinnes and Cowling 1975) and
423
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by 7-9 per cent in the long run (Johnston 1980, Witt and Pass
1981). In the U.S. a 10 per cent increase in advertising
expenditure increases cigarette consumption by 2-4 per cent
in the short run and by 2-6 per cent in the long run (Fujii
1980, Hamilton 1972). Consequently an advertising ban or
restrictions imposed on cigarette advertising can be expected
to reduce consumption slightly. There is some evidence that
this would specifically discourage teenage smoking (Lewit et
al 1981).
Effects of health 'scares' vary, but in general anti-smoking
publicity in the form of health scares reduces consumption by
a small but significant amount. Although little is known
about the specific behavioural responses to anti-smoking
publicity, the available evidence indicates that decreases in
per capita consumption during and after periods of anti-
smoking publicity mainly reflect individuals' quitting
smoking rather than reductions in smoking levels of
continuing smokers (USDHEW 1979).
In the U.K. the publication of the Royal College of
Physicians (RCP) 1962 report and the television advertising
ban of tobacco in 1965 reduced consumption by 4.6 per cent
and 4.9 per cent respectively but the effect died away at a
rate of about 1 per cent a year (Atkinson and Skegg 1973,
1974). This would seem to support the predictions of
Ippolito's (1981) model. The results of Atkinson and Skegg
also indicate that publicity has a temporary effect on the
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number of cigarettes smoked by men, while women's consumption
has been reduced only through increases in taxation. A
slightly different interpretation of the effects of anti-
smoking publicity is given by Witt and Pass (1981) who
estimated that the cigarette consumption decreased by 4.2 per
cent after the 1962 report of the RCP, by 7.1 per cent after
the report of the U.S. Surgeon General in 1964 and by 3.4 per
cent after publication of the 1971 RCP report, during the
year in which the 'scare' occurred and the subsequent year.
In the U.S. Warner (1977, 1981) and Hamilton (1972) found
anti-smoking publicity in the form of anti-smoking
advertisements on the television and radio to be very
effective in the short run - even more effective than
advertising, but it is possible that this marginal
effectiveness would have diminished over time as their early
successes reduced the smoking population to more 'hard core'
smokers. Specifically Lewit et al (1981) found that anti-
smoking advertising had a substantial negative impact on
teenage smoking participation rates, but little or no impact
on the quantity smoked.
In Switzerland the extended publicity following the 1964 U.S.
Surgeon General's Report, various concurrent tax increases,
and an earlier preceeding vote for an advertising ban on
tobacco products, decreased consumption permanently by 11 per
cent (Leu 1984).
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4 SPECIFICATION OF THE EMPIRICAL DEMAND FUNCTIONS
Previous studies suggest that apart from the price and
income, anti-smoking publicity, advertising and advertising
bans affect the demand for tobacco products and should
therefore be included as explanatory variables in the
empirical demand functions. Studies do not give a clear cut
answer as to which model is an appropriate formulation for
estimating the demand for tobacco products. Some level of
dissaggregation by age and sex would also seem necessary.
Casual inspection of Finnish consumption statistics suggests
that the effect of the 1964 report did not extend beyond that
year. The television advertising ban in 1971 does not seem to
have had any direct effect. The Tobacco Act and the extensive
public debate provoked by it in 1976 together with the total
advertising ban in 1977 appear to have had a major effect on
smoking.
The following hypothesis would therefore be appropriate:
anti-smoking publicity caused a temporary decline in demand
for tobacco in 1964, the television advertising ban did not
have any major effect on demand, and a comprehensive tobacco
policy caused a permament fall in consumption. The
specifications of these hypotheses are given by
D64 = rl, for 1964
otherwise
L
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D71 . cl, for 1971
0 otherwise
(D76S = 11, for 1976 onwards
10, otherwise.
Possible erosion of the 1976 intervention effect is examined
with a time trend which is specified as follows:
RR76 = Ii, 2, 3, ... for 1977 onwards
1
LO, otherwise.
The theoretical argumentation in section 2.3 and the previous
studies would suggest the expected signs of the dummy
variables to be negative except for the trend dummy which is
assumed to be positive for all tobacco products.
As we do not have any data on the volume of tobacco
advertising or information about the advertising expenditure
used to promote tobacco products before 1977, we have to
exclude the advertising variable from our demand equations.
We do not believe that this omission will result in a serious
misspecification of our models, particularly as the previous
studies indicate that advertising has only a marginal impact
on the aggregate demand for tobacco product.
Previous Finnish studies (Rimpela and Kuuluvainen 1976,
Valtonen 1982) suggest that the price of cigarettes largely
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determines the demand for pipe tobacco and the price of pipe
tobacco affects the demand for cigars. Thus the demand
functions corresponding to the models (18) - (22) include the
following variables:
Cigarettes:	 03 = fs (P s , Y, D64, D71, D76S, RR76, u,),
Pipe tobacco: Qpt = fpt (P„ Ppt , Y, D64, D71, D76S, RR76, upt),
Cigars:	 Qc = fc (P„ Ppt , Y, D64, D71, D76S, RR76, uc),
where 031 Qpt , Qc = the number of cigarettes, pipe tobacco
(grammes) and cigars consumed per capita
(people over 15 years of age),
P„	 P = the real price of cigarettes, pipe
tobacco and cigars,
= the real disposable income per capita
(people over 15 years of age),
D64, D71,
D76S, RR76 = dummy variables defined above,
u„	 u 	 = error terms.
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5 MATERIALS AND STATISTICAL METHODS
As no disaggregated time series data by age and sex are
available for Finland, the demand functions were estimated
using aggregated annual data for the three broad tobacco
categories. Per capita consumption of cigarettes, pipe
tobacco and cigars was obtained by dividing the total
consumption figures by the number of potential consumers,
i.e. by the mean population over 15 years of age. Respective
price series were derived by dividing the value of the retail
sale by consumption. The real price series were obtained by
deflating the price series by the consumer price index at
1980 prices. The income variable was obtained by dividing the
households' disposable income by the mean population over 15
years of age and deflating it further by the consumer price
index. The data was derived from various publications of the
Central Statistical Office (Putkonen 1980, Tilastokeskus
1988).
All the models were first estimated for the period 1960-81.
The models were estimated by ordinary least squares, except
the habit stock models. The coefficients of the reduced form
equations of the habit stock models were estimated subject to
the non-linear constraint that the ratios of the coefficient
of each lagged independent variable to the coefficient of the
corresponding first difference of that variable are equal to
X.i
. To achieve this, equations were estimated using the Gauss
method (see Hall and Hall 1980).
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The initial conditions for = were the least squares
estimates of the coefficients of the unconstrained model. The
initial condition for L i was the average of the relevant
ratios of the coefficients for lagged independent variables
to the respective coefficients for the first differences of
these variables.
The adequacy of the log-linear models was tested by Andrews'
method (Andrews 1971, Godfrey and Wickens 1981) against the
linear alternative. In our case, Andrews' method consists of
estimating the specified models both in linear and log-linear
forms:
( 23) Qt = Dix ti	 Eai pti	 ut
k	 n
( 24) 1nOt = 213 lnx ti
 + IcxjD tji	 ÷ 1-12qt2 + ut
where Q t is the dependent variable, the x " 's are the relevant
price and income variables, the D,j's are the relevant dummy
variables, al
 is the intercept, u t is random error, and rau and
ea t2 are artificial variables which do not involve unknown
parameters and which depend upon the dependent variables only
through the OLS coefficient estimates of the linear and log-
linear models, where the variables qu and ei t2 are not
included. The equations (23) and (24) are then estimated by
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OLS and the usual t-test of p = 0 provides an appropriate
test of the adequacy of the functional form:
Ho : p = 0 <=> accept the functional form
H1 : p A 0 <=> reject the functional form.
Multicollinearity was diagnosed by two methods. Firstly, all
the independent variables were regressed on each other in
order to examine whether the R 2y < R2 1 , where R2y = R2 y.x1x2...xk
and R2i
= R2xiotherxs, which some (e.g. Maddala 1981) feel.' 
indicate serious multicollinearity. Secondly the method
proposed by Gilbert (1978) was used.
Gilbert's method is based on the correlation matrix of the
independent variables. The advantage of this method is that
it provides an easy method to diagnose for multicollinearity
through the C2
 statistic, which is related to the structure of
the data moment matrix, and to analyse the location of
collinearity. The collinearity measure C 2
 is defined as:
k
C2 = k-lIrii,
i=1
where k is the number of coefficients and r" is the ith
diagonal element of the inverse of the correlation matrix.
The contribution of variable i to the data is measured by
= (r" - 1)/k,c21.
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which is related to C 2 through the following expression
k
C2 = 1 + E.Ci
1=1
as shown by Gilbert (1978). For an orthogonal data set C2 = 1
and the statistic becomes infinitely large as interdependence
between the explanatory variables grows and the moment matrix
approaches singularity.
Gilbert (1978) regards the data matrix as generated by a
badly designed experiment and seeks, through the C2 measure,
to ask by how much the precision of the regression estimates
would be improved by the use of an orthogonal design. In this
framework the derived statistic G = (100/C 2 )*100 % provides a
measure of the efficiency of the experimental design implicit
in the sample observations on the regressors. Inefficiency of
the design implicit in the sample would be indicated by low
values for G. A value of 100 per cent for G corresponds to an
orthogonal set of regressors and thus the estimated
coefficients would be completely unaffected by collinearity.
Autocorrelation was tested with a standard Durbin-Watson
statistics. Normality of the residuals was tested by a method
suggested by Jarque and Bera (1980). Apart from the standard
statistical tests, the post-estimation forecast performance
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in the period 1982-1987 was tested with the method proposed
by Theil (1966).
Let A, be the actual consumption of a tobacco product in
period t and P, the predicted or forecast consumption for the
same period. The actual relative change is a, = (A t
 -
and the predicted relative change is p,= (P, -
Theil (1966) suggested the use of
n	 n
U = [E*(13t — at)2/nr/[2A2t/r1]1/4
t.1	 t=1
for measuring the accuracy of forecasts. This statistic lies
between zero and infinity. It is equal to zero in the case of
perfect forecasts, i.e. when P, = A, for all t. When it is
equal to one, forecasts do not perform better than no change
forecasts. If the statistic is greater than one forecasts
make the situation worse than if it had not been used.
The final models were selected both on the basis of standard
statistical tests and their forecast performance of the
models. The final models were re-estimated for the period
1960-87.
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6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
6.1 The basic model
6.1.1 The log-linear specification
Our initial specification is the log-linear model (18) 1
 with
the corresponding estimating equations:
Cigarettes:
(25) 1nC) 8
 = ao
 + eBlnY + e*551nP5
+ diD64 + d2D71 + d3D76S + d4RR76 + u„
Pipe tobacco:
(26) lnQpt
 = bo + eErtlnY + eapt.pt 1nPpt + e;t.s1nP3
+ diD64 + d2D71 + d3D76S + d4RR76 + upt,
Cigars:
(27) ln(2, = co
 + ec1nY + e*„1nP, + e*c.ptlnPp,
+ d1D64 + d2D71 + d3D76S + d4RR76 + uo.
1 All the previous Finnish studies are based on the log-
linear specification (6) (Rimpela and Kuuluvainen 1976, Sehm
1977, Valtonen 1982). As distinct from other Finnish studies,
dummy-variables relating to anti-smoking publicity and
advertising bans are included in our basic model.
435
From the demand theory the expected signs of the parameters are:
ei > 0, e*ii < 0, e*ii > 0, d1 , d2 , d3 < O.
Furthermore, if the limited duration hypothesis holds, then
> 0. In this specification price and income elasticities are
restricted to be constant over the relevant range of values, and
moreover anti-smoking publicity and advertising bans are not
assumed to alter the price and income elasticities, i.e. they
only shift the demand curves. The estimation results are shown
in Table 3.
All the estimated price elasticities are statistically
significant l
 with the expected signs. Income elasticity is
statistically significant with correct sign only in the
cigarette equation. In other equations the income elasticity is
negative and insignificant. The anti-smoking publicity
variables, D64 and D76S, have the expected signs in the
cigarette and cigar equations, while their signs are positive in
the pipe tobacco equation. All the estimated coefficients of the
anti-smoking variables D64 and D76S are statistically
significant, with the exception of the 1964 variable for cigars.
The relapse rate is negative in all equations and, with the
1 At this preliminary stage our criterion is the 10 per cent
significance level in the one-tail test.
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Table 3. Estimates of the basic model, log-linear
specification, 1960 - 1981. (t-ratios in parentheses)
Cigarettes
(1nO.)
Pipe
tobacco
(1n(4)
Cigars
(1nQc)
Cigarette price
(1nP.)
-.334
(-4.885)
2.160
(11.092)
-
Pipe tobacco price
- -.557 1.073
(1nPF,) (-3.007) (6.266)
Cigar price -
- -2.409
(1nPc) (-17.852)
Income .136 -.093 -.013
(lnY) (2.597) (-.402) (-.035)
Anti-smoking publicity -.067 .255 -.029
in 1964 (D64,	 shift) (-1.880) (2.763) (-.303)
Television adevertising .009 -.091 -.121
ban (D71,	 shift) (.265) (-1.034) (-1.293)
Anti-smoking publicity
and the Tobacco Act -.117 .248 -.313
in 1976 (D76S,
	
shift) (-4.050) (2.798) (-3.312)
Relapse rate -.003 -.070 -.044
(RR76,	 1977-81) (-.391) (-3.439) (-1.555)
Intercept 8.122 -5.021 13.657
(13.617) (-1.928) (2.885)
IRM
.777 .913 .986
DW 1.86 2.11 1.98
F 13.16 32.46 -219.45
(v1 ,	 v2) (5,16) (7,14) (7,14)
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exception of cigarettes, is also significant. The television
advertising ban in 1971 seems to have encouraged cigarette
smoking, while having the expected opposite effect on the demand
for pipe tobacco and cigars, although the effect is not
statistically significant in any of the equations.
The possibility that the insignificant coefficients arise from
multicollinearity was diagnosed by two methods. The results,
shown in Table 4, do not indicate that multicollinearity is a
problem in this data set. The H27 > R2
	all equations, the G
statistics are high and the c2 i 's are very low compared to
values calculated either by Gilbert (1978) or Duffy (1982). The
implicit efficiency (G) in Gilbert's example was 7.75 per cent
and in Duffy's study as low as 1 per cent. The suprisingly low
values of the statistics in Table 4 arise from the fact that the
real prices of tobacco products did not have any clear
systematic trends during the study period while an almost
continous increase in the real income was observed.
The Durbin-Watson statistics (DW) do not indicate the presence
of the first order autocorrelation, and the normality tests did
not reject the hypothesis of normally distributed residuals.
Scatter plots of the residuals did not indicate
heteroscedasticity. Hence the observed insignificant
coefficients are likely to arise from the absence of true
correlation between the dependent variable and the independent
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variable in question. We feel therefore that dropping the
variables with insignificant coefficients from this and
alternative model specifications does not result in a serious
omitted variable bias.
The results of the functional form test are presented in
Table 5. The relevant F-statistics do not reject either of
the functional forms in the case of cigarettes and pipe
tobacco; but the linear model is found inadequate for cigars,
while the log-linear model is not rejected. Thus either
linear or log-linear models may be employed except for
cigars, where the log-linear model should be applied.
Following Fujii (1980), those variables with insignificant
coefficients (at the 10 per cent level in one-tail test) were
dropped from respective equations, and the equations were re-
estimated. The results are shown in Table 6.
In the demand equation for cigarettes all the estimated
parameters have the expected signs. The coefficient relating
to the 1964 anti-smoking publicity is not significantly
different from zero at the 5 per cent level in the two-tail
test. Despite that, we did not drop the variable from the
equation since the estimated coefficient is quite near the
-
acceptance region and the implied fall in consumption
corresponds with the observed reduction in demand.
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Table 5. Andrews' test for the functional form, estimates of
the parameters p l and p2 . ( t-ratios in parentheses)
Cigarettes Pipe	 Cigars
tobacco
(1n$0.)	 (1nQp,)	 (1nQc)
Linear -4.068 -.195 1.368
specification pl (-1.442) (-.168) (6.479)
Log-linear -4.772 -.272 -.046
specification p2 (-1.664) (-.577) (-1.425)
_
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Table 6. The demand functions for tobacco products, log-
linear specification, 1960-81. (t-ratios in
parentheses)
Cigarettes
(1nQ3 )
Pipe
tobacco
(1nQI„)
Cigars
(1nOc)
Cigarette price
(1nP.)
-.331
(-5.207)
2.160
(13.589)
Pipe tobacco price -,617 1.C58
(1nPl„) (-6.193) (7.856)
Cigar price -2.390
(1nPc) (-23.853)
Income .135
(lnY) (2.781)
Anti-smoking publicity -.068 .261
in 1964 (D64,	 shift) (-2.018) (2.953)
Anti-smoking publicity
and the Tobacco Act -.125 .346 -.249
in 1976 (D76S,	 shift) (-6.010) (4.480) (-2.923)
Relapse rate -.066 -.044
(RR76,	 177-81) (-3.439) (-2.204)
Intercept 8.121 -3.922 13.736
(14.944) (-4.290) (33.918)
12 .800 .917 .987
DW 1.88 1.87 1.65
21.97 47.23 411.26
(v1 ,	 v2) (4,17) (5,16) (4,17)
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In the pipe tobacco and cigar equations all the estimated
elasticities have the expected signs. Apart from that, all
other estimated coefficients have the wrong signs, except the
1976 dummy for cigars which has the expected sign.
According to the equations the demand for cigarettes is
highly price and income inelastic. The estimated elasticities
are in close agreement with those obtained in previous
Finnish studies (Rimpeld and Kuuluvainen 1976, Sehm 1977,
Valtonen 1982) as well as in other studies (Atkinson and
Skegg 1973, 1974, Fujii 1975, 1980, Hamilton 1972, Harris
1980, Johnston 1980, Kouytsoyannis 1963, Lewit and Coate
1982, McGuinness and Cowling 1975, Peto 1974, Russell 1973,
Sumner 1971, Warner 1977, 1981, Witt and Pass 1981). The
prices of other tobacco products do not seem to determine the
demand for cigarettes, which sounds intuitively plausible
since cigarette consumption amounts to nearly 90 per cent of
total tobacco consumption.
The demand for pipe tobacco is inelastic in terms of its own
price, but highly elastic with respect to the price of
cigarettes. The real disposable income does not explain the
demand for pipe tobacco. Thus the demand for pipe tobacco is
determined mainly by the price of cigarettes. The cross
elasticity is about the same size as found in previous
studies (Rimpeld and Kuuluvainen 1976, Valtonen 1982), but
the own price elasticity is about twice as high as that
estimated by Valtonen (1982). Rimpeld and Kuuluvainen (1976)
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did not find a significant own price elasticity. This
discrepancy is due to the incorrect specification of the pipe
tobacco demand function in previous studies, which ignored
the variables relating to anti-smokin publicity. This
omission caused serious autocorrelation in Valtonen (1982)
study, which has been removed in this study by an alternative
specification of the demand function.
The demand for cigars appears to be highly elastic with
respect to its own price and slightly elastic to the price of
pipe tobacco. Income does not seem to have any explanatory
power. These results are consistent with the findings of
Rimpela and Kuuluvainen (1976), but the own price elasticity
is higher than found by Valtonen (1982), who also discovered
negative income elasticity. In the latter study the demand
function for cigars is probably misspecified, since the
effects of the anti-smoking publicity from 1976 onwards were
ignored.
The effects of the anti-smoking publicity appear to be
somewhat ambiguous. While publicity seems to reduce cigarette
consumption, at the same time it seems to boost the demand
for pipe tobacco. As the anti-smoking publicity was directed
against all tobacco products, not cigarettes particularly,
this would suggest an error in our results. We shall return
to this problem in the following sections.
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The ban on television advertising of tobacco in 1971 does not
appear to have had a direct effect on the demand for tobacco.
In this analysis it was not possible to separate the
independent effect of the 1977 total advertising ban on
consumption. The trend dummies did show significant annual
decline in the demand for pipe tobacco and cigars, but it is
highly unlikely that this was caused by the advertising ban.
We were not able to find a significant trend coefficient for
cigarettes, although we would have expected to find one for
cigarettes particularly rather than for other tobacco
products, since the latter were hardly advertised before the
ban. Moreover, there is no reason to assume that cigarette
advertising was the least effective of the three.
6.1.2 Stability of the estimated elasticities
The log-linear specification applied implies that the price
and income elasticities are constrained to be constant over
the relevant range of prices and income. Elasticities measure
how the demand tends to respond to small changes in the
explanatory variables. The same elasticities cannot, a
priori, be assumed to hold good for large changes. In the
previous section this assumption was made. There, we
implicitly assumed that the events in 1976 only shifted the
demand curves, leaving the estimated price and income
elasticities unchanged. These shifts should therefore be
interpreted to measure the direct effects of other factors
than prices and income, e.g. the effects of anti-smoking
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publicity. The results indicated, however, that this
interpretation may not be quite appropriate.
In this section we shall test whether the price and income
elasticities have remained stable over the study period. This
will also enable us to examine the hypothesis that the sharp
fall in the demand for tobacco in 1976 was caused directly by
the exceptionally high price increases and only indirectly by
the anti-smoking publicity. The slope dummies assumed to
capture the possible changes in the elasticities were defined
as follows:
[
DlnPi =	 1nP1, for 1976,...,1981
DlnPii =	 1nPij, for 1976,...,1981
lO, otherwise,
DlnY	 =	 lnY, for 1976,...,1981
0, otherwise,
where Pi
 is the real price of the tobacco product, P
	 the
real price of the substitute and Y is the real disposable per
capita income. Because of the high collinearity between the
_
dummy variables D76S, DlnPi , DlnPii , and DlnY only one of the
variables can be included in the models at a time.
0, otherwise,
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[The stability of the price elasticities were tested by
models'
lnQ, = ao + e*„1nP, + d*„DlnP, + ealnY + ddD64 + u„
lnQ, = ao + e*„1nP5 + eglnY + ddDlnY + d iD164 + u„
lnQp, = ao + e*p, ,s1nP, + e*p, ,p,lnPp, + é*pt,ptDlnPpt
+ d/D64 + d3RR76 + up„
_*lnQp, = ao + ept,s1nP, + e p , ,3D1nP3 + e*pt.ptlnPpt
+ diD64 + d3RR76 + up„
lnQ, = ao + e*„1nP, + ea, ,p,lnPp, + e*c.p,D1nPp,
+ d4RR76 + u„
lnQc =
*
ao + e*„1nP, + 8*„DlnP, + e ,43,1nPpt
+ d4RR76 + u,.
The ordinary t-statistic for ei , eil , gil provides a test for
the stability of the price elasticities. For example, the
hypotheses for the stability of the cigarette price
elasticity are
Ho : ê 	 0
Hi :
. 
lnQ, = ao + e*„1nP, + e slnY + dID64, for 1960-75
{ lnQ, = ao + ( e*„ + e*53 )1nP5 + e„lnY, for 1976-81.
Other hypotheses are similar.
I Note that estimating the dummy variable model is equal to
estimating two separate models for subsamples. The difference
between the two approaches is that the estimates of the error
variance is efficient in the dummy variable model whereas in
the latter approach it will not be efficient, because in this
case the information about the error variance contained in
the other subsample is not utilized.
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The above specifications imply that the price elasticities
are assumed to change only as a result of substantial price
increases. Yet, in fact, they may change as a result of
substantial price increases, anti-smoking publicity or both.
Examining the signs of the slope dummies we may trace the
likely cause of the possible change in price elasticities. In
the first case, provided the price elasticities have changed
only as a result of huge price increases we would expect the
demand to become more elastic with respect to prices, i.e.
..*	 _*
e	 < 0 e	 > 0.ii	 r	 ij
In the second case the direction of the effect depends on the
functional form employed. The full price of tobacco products
may be interpreted broadly to incorporate both the actual
price paid by the consumer and the indirect cost of consuming
tobacco products. The latter pertains to the perceived cost
of the health hazards associated with smoking, which
presumably will rise as a result of anti-smoking publicity.
Although an increase in the perceived cost of smoking alters
the demand elasticity with respect to actual money price, the
direction of the effect is not unambiguous. In the log-linear
specification the price elasticity will reduce as a result of
increased knowledge of the health risks of smoking, while in
_
the linear specification the price elasticity will increase'.
' Assuming that the full price of cigarettes (z) is a sum
of their monetary price (p) and the perceived cost of health
risks of smoking (c) and the quantity of cigarettes smoked
(q) is a function of its full price q = f(z) = f(p + c),
then in the log-linear specification, in which the demand
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Hence in the case where changes in price elasticities are
caused solely by the anti-smoking publicity the expected
..*	
.	
...*
signs of the slope dummies would be, e > 0 e < O.ii	 ii
In the third case the behavioural hypothesis is that while
anti-smoking publicity makes consumers more aware of the
health risks of smoking, the huge price increases would be
the final trigger to stop to smokers wanting to give up
smoking. If this hypothesis is true we would expect the
combined effect of anti-smoking publicity and price increases
to result in higher own price elaticities in all demand
equations, leaving the cross-elasticities unchanged or
reducing them (i.e. eii , ê 	 0). If the combined effect
were mainly due to anti-smoking publicity we would not expect
smokers to substitute pipe tobacco for cigarettes (or cigars
for pipe tobacco) more easily than they did before the 1976
events, since the anti-smoking publicity was directed against
all tobacco products, not particularly against cigarettes.
The results for cigarettes (Table 7) indicate a small
increase in the price elasticity. The demand has become
slighty more responsive to changes in the real price of
1
elasticity with respect to full price (a) is constant;
lnq = a - alnz, -(01ng/alnp) = e = p(p+c) -1a, and (ae/ac) =
-p(p+c) -2a < O. On the other hand, in the linear
specification, in which the elasticity rises in absolute
value as c rises: q = a - bz = a - b(p+c), e = bpq-1,
(ae/ac) = b 2pq-2 > O.
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Table 7. Stability of the demand elasticities for
cigarettes, log-linear specification, 1960-81.
(t-ratios in parentheses).
(1) (2) (3)
Cigarette price -.331 -.331 -.331
(1n13.) (-5.200) (-5.190) (-5.200)
Cigarette price
-.022
shift (D1nP3)a (-5.990)
Income .135 .135 .135
(lnY) (2.780) (2.780) (2.780)
Income shift
-.012
(DlnY)b (-5.990)
Anti-smoking publicity -.068 -.068 -.068
in 1964 (D64,	 shift) (-2.020) (-2.020) (-2.010)
Anti-smoking publicity
and the Tobacco Act -.125
in 1976 (D76S, shift) (-6.000)
Intercept 8.122 8.119 8.117
(14.940) (14.910) (14.910)
Ft2
.800 .800 .800
DW 1.88 1.88 1.88
21.97 21.89 21.92
( v1 ,	 v2 (4,17) (4,17) (4,17)
a DlnP. = (1nP„ for 1976-81
0, otherwise
DlnY = Vny, for 1976-81
0, otherwise
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cigarettes, which is compatible with the first and the third
hypothesis. The result implies that huge price increases may
make demand more elastic, thus improving the effectiveness of
the pricing policy. However, the change in demand elasticity
Is very small indeed, indicating that the price elasticity
has remained rather stable over time. The change in the
income elasticity also seems to be very small.
The results for pipe tobacco (Table 8) indicate that demand
has become more inelastic with respect to its price, whereas
the cross-elasticity has increased slightly. These results
are compatible with the first and the second hypothesis.
However, as the demand for pipe tobacco has become less
elastic in respect to its own price (despite the 49 per cent
increase in its real price) and the cross-elasticity has
increased, these together would seem to suggest that the
drastic changes observed in the demand for pipe tobacco since
1976 are mainly a direct result of the huge increases in the
real price of cigarettes, and the publicity effect has been
mainly indirect. Moreover, together with the results in Table
8, those for pipe tobacco would suggest that smokers have
become slightly more sensitive to changes in the price of
cigarettes; nowadays, cigarette smokers switch to pipe
tobacco more easily than before 1976.
_
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Table 8. Stability of the demand elasticities for pipe
tobacco, log-linear specification, 1960-81.
(t-ratios in parentheses).
(1) (2) ( 3 )
Cigarette price 2.158 2.159 2.158
(1nP.) (13.590) (13.500) (13.580)
.050Cigarette price - -
shift (D1nPa)a (4.490)
Pipe tobacco price -.617 -.620 -.617
(1nP.) (6.190) (-6.170) (-6.190)
.064Pipe tobacco price - -
shift (D1nPp)b (4.400)
Anti-smoking publicity .261 .262 .261
in 1964 (D64,	 shift) (2.950) (2.940) (2.950)
Anti-smoking publicity
and the Tobacco Act .280 _ -
in 1976 (D76S, shift) (4.500)
Relapse rate -.066 -.068 -.067
(RR76,	 1977-81) (-3.440) (-3.440) (-3.440)
Intercept -3.922 -3.916 -3.920
(-4.290) (-4.250) (-4.290)
R2 .917 .915 .917
DW 1.87 1.90 1.87
F 47.23 46.52 47.17
( v1 ,	 v2) (5,16) (5,16) (5,16)
_
a DlnP. . [lnP„ for 1976-81
0, otherwise
b DlnPpt . [1nPpt , for 1976-81
0, otherwise
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The demand for cigars (Table 9) seems to have become more
elastic with respect to its own price and less elastic with
respect to the price of pipe tobacco, which is compatible
with the third hypothesis.
The results suggest that the price and income elasticities
may have changed as a result of the exceptionally high
increases in the real price of cigarettes, but that the
likely changes have been only marginal.
The slope and shift dummies seem to capture the effects of
the 1976 events equally well (in terms of goodness of fit),
which is not surprising as we have examined the same
phenomenon by altering only the specification of the dummy
variables. However, the policy implications of the
alternative specifications differ. Models with shift dummies
imply that the reduction in demand has been caused by
exogenous shocks such as anti-smoking publicity, whereas the
models specified with slope dummies imply that the reduction
is caused directly by huge price increases and possibly
indirectly by anti-smoking publicity. Instead of studying the
effects separately it would be preferable to incorporate both
these variables into the models in order to isolate their
separate effects. Because of the high collinearity between
_
the dummy variables it was not possible to estimate their
parameter values reliably in the log-linear specification. An
obvious solution to this kind of multicollinearity problem is
to estimate linear demand equations, in which the demand
453
Table 9. Stability of the demand elasticities for cigars,
log-linear specification, 1960-81. (t-ratios in
parentheses).
(1) (2) (3)
Cigar price -2.390 -2.390 -2.392
(1nPc ) (-32.850) (-32.790) (-32.650)
Cigar price -.048
shift (D1nPe)a (-4.180)
Pipe tobacco price 1.053 1.053 1.053
(1nPl„) (7.860) (7.840) (7.840)
Pipe tobacco price -.068
shift (D1nPpt)b (-4.160)
Anti-smoking publicity
and the Tobacco Act -.293
in 1976 (D76S, shift) (-4.190)
Relapse rate -.044 -.041 -.042
(RR76,
	 1977-81) (-2.200) (-2.010) (-2.060)
Intercept 13.737 13.736 13.726
(33.920) (33.860) (33.760)
-g2
.987 .987 .987
DW 1.65 1.65 1.66
411.26 409.84 408.02
(v1 ,	 v2 ) (4,17) (4,17) (4,17)
DlnP. = [1nP„ for 1976-81
0, otherwise
b DlnPpt =tlnPpt , for 1976-81
0, otherwise
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elasticities are allowed to vary with the values of the
explanatory variables. The linear specification should also
enable us to isolate the independent effects of the price
increases from the effects of anti-smoking publicity. As the
linear specification was not rejected in the case of
cigarettes and pipe tobacco we shall experiment with them
below.
The scatter diagrams indicate that the demand curve for
cigars has shifted with respect to its own price, whereas no
change has happened in respect to the price of pipe tobacco.
In fact, the demand for cigars appears to be negatively
correlated with the price of pipe tobacco, which is exactly
the opposite to what the elasticities indicated. Because 01
this puzzling finding we felt it necessary to experiment also
with the linear models in this case in order to examine
whether the substitution is found in the linear specification
as well.
6.1.3 The linear specification
We estimated the linear models corresponding to the log-
linear models in Table 6, with one exception. When both the
1976 dummy variable (D76S) and the relapse rate (RR76) were
included in the cigar equation simultaneously they became
statistically insignificant. We did not, however, drop both
of them, as this would have caused serial correlation in the
residual series. Instead we dropped only the relapse rate
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variable.' The scatter plots did not justify dropping of the
shift dummy. The estimating results are shown in Table 10.
All the estimated coefficients have the same signs as in the
log-linear specifications, with the exception of the price of
pipe tobacco in the cigar equation, which is now negative and
insignificant.
In the cigarette equation the estimated income and shift
(D76S) coefficients are insignificant. The low value of the
Durbin-Watson statistic (DW) and the unrealistically high
value of the shift coefficient (D76S) point to model
misspecification. 2 We did not, however, respecify the basic
model on an ad hoc basis, as the alternative models below
allow us to do this in a more attractive theoretical setting.
The estimated results for pipe tobacco are consistent with
those obtained with the log-linear model, and the model seems
appropriate by all statistical criteria.
The results for cigars differ dramatically from those of the
log-linear specification. The demand for cigars is
negatively, not positively, influenced by changes in the
1 In various specifications this variabld indicated an
annual fall of two cigars per capita after 1976.
2 Estimation of the model with the first order
autocorrelated errors did not produce statistically
significant estimates for pi , which gives further support to
our conclusion.
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Table 10. Estimates of the basic model, linear specification,
1960-81. (t-ratios in parentheses).
Cigarettes	 Pipe
tobacco
(Q.)	 (Qpt)
Cigars
(Qc)
Cigarette price
	 -2.323
( PO 	(-4.260)
Pipe tobacco price	 -
1.977
(13.212)
-2.102
-
-.054
-
-
(Ppt) (-5.775) (-.442)
-.059-Cigar price - -.057
(Pc) (-7.961) (-11.034)
Income	 .022 - _ -
( Y )	 (1.033)
Anti-smoking publicity -170.777 65.177 - _
in 1964 (D64,	 shift)	 (-2.270) (2.906)
Anti-smoking publicity
and the Tobacco Act	 -736.207 73.295 -9.346 -10.208
in 1976 (D76S,	 shift)	 (-1.342) (4.784) (-2.717) (-3.681)
Relapse rate	 - -18.504 _ _
(RR76,	 1977-81) (-3.852)
Intercept
	
2599.50 -122.795 65.880 63.332
(16.930) (-2.770) (9.532) (16.958)
ri2	
.729 .913 .845 .852
DW	 1.20 1.83 1.89 .179
F	 15.09 45.15 39.16 61.24
(v1 ,	 v2)	 (4,17) (5,16) (3,18) (2,19)
_
457
price of pipe tobacco. This result is consistent with the
shape of the empirical demand curve, but it is exactly
opposite to the results of the log-linear specification.
Moreover, the independent effect of pipe tobacco price is not
significant in the linear specification. Both these findings
contradict the results obtained in previous Finnish studies
(Rimpela and Kuuluvainen 1976, Valtonen 1982), which
concluded that the price of pipe tobacco has a significant
positive effect on the demand for cigars. Our results imply
that this relationship is spurious, possibly arising from the
research strategy employed in those studies. The authors
postulated a log-linear estimating equation, in which income
and the own price of the tobacco product were the only
independent variables set in advance, the other explanatory
variables being chosen by computer using the forward
selection procedure. The price of pipe tobacco was picked up
as the residuals indicated serious autocorrelation when it
was not included. However, as its sign appears to be wrong,
and the residuals were autocorrelated when the relapse rate
(RR76) was excluded from the log-linear specification, this
would suggest that the basic model is misspecified for the
demand for cigars. We shall examine alternative
specifications of the demand function in the following
sections.
-
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As the linear specifications of the basic model prove to be
satisfactory only for pipe tobacco we shall not discuss their
implications before we have examined alternative linear
specifications of the demand functions.
6.2 Habit formation
6.2.1 The partial adjustment model
Our findings do not lend any support to the partial
adjustment hypothesis (Tables 11, 12). None of the estimated
parameters of the lagged dependent variables were
statistically significant. As a matter of fact all of them
were practically zero, which implies that the partial
adjustment model is an inappropriate formulation for
estimating the demand for tobacco products between 1960 and
1981 in Finland. This, in turn, would suggest that the
adjustment of the actual level of demand to the desired level
is instantaneous, taking place within a year, for all tobacco
products. This result is consistent with the findings of Leu
(1984) and McGuinness and Cowling (1975) which did not
support the partial adjustment formulation either for
Switzerland or the U.K., but contradicts the results obtained1
with the U.S. data (Fujii 1975, 1980, Hamilton 1972, Warner
1977, 1981, Young 1983) which indicate gradual adjustment.
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Table 11. Estimates of the partial adjustment model, log-
linear specification, 1961-81. (t-ratios in
parentheses).
Cigarettes
(1n().)
Pipe
tobacco
(1nOpt)
Cigars
(1nOc)
Lagged consumption .097 .171 -.013
(1n()/) (.616) (1.322) (-0.083)
Cigarette price -.312 1.920 -
(1nP.) (-3.582) (6.653)
Pipe tobacco price _ -.464 1.047
(1nP) (-2.929) (6.821)
Cigar price _ - -2.380
(1nPc) (-12.296)
Income .115 - -
(lnY) (2.020)
Anti-smoking publicity -.078 .273 -
in 1964 (D64, shift) (-2.079) (3.163)
Anti-smoking publicity
and the Tobacco Act -.116 .264 -.295
in 1976 (D76S,	 shift) (-4.684) (4.258) (-3.816)
Relapse rate _ -.071 -.043
(RR76,
	 1977-81) (-3.728) (-2.002)
Intercept 7.476 -4.190 13.532
(4.986) (-4.427) (9.920)
ii2
.789 .917 .983
h .224 1.224 .863
F 15.93 37.59 _238.99
(v1 ,	 v2) (5,15) (6,14) (5,15)
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Table 12. Estimates of the partial adjustment model, linear
specification, 1961-81. (t-ratios in parentheses).
Cigarettes Pipe
	 Cigars
tobacco
(1nQ5 )	 ( 1nQpt)	 (1nQc)
Lagged consumption -.089 .124 -.038
(Qt-1) (-.582) (.907) (-.223)
Cigarette price -2.377 1.821 -
( PO (-3.762) (6.674)
Pipe tobacco price - -1.699 -
(Ppt)
Cigar price - -
-.059
(Pc) (-5.054)
Income -.011 - -
( Y ) (-2.181)
Anti-smoking publicity -153.579 65.783 _
in 1964 (D64,	 shift)	 (-2.170) (2.859)
Anti-smoking publicity
and the Tobacco Act	 -233.806 70.856 -10.006
in 1976 (D76S,
	
shift)	 (-4.804) (4.420) (-3.380?
-19.494Relapse -rate -
(RR76,
	 1977-81) (-3.875)
Intercept
	 2258.87 -143.041 61.829
(5.415) (-2.909) (5.633)
ii2	
.800 .904 .831
h	 .058 .712 .403
F	 16.97 32.28 33.87
( v1 ,	 v2)	 (5,15) (6,14) _	 (3,17)
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Given the annual data and a frequently purchased item with
the relatively low cost of adjustment to desired consumption
levels, our result is not suprising, particularly as the
gradual adjustment found in the U.S. studies seems to arise
from the chosen study period which covered years of market
expansion as well as saturation.1
6.2.2 The habit stock model
This dynamic model is consistent with a linear demand
equation only. Therefore we were not able to experiment with
logarithmic transformations of the variables. However, as the
results presented in Table 5 did not reject the linear
models, except for cigars, this would suggest that the linear
transfomations may be employed. We also estimated the linear
model for cigars, although it did not pass the functional
form test.
From the structural equations, ignoring the dummy variables,
(28) 0
-st = Poi + P21Pst	 PilYt + ps	 + ust
1 This phenomenon is adequately captured by the lagged
dependent variable together with a constant term in equation.
As Schneider et al (1981) have pointed out, the high trend
growth at the beginning of the sample (starting from around
1930) leads to unreasonably high income elasticity in the
latter years of the sample. This would suggest that the
elasticities may not have remained stable over time, which,
if holds good, would necessitate estimation of separate
demand functions for different sub-periods. In the studies
referred to, the stability of the estimated elasticities has
not been tested.
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(29) Qptt =
(30) Qct =
(31) Sit =
1302 4- PnPst + P P32 ptt + p 42 Sptt + uptt
1303 + 1323Ppt + P Pr-,33 ct	 + 1343sct	 + Uct
Qit - 8iS it •
the following estimating equations can be derived (see
Appendix):
(32) Q.t = aca + anQs,t-i + anA-Pst + anLiPs.t-i.
+ anAYt + a31L1Yt-1 + vat
( 33 )	 Qptt = a02 + a12 Qpt. t-1 4- a22AP3t + a22L2 Ps, t-1
÷ a32APptt + a32L2Ppt, t-1 + Vptt
(34) Q, = a03 + a13Qc, t-1 + a23APptt + a23L3Ppt. t-1
1- a33APct 1- a33L3 Pc, t-1 4. Vct '
The structural parametrs pii are related to the reduced form
coefficient estimates, the ay. and Li , through the following
formulae:
2a0(1 - Li /2 )
)...j ( an + 1)
2aji ( 1 - X.1 /2 )
, j = 2, 3	 _
aii + 1
2(a11 - 1)	 Li
1341
	
	 	 +	 	
an + 1	 1 - L1/2
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The estimated equations are presented in Table 13. For
cigarettes and pipe tobacco the results correspond with those
obtained from the static models. In the cigarette equation
all coefficients are significant with the expected signs,
apart from the coefficient of lagged consumption, which is
insignificant. In the pipe tobacco equation all coefficients
have the same sign as in the static model and, with the
exception of the lagged consumption and cross-price, all are
statistically significant.
The cigar equation differs drastically from the static and
partial adjustment models. The cross-price-coefficient and
the coefficients of the dummy variables were statistically
insignificant (the t-statistics being less than one) and were
therefore dropped. The demand for cigars is adequately
explained by the demand in the previous year, and year to
year changes in its price. We shall return to the demand for
cigars later on.
The appropriateness of the habit stock model can be judged,
apart from with the standard statistics, by examining the
plausability of the structural coefficient estimates. The
implied coefficients are presented in Table 14.
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Table 13. Estimates of the habit stock model, 1961-81.
(t-ratios in parentheses).
Cigarettes
(111%)
Pipe
tobacco
(1nQp,)
Cigars
(1n(2,)
Lagged consumption	 .017 .023 .503
(Qt-1)	 (0.054) (.094) (2.592)
Income	 .011 - _
(A.Y)	 (2.441)
Own price	 -2.151 -1.075 -.097
(AP)	 (-1.996) (-1.182) (-5.219)
_Cross price 1.487 -
(AV') (2.442)
Anti-smoking publicity -149.858 63.142 -
in 1964 (D64,	 shift)	 (-2.009) (2.639)
Anti-smoking publicity
and the Tobacco Act	 -259.917 84.132 _
in 1976 (D76S,	 shift)	 (-2.303) (2.752)
Relapse rate	 - -24.687 _
(RR76,	 1977-81) (-2.41355
X.	 1.214 1.397 .311
(1.391) (1.685) (2.462)
Intercept	 2420.730 -199.960 29.186
(3.384) (-2.004) (2.458)
Ii2	
.786 .898 .831
DW	 1.96 1.81 2.25
h	 - - _	 -1.249
Pi.	 -1.260 .132 -.375
(-1.438) (.307) (-1.010)
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Table 14. Derived estimates of the structural coefficients of
the Houthakker-Taylor model.
Cigarettes	 Pipe
tobacco
(1n05 )	 (1nOpt)
Cigars
(1n0)
Cigarette price (P.)	 -1.663
	 .876
Pipe tobacco price (Ppt )	 -	 -.633
Cigar price (Pc )	 - -.109
Income (Y) .008
Stock of habits (S) 1.156
	
2.728 -.294
Depreciation rate (6) 3.091	 4.637 .368
Intercept 1540.946	 -84.279 105.510
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The estimates of 13 41 imply that the stock effect is positive
for cigarettes and pipe tobacco, which is consistent with the
interpretation of the stock variable as a psychological stock
of smoking habits, tending to increase consumption. For
cigars the coefficient is negative, and thus we have to relax
the psychological stock hypothesis in this case. However, it
may be possible to interpret the negative effect in physical
stock adjustment terms in this case.
The rate of depreciation of the stock variable, 8, falls
outside the range of acceptability [0,1] in the cigarette and
pipe tobacco equations. Furthermore, the values of Li are
insignificantly different from 2/3 which is consistent with 81
being unity, that is, the stock dying out rapidly within a
year.
In the case of cigars the physical stock seems to wear out
quite rapidly, the results implying that 2/3 of the desired
change in the stock takes place in a year.
The implausible values of Si rule out these models as our
preferred specifications for cigarettes and pipe tobacco,
whereas the cigar equation is not rejected. Our empirical
results do not lend support to the habit stock model, which
-
is consistent with findings obtained in the other econometric
studies using post-war data (Comanor and Wilson 1974, Leu
1984).
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6.2.3 The addiction asymmetry model
As the partial adjustment model was previously rejected we
estimated only the static addiction asymmetry model (21). The
following estimating equations were specified:
(35) Qst	 .30 + aiP„ + a*2PF5t	a3;	 e4YRt
+ a5D64 + a6D76S + v.t
(36) Qptt	 bo + biPBt + b* 2PR3t + /3 3 13ptt + b*4PFptt
+ b5D64 + b 6D76S + b7RR76 + vpt,
(37) Qct	 co + c iPat	 c*2PFct + c3D76S + c4RR76 + Vct •
The results for cigarettes are presented in Table 15. In
cigarette equation (1), the coefficient of the falling
cigarette price variable is negative and significant, whereas
the income rising coefficient is insignificant. Thus we shall
reject the hypothesis of the equal slopes of the demand
curves which imply a kinked demand curve for cigarettes. The
markets' responses to rising or falling cigarette prices
differ. We are not able to reject the hypothesis of symmetric
responses to changes in income.
We dropped the income rising variable from the model and re-
estimated the cigarette demand equation. In the resulting
equation (2) in Table 15 all other coefficients are
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Table 15. Estimates of the addiction asymmetry model for
cigarettes, linear specification, 1960-81.
(t-ration in parentheses).
(1) (2)
Cigarette price -3.457 -3.463
(P.) (-5.142) (-5.258)
Cigarette price falling -3.408 -3.423
(PF.) (-1.908) (-1.956)
Income .076 .C142
(Y) (1.264) (2.719)
Income rising -.034 -
(YR) (-.592)
Anti-smoking publicity -125.237 -126.179
in 1964 (D64,	 shift) (-2.049) (-2.108)
Anti-smoking publicity
and the Tobacco Act -81.568 -125.591
in 1976 (D76S,	 shift) (-.763) (-1.671)
Intercept 2932.24 2941.76
(9.648) (9.896)
"g2
.829 .836
DW 2.25 2.20
F 18.00 22.44
(v1 ,	 v2) (6,15) (5,16)
_
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statistically significant except that of the shift dummy
(D76S). We did not, however, drop that variable, since the
coefficient is almost significant, and the approriate F-test
did not reject model (2) against model (1) (F = .37 < Fo_15)).
The corrected R-square is rather high and the Durbin-Watson
statistic does not indicate the presence of the first order
autocorrelation in the residual series.
The estimated results for pipe tobacco do not support the
addiction asymmetry hypothesis (Table 16). Neither the
coefficient of the own-price falling variable nor the cross-
price increasing variable differ significantly from zero,
irrespective of whether the variables are included in the
equation simultaneously (equation (1)) or separately
(equations (2, 3)), which implies that the previously
estimated basic model adequately represents the demand for
pipe tobacco.
The asymmetry hypothesis does not seem to hold true for
cigars either (Table 17). In equation (1), all the
coefficients are insignificant. When the trend dummy was
dropped the price falling coefficient became almost
significant but the shift dummy remained insignificant in
equation (2). When tested against the previously estimated
....
linear model the symmetric model was not rejected (F = 2.7 <
F (1.18) ) .
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Table 16. Estimates of the addiction asymmetry model for pipe
tobacco, linear specification, 1960-81. (t-ratios
in parentheses).
(1) (2) (3)
Pipe tobacco price	 -2.763 -1.648 -1.692
(Ppt)	 (-2.245) (-2.114) (-2.912)
Pipe tobacco price falling -2.564 .381 -
(PFpt )	 (-.987) (.662)
Cigarette price	 1.155 1.912 1.761
(P.)	 (1.708) (10.555) (6.277)
Cigarette price rising	 1.364 - .233
(PR.)	 (1.162) (.909)
Anti-smoking publicity 	 53.084 62.364 59.884
in 1964 (D64, 	 shift)	 (2.186) (2.688) (2.574)
Anti-smoking publicity
and the Tobacco Act	 56.936 57.722 52.570
in 1976 (D76S,	 shift)	 (2.041) (2.046) (1.910)
Relapse rate
	
-17.971 -20.393 -20.587
(RR76,	 1977-81)	 (-3.009) (-3.602) (-3.850)
Intercept
	
-15.956 -173.816 -163.270
(-.098) (-1.947) (-2.591)
ii2	
.912 .910 .912
DW	 2.22 1.83 1.88
F	 32.10 36.38 37.35
(v1 ,	 v2)	 (7,14) (6,15) (6,15)
_
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Table 17. Estimates of the addiction asymmetry model for
cigars, linear specification, 1960-81. (t-ratios in
parentheses).
(1) (2)
Cigar price -.103 -.114
(P.) (-1.672) (-3.391)
Cigar price falling -.040 -.049(PFc ) (-.726) (-1.648)
Anti-smoking publicity
and the Tobacco Act -1.943 -1.532
in 1976 (D76S, 	 shift) (-.307) (-.260)
Relapse rate -.518 _
(RR76,	 1977-81) (-.221)
Intercept 149.907 171.869
(1.247) (2.605)
.856 .864
DW 1.73 1.71
F 32.27 45.94
(v1 ,	 v2 ) (4,17) (3,18)
_
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The results for the log-linear specifications of the
addiction asymmetry model are presented in Table 18. Those
for cigarettes are similar to the linear specification
results. The estimating results for pipe tobacco would seem
to support the addiction asymmetry hypothesis with respect to
cigarette price. The results for cigars do not allow us to
reject the symmetric model.
Our results imply that the addiction asymmetry model may be
appropriate for cigarettes in both linear and log-linear
forms. The log-linear formulation of the model is applicable
to pipe tobacco. The addiction asymmetry model is not
appropriate for cigars.
Our results are consistent with those obtained by Young
(1983) as far as the cigarette prices are concerned. However,
habit formation is not confirmed in respect of income in the
case of cigarettes, and the estimated results for other types
of tobacco products do not allow us to reject symmetric
linear models.
6.2.4 The demand for cigars
In the previous sections we have derived alternative demand
_
functions for cigars, though none proved fully satisfactory.
The functional form test rejected the basic linear
specification, yet the log-linear specification produced
spurious results. Both the partial adjustment model and the
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Table 18. Estimates of the addiction asymmetry models log-
linear specification, 1960-81. (t-ration in
parentheses).
Cigarettes	 Pipe
tobacco
(1nQ3 )	 ( lnQpt )
Cigars
(1nQc)
Own price -.486 -.361 -3.114
(1nP) (-5.413) (-2.463) (-7.185)
Own price falling -.399 - 6.139
(1nPF) (-1.883) (	 1.637)
1.643Cross price _ -
(1nP*) (5.789)
Cross price rising - .546 -
(1nPR*) (2.076)
Income .414 - -
(lnY) (2.872)
Anti-smoking publicity -.059 .222 _
in 1964 (D64, shift) (-2.060) (2.718)
Anti-smoking publicity
and the Tobacco Act -0.076 .059 0.230
in 1976 (D76S,	 shift) (-1.997) (.560) (1.358)
Relapse rate - -.066 -
(RR76,	 1977-81)	 ) (-3.490)
Intercept 6.257 -2.285 23.452
Tz2
.872 .930 .942
DW 2.18 1.86 1.72
F 30.23 47.79 73.09_
(v2 ,	 v2) (5,16) (6,15) (3,18)
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addiction asymmetry model turned out to be inappropriate
formulations for estimating the demand for cigars. The habit
stock model was not found inadequate, but being consistent
only with the linear specification, which was rejected, it is
not acceptable.
We can, however, adapt the habit stock formulation as a
starting point for further analysis by the argument that,
while the structural form of the model is compatible with the
linear specification only, the same does not necessary apply
to the reduced form. The reduced form can be treated as a
dynamic estimating equation without setting any prior
restrictions on its functional form.' Thus we can estimate
the reduced form equation in both linear and log-linear
forms. The results in Table 13 indicate that the estimating
equation is of the form
Qt . Co + C iQt_i + CAPt + C2A-P t _i + lit,
which equals
(38) Qt . co + c2Qt_i - c2 (1 - x.) p t_l + c2pt + ut.
As the equation (38) is no more over-identified, the
estimating equation can be written as:
1 Of course, the parameters of the structural form can be
derived only from the linear estimating equation.
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Qt = ao + aiQt-i + a2Pt + a3 13t-1 + ut
in linear form, and
lnQt . po + p i in(:),, + p 21nP t + p 3 11113, 1 + u t
in log-linear form. The estimating results are presented in
Table 19.
All the coefficients of the explanatory variables are
statistically significant and neither the DW and h statistics
nor the estimate of the first order autocorrelation
coefficient (il ) indicate model inadequacy.
However, the Andrews' test rejects the linear form (Il l ), while
the log-linear form is not rejected (p2 ). Thus the dynamic
log-linear model appears to be an appropriate formulation for
the demand for cigars.
The demand for cigars is adequately explained by the demand
in the previous year, and the year to year changes in price.
The anti-smoking publicity appears to have had no effect on
the demand for cigars, which disproves our earlier results.
_
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Tz2
DW
h
F
(v1 , v2)
o,
Table 19. The demand for cigars, 1961-81. (t-ratios in
parentheses).
Qc	 lnQc
Lagged consumption
Cigar price
Lagged cigar price
Intercept
1-1
Qt-1 .503 lnQ,1 .648(2.592) (3.521)
Pc
-.097 lnPc -2.088
(-5.219) (-8.041)
Pt-1 .067 1nPt..1 1.509
(3.363) (4.596)
29.186 4.725
(2.458) (1.585)
.831 .964 (.945)a
2.25 2.35
-1.270 -1.496
33.72 180.33
(3,17) (3,17)
-.375 -.421
(-1.009) (-1.332)
.653 -.130
(4.035) (-.810)
a Adjusted R-square calculated from the anti-logged
transformations of the actual and predicted values of the
dependent variable.
-
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6.3 Selection of the final demand models
The results in previous sections suggest various appropriate
models for estimating the demand for cigarettes and pipe
tobacco, while only the dynamic log-linear model adequately
represents the demand for cigars.
The basic log-linear demand model was found appropriate for
all tobacco products. The empirical results did not lend
support to the partial adjustment model nor to the habit
stock model. None of the estimated parameters of the lagged
consumption variables in the partial adjustment models were
statistically significant. The habit stock model produced
implausible parameter estimates and was therefore rejected.
The addiction asymmetry model was found appropriate for
cigarettes and pipe tobacco but not for cigars.
The goodness of fit criterion (in terms of adjusted R-
squares) suggests the log-linear formulation of the addiction
asymmetry model for cigarettes (Table 20). It is also a
potential candidate for pipe tobacco, together with the basic
models. All the estimated models for cigars fit well to the
data, but apart from the dynamic log-linear model they were
rejected.
_
The addiction asymmetry model had the best forecast
performance in 1982-87 for cigarettes and pipe tobacco (Table
21). The forecast performance of the basic log-linear
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Table 20. The goodness of fit (the adjusted R-square) of the
alternative models.a'b
MODEL Cigarettes Pipe
tobacco
Cigars
BASIC MODEL
Linear (.729) .913 (.852)
Log-Linear .796 .902 (.945)
PARTIAL ADJUSTMENT MODEL
Linear (.800) (.904) (.831)
Log-linear (.728) (.907) (.943)
HABIT STOCK MODEL (.786) (.898) (.831)
ASYMMETRIC MODEL
Linear .836 .912 (.864)
Log-linear .869 .882 .942
DYNAMIC LOG-LINEAR MODEL - - .945
a The adjusted R-squares of the log-linear models are
calculated from the anti-logged transformations of the
actual and predicted values of the dependent variables in
order to render this measure comparable with those for the
linear models.
b Rejected models in parentheses.
Y..
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Table 21. The forecast performance (the U-coefficient) of the
alternative models in 1982-87.a
MODEL Cigarettes Pipe
tobacco
Cigars
BASIC MODEL
Linear (.019) .050 (.432)
Log-Linear .022 .042 (.401)
PARTIAL ADJUSTMENT MODEL
Linear (.035) (.120) (.396)
Log-linear (.026) (.066) (.397)
HABIT STOCK MODEL (.020) (.259) (.313)
ASYMMETRIC MODEL
Linear .043 .045 (.994)
Log-linear .018 .040 .513
DYNAMIC LOG-LINEAR MODEL .206
a Rejected models in parentheses.
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model was somewhat inferior to the addiction asymmetry model.
All the cigar models had poor forecast performance, but the
dynamic log-linear model was clearly superior to others.
On the basis of the explanatory power and post-estimation
forecast performance, our favoured model for cigarettes is
the log-linear asymmetric model, for pipe tobacco the basic
log-linear model, and for cigars the dynamic log-linear
model. The final models were re-estimated for the period
1960-87. The estimation results are presented in Table 22.
_
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Table 22. The demand models for tobacco products in Finland.
(t-ratios in parentheses).
Cigarettes
(1n(2.)
Pipe
tobacco
(1nQpt)
Cigars
(1nQc)
Cigarette price -0.493 2.144 -
(1nP3 ) (-6.251) (15.562)
Cigarette price falling -0.445 - _
(1nPF.) (-2.581)
Pipe tobacco price - -0.599 -
(1nPpt) (-7.011)
Cigar price - - -1.697
(1nPc) (-6.542)
Lagged cigar price - - 1.536
(lnloc.t_i) (4.793)
Lagged cigar consumption - - 0.821
(1nQi) (4.987)
Income 0.450 - _
(lnY) (3.994)
Anti-smoking publicity
in 1964 -0.057 0.257 _
(D64,	 shift) (-2.221) (3.342)
Anti-smoking publicity
and the Tobacco Act in 1976 -0.067 0.260 -
(D76S,	 shift) (-2.157) (6.112)
Relapse rate - -0.056 -
(RR76,	 1977-87) (-8.038)
Intercept 5.953 -3.920 1.581
(7.588) (-4.958) (0.602)
Te 0.885 0.927 0.941
DW 2.12 1.88 2.28
F 42.45 69.72 139.98
(v1 ,	 v2 ) (5,22) (5,22) (3,23)
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7 THE DEMAND FOR TOBACCO PRODUCTS IN FINLAND
The demand equations in Table 22 imply that the demand for
cigarettes is adequately explained by its real price, real
disposable income and variables relating to anti-smoking
publicity. The demand for pipe tobacco is mainly determined
by its real price and the price of cigarettes. The demand for
cigars depends on the demand in the previous year and the
year to year changes in its price. In this section we shall
examine more closely how various factors influence the demand
for tobacco products in Finland.
7.1 Prices and income
The price of tobacco products, particularly of cigarettes, is
the most important single determinant of the demand for
tobacco products in Finland. By controlling the price of
cigarettes it is possible to regulate the demand for
cigarettes and pipe tobacco.
The most important feature of the cigarette demand is its
asymmetric response to its price. The demand for cigarettes
is twice as sensitive to falling prices (elasticity -0.94) as
to rising prices (elasticity -0.49). This supports the
_
hypothesis that new smokers are encouraged to enter the
cigarette markets in the event of any price decrease and that
the habits, when developed, would persist when prices
subsequently rise. This interpretation is consistent with the
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results obtained by Lewit and Coate (1982), who found that
the price has its greatest impact on the decision to smoke
rather than on the quantity smoked (see also USDHEW 1979).
This is particularly true for young smokers, and we feel
that the most likely explanation of why falling price
elasticity is so much higher than rising price elasticity is
to be found from the smoking behaviour of young smokers. The
results of Lewit et al (1981) would seem to support this
notion. They found the demand for cigarettes by teenageers to
be elastic with respect to its price. Similar result were
obtained by Lewit and Coate (1982), who found that smoking by
young adults aged twenty through twenty four is much more
responsive to price than smoking by older adults.
If the real price of cigarettes is allowed to fall new
consumers are encouraged to enter the cigarette market, and
when habits are formed price increases are less effective in
discouraging smoking. The results imply that if the real
price is allowed to fall by e.g. 5 per cent, the real price
would later have to be increased by 10 per cent in order to
restore the per capita demand to the level obtaining before
the price fall.
The demand for cigarettes is also responsive to changes in
_
real disposable income. The income elasticity for cigarettes
is +0.45, which is somewhat higher than found in previous
studies (Rimpela and Kuuluvainen 1976, Sehm 1977, Valtonen
1982).
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The most important factor influencing the demand for pipe
tobacco is the price of cigarettes. The cross-elasticity
(+2.14) is three and half times higher than the own price
elasticity (-0.60). This arises from the fact that the price
of hand-rolled cigarettes is only half that of manufactured
cigarettes. As about 50-60 per cent of pipe tobacco is used
for hand-rolled cigarettes, increases in the cigarette price
result partly in a reduced demand for cigarettes and partly
in increased consumption of cheap hand-rolled cigarettes. The
cross-elasticity is about the same as in previous studies
(Rimpela and Kuuluvainen 1976, Valtonen 1982), while the own-
price elasticity is twice as high (Valtonen 1982). The
results imply that increasing the price of pipe tobacco
appears to be more effective in discouraging smoking than
previous studies have suggested.
There is some indication that the demand for pipe tobacco may
respond asymmetrically to changes in the price of cigarettes.
The demand elasticity for pipe tobacco with respect to
falling cigarette price was +1.64 and to increasing cigarette
price +2.19 (Table 18). This may indicate that some of the
smokers who substitute pipe tobacco (hand-rolled cigarettes)
for cigarettes may adopt new smoking habits and start to
_
smoke a pipe instead of cigarettes. The strength of the
asymmetric behaviour is not very strong. When cigarette
prices decline, most of those who had earlier switched from
cigarettes to hand-rolled cigarettes adopt their previous
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smoking habits and start to smoke cigarettes again. This,
however, is not shown in the cigarette demand function
because the substitution is relatively small compared to the
total cigarette consumption, and is likely to be concealed by
the ever present random variation in demand.
The demand for cigars is adequately explained by changes in
its price. The short run price elasticity is -1.70 and the
long run elasticity -0.90. Thus the demand for cigars may be
effectively influenced by manipulating its price.
7.2 Anti-smoking publicity
The effects of the anti-smoking publicity appear ambiguous.
While reducing cigarette consumption it also seems to
encourage pipe tobacco smoking. As publicity has been
directed against all tobacco products, not merely cigarettes,
this would suggest something wrong with our results. However,
this seemingly odd finding can be explained quite easily with
the help of simple diagramms.
In Figure 5, the demand for cigarettes at time t o is 00 at
price Po . Anti-smoking publicity shifts the demand curve
towards the origin, from Do to Dia, and hence at the same
price less, Q1a, will be demanded. Provided the price of
cigarettes is raised simultaneously with publicity, from Po to
Pl , then the quantity demanded will be Q, which is less than
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either Q1A or Q 1P , the quantities demanded when the measures
are taken separately. This is, of course, rather obvious and
does not raise any complications in interpreting our results
when the price of a substitute remains unchanged.
Complications arise when the price of the substitute rises
simultaneously with the own-price and the anti-smoking
publicity has a further impact on the consumption as in the
case of pipe tobacco.
In Figure 6, the pipe tobacco demand curve shifts from D o to
D ia as a result of publicity and the demand falls from Qo to
Q/a . In the absence of publicity, a rise in cigarette price
would shift the demand curve from D o to Djs and the demand
would increase from Qo to %Ps . Anti-smoking publicity will
reduce the cross-price effect so that the resulting demand
curve will be D im's and hence less pipe tobacco will be
demanded, %al's , compared to the situation when only the
substitution effect takes place. Hence depending on the
strength of the substitution effect, demand may increase
despite anti-smoking publicity provided the cross-price
effect is greater than the publicity effect. Thus our
estimated results are not as suprising as they look at first
sight. From Figure 6 we also note that what our shift dummies
actually measure in this case is the magnitude of the net
effect of substantial cigarette price increases on the demand
for pipe tobacco, which is given by the difference Q lms - 00-
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Figure 5.	 The demand for cigarettes, anti-smoking
publicity (A) and price increase (P).
Figure 3. The demand for cigarettes, anti-smoking publicity (A)
and price increase (P).
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Figure 7 points out how an increase in the price of pipe
tobacco affects its demand when accompanied by cigarette
price rise and anti-smoking publicity. Provided the rise in
cigarette price is substantial and the anti-smoking publicity
not too effective, even huge increases in the price of pipe
tobacco may not be sufficient to reduce consumption. This
seems to provide a plausible explanation of why the demand
for pipe tobacco increased substantially in 1976 despite a 49
per cent rise in its real price.'
In other words, our analysis indicates that the shift dummies
in the cigarette equation reflect the direct publicity
effect, while in the pipe tobacco equation they measure the
net effect of the increases in cigarette price over the
publicity and own-price effects. It should be noted however
that anti-smoking publicity also reduces the pipe tobacco
consumption but its direct effect is concealed by the cross-
price effect.
The shift dummies imply that the 1964 publicity caused a 5.7
per cent immediate, but temporary, reduction in cigarette
demand, while the 1976 events reduced it permanently by 6.7
per cent. By comparison, estimates in other studies (Atkinson
and Skegg 1973, 1974, Fujii 1975, 1981, Hamilton 1972, Leu
-
1 A similar explanation can be given to the 1964 anti-
smoking variable. The real price of cigarettes and pipe
tobacco rose 22 and 18.5 per cent respectively from 1962 to
1964. At the same time the demand for pipe tobacco increased
nearly 88 per cent.
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1984, Peto 1974, Warner 1977, 1981, Witt and Pass 1981) imply
at least a 5 per cent reduction in cigarette consumption as a
result of anti-smoking publicity.
The results do not indicate that the demand effects of the
Tobacco Act and the related anti-smoking publicity have
weakened over time. It is possible, however, that the initial
effect has been eroded, but been compensated by the extensive
health education programme implemented by the Act. If true,
it would emphasize the significance of continous health
education. This notion is supported by the observation that
the 1964 intervention appeared to have only temporary effect.
The trend variable showing an annual 5.6 per cent fall in
pipe tobacco consumption seems to capture the effects of the
underlying declining trend, which presumably reflects changes
in consumers' tastes, starting from the late 60's, rather
than the effects of either the anti-smoking publicity, the
Tobacco Act or the total advertising ban in 1977.
A minimum estimate of the annual welfare gain produced by the
Tobacco Act and related anti-smoking publicity can be derived
by consumer surplus analysis as shown by Fujii (1985). Given
the elasticity of demand and the reduction in cigarette
consumption due to the 1976 events it can be estimated that
the initial welfare gain in 1976 was FIM 7.4 million which
equals a FIM 17.4 million annual welfare gain in 1987
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prices. 1
 This estimate is clearly only a minimum estimate of
the welfare gain as it does not allow for addiction and habit
formation and assumes perfect perception of the risks
associated with smoking by consumers. It is not possible to
derive a similar estimate for pipe tobacco.
7.3 Advertising bans
The banning of televised tobacco advertising in 1971 does not
appear to have had a direct effect on the demand for tobacco.
In this analysis it was not possible to isolate the
independent effect of the 1977 total advertising ban on
consumption. The trend variables did show significant annual
decline in the demand for pipe tobacco and cigars, but it is
highly unlikely that this was caused by the advertising ban.
We were not able to find the expected significant trend
coefficient for cigarettes, although they were heavily
1 Given the cigarette demand elasticity (ep
 = -0.493) and
the reduction in consumption due to the Tobacco Act and
related anti-smoking publicity in 1976 (D76S = 6.74 Is
annually), the implied change in cigarette price (AP.) which
would have resulted in the same reduction in consumption is
given by Aps (D76S/ep)P5. The average retail price of
cigarettes in 1976 was FIM 3.99 per pack. This implies that
dp. is FIM 0.5455 per pack of cigarettes. The per capita
consumption of cigarettes (Q) in 1975 was 2178 cigarettes.
The reduction in consumption (LW) due to the 1976 events is
given by AQ = D76SQ, which is equal to 146.8 cigarettes per
capita, i.e. 7.34 packs.
The gain in welfare in 1976 is given by NAPAQ/2, where N
(= 3 701 865) is the mean annual population of people aged 15
and over. Thus the initial welfare gain in 1976 was FIM 7.4
million, which is equal to FIM 17.4 million at 1987 prices.
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advertised before the ban, unlike the other tobacco products.
However, there is no reason to assume that cigarette
advertising was the least effective of the three.
In the short-run we would have expected the advertising ban
to have exerted only a marginal effect on demand (Atkinson
and Skegg 1973, 1974, Fujii 1980, Hamilton 1972, McGuinness
and Cowling 1975). The anti-smoking publicity associated with
the implementation of the Tobacco Act in 1976 appears to have
reduced the consumption of cigarettes permanently. This
effect is likely to dominate the possible marginal effect of
the 1977 advertising ban, and it was not possible therefore
to isolate its independent effect.
We would expect the total advertising ban to have had a
slightly greater effect on demand over the long-run than in
the short term (Fujii 1980, Hamilton 1972, Johnston 1980,
Witt and Pass 1981), but our present specification of the
model did not shed any light on this. In the long run banning
of advertising is likely to effect the social acceptance of
smoking by removing the social overtones associated with it,
and thus reducing the demand for tobacco. Clearly, this
hypothesis is not testable using a time series analysis based
on highly aggregate data.
-
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7.4 Comparison of the demand effects of price and anti-
smoking publicity
Using the estimates, in Table 22, of cigarette and pipe
tobacco demand functions, Table 23 compares the effects of
prices, income and anti-smoking publicity on demand. In 1964
the per capita cigarette consumption decreased by 267
cigarettes, while pipe tobacco consumption rose by 96
grammes.' During the period 1975-87 per capita cigarette
consumption declined by 319 cigarettes and pipe tobacco
consumption decreased by 28 grammes. Using the estimated
coefficients for the independent variable, the change in its
measured value can be converted to the amount consumption
would have changed during the period had all other
independent variables remained unchanged.
Cigarette price increases have reduced cigarette consumption
by 488 cigarettes over the period 1975-87 while increasing
the consumption of pipe tobacco by 212 grammes. The
corresponding mean annual decline in cigarette consumption
was 40.7 cigarettes and the mean annual increase in pipe
tobacco consumption 17.7 grammes. Thus, over 40 per cent of
the observed reduction in cigarette consumption, resulting
from price increases, has been compensated for by the
_
increased demand for pipe tobacco. The relatively low price
of pipe tobacco, compared to cigarettes, makes switching from
1 A gramme of pipe tobacco is approximately equal to one
cigarette.
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Table 23.	 Effects of income, price, anti-smoking publicity
and the Tobacco Act on change in per capita
consumption in 1964 and during 1975-87.
Change in	 Change in
consumption	 consumption
in 1964
	 in 1975-87
Cigarettes Pipe Cigarettes Pipe
tobacco	 tobacco
Consumption 1963/1975	 2092	 191	 2178	 218
Income effect
	 14.6	 -	 273.7	 -
Cigarette price effect	 -92.1	 36.5	 -488.0	 212.0
Pipe tobacco price effect 	 -	 -4.9	 -	 -134.3
Anti-smoking publicity
effect in 1964	 -119.9	 49.0	 -	 _
Anti-smoking publicity
and the Tobacco Act
effect in 1976-87	 -	 _	 -146.7
	 56.6
Preference change
effect 1977-87	 -	 _	 -	 -140.9
Residual	 -69.7	 15.4	 41.9	 -21.5
Consumption 1964/1987
	
1825	 287	 1859	 190
Change in consumption	 -267	 96	 -319	 -28
Direct anti-smoking	 1
publicity effect
	
-119.9	 -	 -146.7	 _
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cigarettes to pipe tobacco economical and dramatically
reduces the effectiveness of pricing policy. The anti-smoking
publicity seems to have depressed cigarette consumption, but
boosted the consumption of pipe tobacco. Assuming that the
observed shifts in pipe tobacco demand reflect the net effect
of huge increases in cigarette prices over other effects we
may credit the fall in cigarette demand to the direct effects
of anti-smoking publicity, and the rise in the demand for
pipe tobacco to increases in the cigarette price. Hence the
anti-smoking publicity appears to have reduced cigarette
demand temporarily by 119.9 cigarettes in 1964 and
permanently by 146.7 cigarettes in 1976-87. The corresponding
mean annual decline in cigarette consumption was 12.2
cigarettes in 1975-87. This gives only a minimum estimate of
the overall publicity effect as the cross-price effect
dominated the demand for pipe tobacco, thus concealing the
magnitude of the direct publicity effect in this case.
The results imply that price measures were about three times
more effective than publicity in deterring cigarette
consumption in 1975-87, whereas the reverse is true for 1964,
when anti-smoking publicity was more effective than the price
of cigarettes. As the huge price increases can be interpreted
by smokers as a final trigger to give up smoking the overall
publicity effect may be larger than our results suggest.
The results in Table 23 highlight the importance of income in
determining the demand for tobacco. The growth in real
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disposable income in 1975-87 eliminated about 56 per cent of
the fall in cigarette consumption induced by price measures.
Income growth was almost twice as effective in boosting
cigarette consumption as was anti-smoking publicity in
deterring it. The growth in real income compensated for 43
per cent of the reduction in cigarette consumption induced by
the price measures and anti-smoking publicity during 1975-87.
-
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8 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The main findings of this study are summarized in Figure 8.
Our investigation of the demand for tobacco products in
Finland leads to nine main conclusions:
(1) The price of tobacco products, in particular of
cigarettes, is the most important determinant of demand.
Cigarette price elasticity is -0.49 with respect to
increasing prices and -0.94 with respect to falling prices.
The own-price elasticity of pipe tobacco is approximately -
0.60 and the elasticity of demand with respect to cigarette
price about +2.14. The short-run cigar price elasticity is -
1.70 and the long run elasticity -0.90. The results imply
that increasing the price of cigarettes and pipe tobacco
appears to be more effective in discouraging smoking than
earlier studies have suggested.
(2) Because of the relatively low price elasticities the
real price of cigarettes and pipe tobacco must be raised
considerably in order to cut down consumption substantially.
As the elasticity estimates reflect only small changes in
respective variables, the same estimates cannot, a priori, be
assumed to hold for large changes. Our results showed,
-
however, that though elasticities may have altered as a
result of major price increases, changes in them have been
very small indeed indicating that the price elasticities have
remained rather stable over time. Thus we feel the elasticity
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estimates can be used to approximate the effects of non-
marginal changes in prices as well.
(3) The most important finding of this study is that the
demand for cigarettes responds asymmetrically to changes in
its price. An obvious policy implication is to index-link the
price of cigarettes in order to prevent the cigarette markets
from expanding further. This would discourage young smokers
in particular from starting to smoke, or would postpone them
starting. Such indexing would not decrease the welfare of
current smokers, yet it would have favourable effects on the
incidence of smoking related diseases in the long run.
(4) Indexing would not be sufficient however, because the
demand for cigarettes is also influenced by real disposable
income. The income elasticity is +0.45. Although rather low,
this elasticity estimate does imply that, to be effective,
price increases should also allow for the anticipated growth
in real income. Thus price increases aimed only at keeping
pace with inflation would allow cigarette consumption to
increase. In order to stabilize per capita consumption of
cigarettes the price of cigarettes should be raised annually
by a percentage which equals the anticipated rate of
inflation plus the anticipated growth in real disposable
income. The demand for other tobacco products does not
respond to changes in real disposable income.
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(5) The fact that pipe tobacco is a substitute for
manufactured cigarettes must be taken into account in tobacco
pricing policy. A substantial increase in the price of
cigarettes will lead to some cigarette smokers switching to
cheaper, hand-rolled cigarettes. This reduces the
effectiveness of taxation in deterring smoking if it is not
controlled for. Our estimating equations imply that if the
price of cigarettes and pipe tobacco is increased by the same
percentage, about half of the fall in per capita consumption
of cigarettes will be taken up by the increase in consumption
of hand-rolled cigarettes.' Assuming the price increases do
not change the prevailing parameter estimates, the pipe
tobacco equation implies that increasing the real price of
pipe tobacco about three and half times more than the price
of manufactured cigarettes would prevent the substitution
effect .2
When the price of pipe tobacco approaches the price of
cigarettes substitution is likely to vanish and the demand
for pipe tobacco will decrease. If the real price of all
tobacco products is raised at the same time it would seem
possible both to reduce demand and alter the consumption
1 From AVQ, = bi ( ALIP.) and A.Qpt/Qpt = b2 (ATIPs) we
get AL.(4 t/A44 . (b 2/b,) (Qpt/Qs), where b2 = 2.144 and bl =
-.493 as in Table 22 and Q. = 1798 and Qpt = 198 in 1987
(Tilastokeskus 1988).
2 From A.%Qpt = e*42%ps + e*26Appt = 0 follows 6AP2tiMP5 =
-e*de*2 , where e*/ = 2.144 and e*2 = - . 599 as in Table 22.
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structure in a more favourable direction. Then it would be
possible, as McGuinness and Cowling (1975) argue, for the
price elasticity of total consumption to increase and the
effectiveness of price measures to improve. Given the
addictive nature of tobacco, however, we would expect that
after a certain point the effectiveness would again diminish,
as the huge increases reduce the smoking population to more
'hard core' smokers, who, due to addiction, would presumably
be less sensitive to price increases than light smokers.
(6) Substantial price icnreases may not be politically
feasible for three reasons. Firstly, tobacco is a
considerable source of government revenue; dramatic
reductions in demand may have an adverse effect on
government's finances. However, the estimated low price
elasticities imply that there is ample scope for increasing
tax revenue by rising the rates of duty. As the proportion of
excise duty in the retail price rises, the government's
ability to increase its revenue will be reduced. Due to
prevailing low elasticities, however, prices can be raised
considerably before this point of diminishing returns is
reached.•
1 Assuming for simplicity that all revenue from tobacco
is raised through an excise duty, then TR = tQ, where TR =
tax revenue, t = tax per unit, and Q = the total quantity of
tobacco products purchased per period. Then aTR/at = Q +
t(aQ/ap)(dp/dt) and assuming that the tax is completely
passed to the consumer, the elasticity of TR with respect to
t is given by (I) = 1 + (t/p)e, where e is the uncompensated
own price elasticity. Thus, in general, for (I). to be positive
p/t must be greater than -e.
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Secondly, increases in the price of tobacco and other
products which are set by the government are widely
interpreted to reflect its expectations of inflation.
Moreover, changes in these prices do actually affect the
general rate of inflation. If price increases are justified
by health objectives, the inflation expectation argument can
be relaxed. The actual impact of price rises on the inflation
rate (measured as a change in the consumer price index) can
be estimated directly by employing the known weighting
structure of the consumer price index.
In the case of pipe tobacco, the elasticity of tax revenue
depends both on the own-price elasticity and cross
elasticity. The elasticity of TR with respect to pipe tobacco
tax rate is given by the above formula, and the elasticity of
TR with respect to the cigarette tax rate is given by (0, =
(ta/ps )ept. „ where subscript s refers to cigarettes, and ept.,
is the uncompensated cross-price elasticity. Thus, as long as
the cross elasticity is positive and p/t is greater than -e,
4 will be positive for pipe tobacco.
2 While the price elasticities have a crucial role to
play in determining the elasticty of tax revenue with respect
to tax rate, our estimates imply ample scope for increasing
tax revenue by raising the rates of duty since the products
of these elasticities and the proportion of tax in the final
price is less than unity for cigarettes and pipe tobacco.
In the case of cigarettes, tax accounts for about 70 per cent
of total price. Therefore, as long as the magnitude of the
price elasticity is less than 1.4, an increase in tax rate
will increase excise revenue. In the case of pipe tobacco,
taxes amount to about 55 per cent of the final price,
therefore as long as the cross elasticity remains positive
and the own-price elasticity is less than 2, the result is
the same. It is, of course, true that as the proportion of t
in the final price increases, the government's ability to
increase its revenue will be reduced, i.e. (0 falls, but due
to prevailing low elasticities, prices can be raised
considerably before a point of diminishing returns is
reached.
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Thirdly, smoking is highly related to socio-economic class.
Tobacco tax is a regressive tax; an increase in excise duty
will fall more heavily on poor than rich, assuming the same
price elasticities in all socio-economic groups. When prices
are raised by increasing taxation, compensatory changes in
other taxes or prices ought to be made for the poor. Given
the positive income elasticity for cigarettes, this would
reduce the effectiveness of the price policy, yet this effect
would be only marginal as the relative changes in income
would not be substantial.
(7) The anti-smoking publicity does seem to have had a
substantial effect on per capita tobacco consumption,
although its exact magnitude was not tracable, due to the
confounding effects of huge price increases. Our results
imply that the 1964 anti-smoking publicity may have caused a
5.7 per cent temporary reduction in cigarette consumption and
the extensive anti-smoking debate provoked by the Tobacco Act
in 1976 publicity resulted in a 6.7 per cent permanent
reduction in the consumption. We were not able to isolate the
magnitude of the publicity effect for other tobacco products.
(8) The banning of television advertising did not seem to
_
have a direct influence on the demand. And there is some
doubt whether the total advertising ban had any significant
short-run effect either. The permanent demand impact of the
huge price increases and the anti-smoking publicity effect in
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1976 were so large that the possible marginal effect of the
ban in 1977 seem to be concealed under these, as there was no
systematic variation in the residuals left to be explained by
the ban, or any other variables.
(9) Our results show that taxation would seem to be a
powerful instrument for achieving the objectives of
restricting consumption of tobacco products and raising
government revenue. Yet taxation together with extensive
anti-smoking publicity would have a more advantageous effect
on public health than either of them used in isolation.
_
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APPENDIX:	 Derivation of the estimating equations for the
habit stock model.
The habit stock model introduced by Houthakker and Taylor
(1970) is defined by two structural equations. For cigarettes
these are the quantity demanded Q„ real price of cigarettes
P t, real disposable income Y t and a state variable St:
(1) Qt = a+ I3S, + y.Y, + TI.13,
and the state variable which relates the net change in the
psychological stock at time t to the flow of cigarette
purchases net of depreciation which is assumed to accrue at a
constant rate 6:
(2) S = Qt - 8St.
Ignoring the time subscripts and substituting (1) into (2) we
get
(3) = Q - ( 8/13 )(0 - a - TY - 1P).
Differentiating (1) with respect to time
(4) 6 . pi + .y. + TO
and substituting (3) into (4) we obtain
(5) 6 . ao + ( p _ 8)Q + yY +8yY + 1P + 61P.
A finite approximation for (5) can be derived defining
_
_
IQ = Q - Sil ,	 CD = (Q + (L1)/2.
Then	 AQ = a6 + ( p - e)d + yAY +6ii + TAP + 61.P.
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Q = 130 4- 131Q-1 4. P2AY + P2LY-1 ÷ 134P + P3LP-1
_
a.
p1
(8)
where
(9)
(10)
is equal to
(6) Q - CLI. . a8 + (p - 6)2 -1 (Q + (L I ) + yAY +6y2 -1 (Y + Y..1)
+ TiAP + 61.2 -1 (P + 13_1).
Reorganising terms in (6) we arrive at
a6	 1 + (p - 8)/2	 y(1 + 6/2)
(7) Q - 	  + 	 Q_1+ 	 AY
1 - (p - 6)12	 1 - (p - 8)/2	 1 - (p - 6)/2
6y	 141 + 6/2)	 61.
+ 	 Y_1 + 	 AP + 	
1 - (p - 6)/2	 1 - (p - 6)/2	 1 - (p - 8)/2
Denoting k = (p - 6)12 we get
a6	 1 + k
	 y(1 + 6/2)	 Sy.
Q _ 	  + -----Q_1 + 	 AY + 	 Y_1
1 - k	 1 - k
	
1 - k
	 1 - k
141 + 8/2)
	 611.
+ 	 AP + 	 13_3.
1 - k	 1 - k
Thus we have derived the estimating equation (the reduced
form of the model):
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6 -
_R
Y.
-
_
1. _
y.(1	 + 6/2)
(11) 132
1 - k
6y.
(12) 132X-
-
1 - k
11(1 + 6/2)
(13) 13
1 - k
611.
(14) R4x-
-
1 - k
Parametres of the structural form (1) and (2) can be derived
from the estimated coefficients of the reduced form (7). From
(11) and (12) we get
),.
1 - L/2
From (10) we get
2([31 - 1)
	
X.
+
13 1 + 1	 1 - x../2
From (11) we get
213 2 (1 - L/2)
From (11) and (13) we get
2[3 3 (1 - X./2)
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and from (9)
213 0 ( 1 - L/2)
a
+ 1)
When the anti-smoking dummy variables D64 and D76S are
introduced to the model, the corresponding coefficients of
the reduced form are for D64
a18
(15) 134
1 - k
and for D76S
a28
(16) 13 5	 - 
1 - k .
From the estimated parametres (15) and (16) the following
coefficients of the structural form can be derived for D64
13 4 [ 1 - ( P - 5)/2]
al
and for D76S
a2 =
8
13 5 [1 - (13 - 8)/2]
8
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PART IV:
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
PART IV: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of the study was to examine the case for
government intervention on the tobacco markets in Finland.
The first part of the study indicated that there may exist
several market failures which could lead to an inefficient
allocation of resources. Consumption externalities, imperfect
information about the health risks, smoking dependency and
inefficient levels of prevention may lead to a situation
where free competitive tobacco markets may create external
costs to third parties and may not maximize smokers' and
nonsmokers' welfare. Therefore, if left alone, the
competitive markets may fail to lead to an efficient
allocation of resources. Thus there may be a case for the
government to intervene in tobacco markets on other than
purely paternalistic grounds.
It was shown that the choice of an appropriate method of
intervention depends on the market failure that government
wishes to remedy. If the main concern is financial
externality, prevention of addiction or an inefficient level
of prevention, then taxation, health education, restrictions
and improvements in risk technology will be appropriate. If
the government attempts to diminish caring externality then
health education, restrictions, improvements in risk
technology and subsidies will be suitable. The same measures,
excluding subsidies, are appropriate for correcting direct
consumption externalities. Market failure due to imperfect
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information may be corrected by health education and
taxation. If the government attempts to help smokers free
themselves of dependency, then improvements in risk
technology, subsidies to smokers wanting to give up and to
firms helping smokers in their endeavour will all be suitable
measures to take.
It seems indeed possible, in principle, to reduce the exter-
nal costs of smoking by taxation, health education, rest-
rictions and by changing risk technology. The social optimum
can be achieved by taxation and, in principle, by restricting
consumption, but in the latter option there will still be
external costs. The socially optimal level of consumption
cannot be attained by health education, unless the optimum is
zero, nor by changing risk technology, unless the new risk
technology completely removes the hazardous components of
tobacco.
If, in addition to reducing the external costs, the aim of
the intervention is to reach the social optimal level of
consumption then health education and changes in risk
technology ought to be combined with taxation or restriction
measures. Taxation is the only measure that will internalize
externalities. Other measures will reduce external costs, but
i
there will always be some costs to third parties.
It appeared possible to estimate the social costs of smoking,
but not feasible to determine unambiguously which proportion
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of these costs is relevant for designing policy towards
smoking. In particular, the estimated costs vary considerably
depending on which economic framework is used. A
theoretically correct economic analysis of the costs of
smoking depends on the assumptions made with regard to
dependence and information among consumers.
Our investigation of the health and economic consequences of
smoking in Finland in 1987 showed that smokers themselves pay
the major part of the estimated social costs of smoking. It
seems likely that smokers as a group pay the external costs
they generate to non-smokers and relevant institutions,
irrespective of what is assumed about addiction and awareness
about the health risks. There does not seem to be a case for
government intervention to correct for financial externality.
There does appear, however, to be a case for intervention to
correct market failures due to caring externality, imperfect
information and tobacco addiction.
Our investigation of the demand for tobacco products in
Finland indicated that the price of tobacco products, in
particular cigarettes, is the most important determinant of
demand. The demand for cigarettes appeared to respond
asymmetrically to changes in its price. The demand for
_
cigarettes was also influenced by real disposable income.
Cigarette price also affected the demand for pipe tobacco.
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Anti-smoking publicity did seem to have had a substantial
effect on per capita tobacco consumption, although its exact
magnitude was not identifiable. Our results imply that the
extensive anti-smoking debate provoked by the Tobacco Act in
1976 resulted in a 6.7 per cent permanent reduction in
cigarette consumption. It was not possible to isolate the
magnitude of the publicity effect on other tobacco products.
The study indicates that there may be a case for the
government to intervene in tobacco markets in Finland on
other than purely paternalistic grounds, and that taxing
tobacco would appear to be a particularly effective tool for
remedying market failures.
The study does not, however, give any guidance as to whether
or not the government should intervene in the end. That
decision needs to be based on overall analysis of the
marginal costs and benefits of intervention. The total social
costs of smoking as estimated in this study are clearly not
the relevant figures for that purpose.
The study indicates that smoking is not primarily an economic
problem in Finland; the main concern is with health-related
matters. Thus actions taken to reduce tobacco consumption
may be seen as one way of improving the health of the
population. The benefits of such activities need to be
evaluated primarily in health terms, such as improvements in
health-related quality of life.
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